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ABSTRACT
The Bourbon Kings of Spain worked to enhance their 
governing capabilities during the eighteenth century. They 
borrowed modem institutions such as the intendancy from 
their relatives in France, and used them to improve adminis­
tration in Spain. Charles III, on the advice of his 
enlightened ministers, began extending the reforms to Spain's 
empire in order to increase colonial revenues. Among these 
reforms was the creation of a Viceroyalty of Rio de la 
Plata in 1776. Six years later, Spanish authorities applied 
the intendancy system to the new viceroyalty. The operation 
of this new administrative unit was an experiment in 
colonial management and an attempt to strengthen Spain's 
tenuous hold on her colonies.
Francisco de Paula Sanz, the subject of this study, 
held several important positions in the Viceroyalty of Rio 
de la Plata during all but a few months of its existence. A 
brief examination of his career would therefore be helpful 
toward understanding how a Spanish colonial official 
actually dealt with local and viceregal issues, and how 
policies emerged from bureaucratic conflicts and maneuverings.
Sanz was appointed Director of the Royal Tobacco 
Monopoly for Rio de la Plata in 1777, the year after the
viceroyalty was established. He set up the machinery for 
the Monopoly in Buenos Aires and then spent three years 
traveling throughout the different provinces to establish 
branches and to inspect facilities. Following his return to 
Buenos Aires, Sanz was named Superintendent General of War 
and Finance for the viceroyalty. During his five years as 
superintendent, he clashed with his superior, the viceroy, 
over the prerogatives of their offices. This disagreement 
was one reason why the superintendency was incorporated into 
the viceroy*s office and Sanz was made Intendant Governor of 
Potosi, far to the north in Upper Peru.
Sanz arrived in the once wealthy mining town in 
December 1788. His major task there was to increase silver 
production. To accomplish this, he encouraged the adoption 
of modern methods of mining and refining and sought financial 
aid for the members of the mining community. He also 
expended great efforts to defend the mita, the system of 
forced Indian labor which benefited Potosi miners. The 
Audiencia of Charcas and its liberal Fiscal, Victorian de 
Villava, tried to malign and diminish the service in the 
1790's. But Sanz's public treatises and private maneuverings 
helped to preserve the institution for another fifteen years.
The Indendant Governor continued to work through the 
next decade to increase the yield of the Cerro Rico (Rich 
Mountain) of Potosi. He secured government loans for mine 
operators when the area was threatened by drought and the
lack of mercury. In 1809, after these crises had subsided, 
the Audiencia of Charcas deposed its president. Sanz 
organized and led an armed invasion that threatened the city 
of La Plata— the first royalist maneuver against Upper 
Peru's struggle for independence. The following year, 
radicals in Buenos Aires deposed the viceroy and set up a 
governing junta. Sanz helped to organize a defense against 
the expeditionary force that the junta sent to subdue Upper 
Peru. The rebels were victorious, and Sanz was captured and 
executed becoming one of the first casualties of Spain's 
struggle to retain its empire.
viii
ABBREVIATIONS
AGI - Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain.
AGN - Archivo General de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
ANB - Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre, Bolivia.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the 
highlights of the long career of Francisco de Paula Sanz, 
who consecutively held three different positions in the 
Spanish Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata: Director of the
Royal Tobacco Monopoly, 1777-1783; Superintendent General of 
War and Finance, 1783-1788; Intendant Governor of Potosi, 
1788-1810. The last twenty-two years in Potosi will be 
emphasized.
Sanz came to the new world during a period of 
optimism. The thirty-two-year-old Spanish official had been 
exposed to concepts of the Enlightenment, and was eager to 
serve his King in the effort to rebuild Spain's decaying 
Empire. The very creation of the viceroyalty where Sanz was 
to serve was a part of a plan by Charles III and his advisers 
to reform and improve the efficiency of the Spanish colonial 
system. These reforms and the system that they supplanted 
will be discussed early in this study in order to set the 
stage for Sanz's arrival in Buenos Aires in 1777. Important 
incidents and issues that he faced will then be described in 
chronological order. Changes in Sanz's style of responding 
to succeeding issues will show his growth and development as 
a royal official, from his first dispute with tobacco growers
x
in Paraguay to his futile effort to block invading revolu­
tionaries from entering Upper Peru.
* * * * *
Few historians today would agree with Thomas 
Carlyle's statement that "biography is the only true 
history." On the other hand, the simplifications that are 
necessary to make history intelligible often depict the 
operations of nations as the products of monolithic and 
unanimous choices by leaders and functionaries. An examina­
tion of the career of a functionary in any political system, 
however, will quickly show that these simplifications can be 
inaccurate. Tracing the development of Sanz’s bureaucratic 
modus operandi will demonstrate that the actual policies and 
practices which emerged for the viceroyalty under the 
reforming Bourbons were often syntheses of bureaucratic 
conflicts and maneuverings. The impact of Sanz and of other 
personalities on the viceregal government depended on their 
connections, skill and persistence, all of which Sanz had 
and used.
Most writers who deal with the late colonial period 
and the independence movement of Argentina and Bolivia 
mention Sanz. However, their treatment of him varies 
greatly, depending on their nationality and orientation. 
Royalist Spanish historians for example, treat Sanz as one 
of their own sacrificed to the enemy. Two such writers.
AndrSs Garcia Camba and Mariano Torrente, characterize Sanz 
as a royalist martyr and his executioners as cruel 
assassins. At the same time, Argentine historians view Sanz 
in a very different light. To Gregorio Funes and Vicente 
Fidel Ldpez, he was the corrupt and incompetent beneficiary 
of colonial nepotism who tried to obstruct their nation's 
revolutionary beginning. Bolivian authors Modesto Omiste and 
Jos6 Fellman Velarde take a less passionate view of Sanz and 
portray him as an efficient and well-liked administrator who 
unfortunately got in the way of the independence movement.
Since his career coincided almost exactly with the 
existence of the viceroyalty, Sanz is a major character in 
John Lynch's study of the intendancy system in the Rio de la 
Plata. In this work Sanz appears as a belligerent and 
embattled bureaucrat. But no study of the period emphasizes 
Sanz's entire career, and because of the diverse and con­
flicting portrayals of so important a figure in the vice­
royalty, such a study is warranted.
* * * * *
Research for this project was carried out between 
1975 and 1977. Printed documents were valuable in learning 
about Sanz's career. Transcriptions of Villava’s and Sanz's 
arguments about the Potosi mita by Ricardo Levene and Maria 
del Carmen Cortes Salinas, respectively, formed the basis 
for the chapter dealing with that dispute. The Instituto de
Investigaciones HistOricas of Potosi published documents 
dealing with the mita, some of which were written by Sanz 
and the Potosi azogueros. Eduardo Martirfi published the 
Cddigo Carolino, a law code that Sanz helped to prepare, and 
which provides some insights into his values.
Field research was carried out in Bolivia and in 
Argentina in 1975 and 1976 under the auspices of a Fulbright- 
Hays research fellowship. Some of the useful books, journals 
and newspapers consulted in South America would not have been 
available in the United States. Most of the information, 
however, was acquired from documents in the Archivo Nacional 
de Bolivia in Sucre, the Archivo de la Casa de Moneda in 
Potosi and the Archivo General de la Naci6n in Buenos Aires. 
Moreover, overland transportation between Potosi, Sucre 
(formerly La Plata) and Buenos Aires along some of the same 
roads that Sanz traveled, added another dimension to this 
study. Other sources consulted in the preparation of this 
dissertation include microfilm copies of pertinent documents 
in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville.
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Chapter X
POTOSI IN THE 18TH CENTURY: DECLINING
FORTUNES OF A BOOM TOWN
When Francisco de Paula Sanz started for Potosi in 
1788, the city had already existed for nearly two hundred 
fifty years. The name Potosi had long been known around the 
world as a synonym for great wealth because of the rich 
silver deposits there. The Cerro Rico (Rich Mountain), the 
source of most of this wealth, had come to symbolize not 
only the great profit that Spain gained from her colonies, 
but also the great suffering endured by her indigenous 
subjects to produce that profit. All mineral wealth is 
exhaustable, however, and when Potosi's last colonial 
governor arrived, the local economy, dependent for a quarter 
millennium on the intensive extraction of silver from one 
mountain, had reached its nadir. Production and population 
were low, corruption and discontent were high, and, as Sanz 
slowly made his way northward across the difficult terrain 
from Buenos Aires toward the "Imperial City of Potosi," many 
difficult tasks awaited him.
Potosi is located on the edge of the Altiplano in a 
bleak, cold region at an altitude of about 13,700 feet. The
forbidding climate was often cited as the reason why no 
Creole child survived beyond two weeks after birth in 
Potosi, until Nicolas Flores became the first in 1598, more 
than fifty years after Potosi's founding. Pedro Vicente 
Canete attributed the high incidence of infant mortality to 
poor ventilation and to the unhealthy vapors from coal 
braziers. Nevertheless, wealthy Potosi women often traveled 
to more comfortable altitudes to pass their period of 
pregnancy and to have their babies.1
The pious Bartolomfe Arzans de Orsua y Vela, a self- 
appointed chronicler of Potosi's history, stated that before 
the arrival of the Spaniards in 1545, the Indian town of 
Cantumarca was located about a quarter league from the site 
of Potosi, and that there were several other Indian towns 
nearby. Altogether, about 2,500 Indians lived in the area 
near the Cerro Rico. A short distance away, the famous 
lagoon of Tarapaya was a bathing place for the Incas. More­
over, other baths and springs existed in the area, and 
Arzans, ever attentive to the sensational or supernatural, 
noted that "The Bano de Chaqui, which is seven leagues from 
this Villa, is healing for the 'French sickness' and for 
various other ailments, but it does not help those with
Pedro Vicente Canete, Historia Flsica y Politics de 
la Provincia de Potosi, ed. Gunnar Mendoza (La Pazs 
Fundaci6n Universitaria "Simdn I. Patino," 1952), p. 32.
3internal tumors. The land at the base of the Cerro Rico 
where the town was later built was described by Arzans as 
"damp and marshy."
The precise Pedro Vicente Cafiete depicted the setting 
more exactly:
The surroundings of Potosi are, as far as the 
eye can see, completely composed of hills, mountains, 
ravines, slopes, and crevices, and although it is. 
difficult to perceive the countryside as horizontal, 
the poor quality of the soil is notable.
On all sides, one sees a cordon of extremely high 
mountains: to the southeast, those which now form
with their gorges, the basins of lakes . . .; to the 
west, other mountains forming a chain of ridges, 
extend to the southeast; to the north, those (mountains) 
which one crosses to go to Chuquisaca by a road which 
they call Laderillas (hillsides) because its narrow, 
craggy course goes along the skirt of a mountain for a 
distance of one league, until it reaches a small plain 
called el Tambillo; to the south, is the famous Cerro 
de Potosi, like a column supporting the ridge running 
from southeast to northwest. Between the Cerro and the 
mountain with the lakes,, is a large pass through which 
the road from Buenos Aires comes, touching the rim of 
the Cerro. Many believe that the Cerro is the tallest 
peak in the region, but such statements have been 
proven false by measurement.3
The Indians who lived around the Cerro Rico were 
aware of its mineral wealth, according to legend. In 
Arzans's version, the Inca Huayna Capac, en route to his 
mining centers of Ccolque, Porco, and Andaccaua, saw the 
Cerro and remarked on its size and beauty saying, "This 
mountain doubtless contains much silver." The Inca then
^Bartolom^ Arzans de Orsua y Vela, Historia de la 
Villa Imperial de Potosi, 3 vols. (Providence, Rhode Island: 
Brown University Press, 1965), 1:33-35.
^Canete, Historia Fisica, p. 7.
ordered his vassals to begin mining on the hillside.
Equipped with tools of flint and strong wood, the Indians 
obeyed. After probing to locate the lodes, they prepared to 
extract the rich ore. As they were poised to open the veins, 
they heard a loud noise that made the whole mountain shake, 
and a great voice told them, "Do not take silver from this 
mountain, because it is destined for other masters!" The 
frightened miners related the story to their king saying, 
"Potocsi,1 which means great and terrifying noise. Arzans 
gave the word another possible etyomology, citing Antonio de 
Acosta in Historia de Potosi. who wrote that it was derived 
from orcco Poctocchi, which in Quechua means, "mountain that 
sprouts silver."^
There are several slightly differing versions of the 
story of the European discovery of silver at Potosi. Again 
Arzans's is the most complete. All of the stories agree 
that an Indian shepherd named Hualca (also spelled Gualpa, 
Gualca, etc.), who was included in a repartimiento made to 
Captain Jaime Villarroel, made the initial discovery. Arzans 
wrote that Gualca, in pursuit of far-ranging llamas was 
obliged to spend the night in the marshy area that would 
become Potosi. "The night was dark and so he had to stay on 
the Cerro de 'Potocsi' since he had been guided there by 
divine providence, it was now time for humans to be given 
the silver of that rich mountain." Gunnar Mendoza, however.
^Arzans, Villa Imperial, 1:27.
states that there is evidence that the Incas had worked the 
mines in the Cerro Rico before the Spaniards had come, 
although Gualca may have been the Indian who first showed 
the silver to the Spaniards. At any rate, Gualca’s landlord 
Villarroel was told of the discovery, and made the first 
claim at Potosi in 1545.5
Other Spaniards were attracted by the news of the 
discovery, and Potosi became a boom town that stimulated the 
development of the rest of the continent. By 1559, just 
fourteen years after the discovery of silver on the mountain, 
the population had reached 50,000 (10,000 Spaniards and 
40,000 Indians). These figures represent seventy percent of 
the European population and four percent of the Indian popu­
lation of the entire territory of the Audiencia of Charcas 
which was created in that year. This sudden and large con­
centration of people created a great demand for food, tools, 
and transportation animals, but Potosi's immediate surround­
ings were too high and cold to produce sufficient food, or 
to raise livestock. This demand, therefore, immediately 
stimulated agricultural and cattle production elsewhere, 
first in the Valley of Chuquisaca, and subsequently in 
Cotagaita, Paria, and Chayanta. La Paz became an important 
commercial center and depot, supplying Potosi with potatoes 
from the Lake Titicaca region and with coca from the Yungas, 
to the north. South of Potosi, the city of TucumSn was
5Ibid.
6founded in 1565, and its first inhabitants began raising 
mules to replace llamas as beasts of burden at Potosi.
During the same period, factories were set up in La Paz and 
Chuquisaca to furnish Potosi leather goods, furniture, 
silverware and liquor.®
The legal entry ports until 1776 for the vast 
quantities of European goods consumed in Potosi were Callao 
and Arica, and they were the legal exit ports for the silver 
mined in Upper Peru. Mule trains that transported the 
exports and imports passed through La Paz, a major stopping 
place. Huari, the site of a traditional fair and Colquechaca, 
another settlement, were linked by roads to Potosi, as were 
Paria and Sicasica, important sources of Indian workers. A 
road was soon opened from Potosi to Chayanta, another
n
important source of labor.
This communications network helped the city to grow 
and prosper at a phenomenal rate. In 1611, the viceroy 
ordered that a census be taken in the city of Potosi. That 
census revealed a total population of 160,000 inhabitants, 
more than in any other city in the New World at that time. 
This figure included 76,000 Indians, 40,000 Spaniards, 38,000
O
Creoles and 6,000 Negroes.0
The ore first mined at Potosi was that found near 
the surface of the Cerro Rico. Once this surface ore was
®Josfe Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia. 3 vols.
(La Paz: Editorial "Los Amigos del Libro," 1968), 1:120-23.
^Ibid. 8Ibid.
gone, the miners bored into the sides of the mountains 
seeking continuations of the veins, and in the 1560's just 
twenty years after excavation was begun, tunnels of two 
hundred fifty yards had been dug. The Florentine miner 
Nicolas de Benino had the first adit cut into the mountain, 
320 yards long, and others were soon constructed. The 
purpose of the adits was to provide the laborers with access 
to the work areas at the inner extremities of the tunnels or 
to smaller tunnels which branched off of the main adit.
The earliest tunnels were near the peak of the cone-shaped 
mountain, because at the higher levels the distance from the 
surface to the veins was less. Further down the hillside, 
the Indians had to dig progressively longer tunnels to reach 
the ore until, during Sanz's administration, a tunnel 2,200
Q
yards long was completed.
All of the processes involved in the production of 
silver were labor-intensive. The first step, the removal of 
the ore from the mines, was done by small groups of workers. 
They walked up the mountain and entered the adits or tunnels, 
and walked back to the fronton or work area. Here, the 
barreteros (pickmen) broke off chunks of rock which were 
loaded into leather shoulder-bags called botas, and these 
were carried by apirios who then made their way to the
9D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver 
Mining: Mexico and Peru," Hispanic American Historical
Review, LII:4 (November, 1972), 551.
8surface, aided where necessary by rickety wooden ladders.^ 
Next the ore was transported in like manner down the 
mountainside to be refined. During the first years after the 
discovery of Potosi, most of the refining was done by Indians 
(hired by the Spanish) who used the primitive methods of 
their ancestors. This was possible because the first ore 
mined was relatively free of impurities. The rocks taken 
from the mines were first ground up in marays or basic 
mortars made of stone. The pulverized ore was then heated in 
a wind furnace called a quaira which burned straw or llama 
dung. Since the silver and the impurities melted at dif­
ferent temperatures, they could be separated. This method 
of refining rapidly became inadequate as the high-grade ores
were depleted, so that by the 1560's a severe decline in
11production was apparent.
When the Cerro Rico was discovered in 1545 mine 
owners were able to attract an abundant work force by 
offering a salary of nine pesos per six-day week. The free 
laborers who worked in the mines at that time were called 
mingados. and for the first twenty years after the discovery 
of Potosi, they remained the only source of labor. Exhaus­
tion of the richer veins near the surface, however, forced
lOcanete, Historia Fisica. p. 165.
1^-Eduardo Martir6, El CQdigo Carolino de Ordenanzas 
Reales de las minas de Potosi, y demas provineias del Rxo 
de la Plata (1794) de Pedro Vicente Can.ete (Buenos Aires: 
Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 14.
the mineowners to hire more workers in order to dig deeper 
into the hillsides, and to refine poorer quality ores. The 
entrepreneurs saw their profits begin to shrink and they 
reacted by lowering the weekly salary of the workers from 
nine to seven pesos. This measure exacerbated the problem by 
causing workers to leave Potosi. The mine owners then 
appealed to the authorities, declaring that they would not 
be able to continue their production if some effective form 
of help were not forthcoming.
Abuses in the mita service became apparent as the 
rich ore from the mountain was depleted and it became neces­
sary to search at greater depths. This concerned the Crown 
and royal functionaries, especially when the deputy from the 
Silver Amalgamators1 Guild (members of which were later 
called azoqueros) conveyed the needs of the mining center to 
the viceroy in 1561, making it known that the mining industry 
had greatly deteriorated and diminished because of poor 
government and incorrect mining techniques.
Partly in response to this appeal and also to carry 
out orders from Philip II, the energetic and progressive 
Viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo (1569-81), set out in 
October, 1572, on a five-year inspection tour. Early in 
1572, while Toledo was in Cuzco, he was approached by Pedro 
FernSndez de Velasco who offered to show him how mercury was
^Alberto Crespo Rodas, "La Mita de Potosi, " 
Revista HistOrica (Lima), XXII (1955-56), 178.
10
used to extract silver from the ore, a process invented in
New Spain and known as the "patio process. ” Fem&ndez de
Velasco ground up silver ore, induced amalgamation with
T ^quicksilver, and produced fine white silver. This process 
was adopted for Potosi and consequently, production increased 
rapidly at the mining center (see production graph).
Refiners could not utilize ore which had been thrown on the 
slag heap earlier because of its poor quality. The techno­
logical advantage of mercury amalgamation stimulated new 
activity in and around the Cerro Rico, but it also raised 
the costs of mineral production even higher. More Indians 
had to be hired to attend the process, and the expensive 
mercury had to be transported to Potosi from distant 
Huancavelica.
The mine owners again turned to Toledo for assistance, 
and the Viceroy visited Potosi for three months in late 
1572, and early 1573, to observe the problem firsthand. He 
was greeted with an opulent celebration, but quickly turned 
his attention to investigating the operations there. He 
found corruption and disorganization in the royal exchequer, 
and later he remarked on the deplorable state of the mines, 
particularly the lack of safety precautions.
Toledo was also aware of the deep concern often 
expressed by the Crown for the welfare of Indian subjects.
13Arthur Franklin Zimmerman, Francisco de Toledo, 
Fifth Viceroy of Peru, 1569-1581 (New York: Greenwood Press,
1968), p. 131.
Graph I
Estimated Potosi Silver Production, 1550-1810 
(millions of pesos)
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ANB, Rucik 256.
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As early as 1512 Diego Columbus was charged, in the Laws of 
Burgos, with removing Indians from native villages to Spanish 
settlements
. . . with the least possible harm to said chiefs and 
Indians, to this end encouraging them with praise and 
[we] command them most earnestly to do this with care,, 
fidelity, and diligence, with greater regard for the 
good treatment and conservation of said Indians than 
for any other respect, desire or interest.
King Ferdinand the Catholic went on to specify that Indians
engaged in mining should work for five months of the year
only, and that after this period, they should rest for forty
days. Ferdinand's grandson, the Emperor Charles V, during
whose reign Potosi was discovered, was equally concerned with
the treatment of the Indian. The New Laws, promulgated by
him in 1541, stated:
Whereas one of the most important things in which 
the Audiencias are to serve us is in taking very special 
care of the good treatment of the Indians, and the pre­
servation of them. We command that the said Audiencias 
enquire continually into the excesses or ill-treatment 
which are or shall be done to them by governors or 
private persons . . . [and that] the Audiencias take 
special care that they [Indians] be not laden or in 
case that in some parts, this cannot be avoided, that 
it be in such a manner that no risk of life, health, 
and preservation of the said Indians may ensue from an 
inordinate burthen; and that against their own will and 
without their being paid, in no case be it permitted 
that they be laden, punishing very severely him who 
shall act contrary to this.l*
Although mining silver and gold was known to the 
Indians before the arrival of the Spaniards, they did not
i^Lewis Hanke, ed.. History of Latin American Civili­
zation: Sources and Interpretations, 2 vols. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1973), 1:138.
15Ibid.
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place nearly as high a value on the metals as did the 
Europeans. Traditionally they had been farmers, and many 
resisted leaving their farms for the mines, especially after 
the wage was lowered from nine to seven pesos. When Toledo 
arrived in Potosi, the mine owners pointed out this resis­
tance to him and called it laziness, requesting that he 
establish a coercive labor system. They indicated that in 
order to sustain and improve silver production, at least 
4,500 workers would be needed in addition to the voluntary 
workers already in Potosi. Toledo favored providing the 
mine owners with the workers they had requested, but he was 
faced with the royal constraints already mentioned. He had 
to establish a system that would provide an adequate labor 
supply for the mines of Potosi, one that guaranteed fair 
wages and prohibited abuse of the workers. The system that 
he ultimately devised was called the mita (from a Quechua 
word meaning shift or turn), and it was based on the strict 
control the Incas had over their vassals. The paternal Xnca 
state had been concerned with the welfare of its subjects, 
but at the same time, it had been oppressive and rigorous.
To obtain what was desired from the vassals, the Incas had 
demanded large contributions in labor and in kind. Proponents 
of the Toledan System often pointed to this fact, calling
1 / r
the new system more humane than its predecessor.4-0
To obtain the required number of workers, it was
• ^ Z i m m e r m a n ,  Francisco de Toledo, p. 195.
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necessary to bring Indians from parts of the area between 
Cuzco to the north and Tarij a to the south? from the Pacific 
coast to the Amazon lowlands. But within this area there 
were lowland zones with tropical climates# and it was believed 
that the inhabitants of these regions should be excluded from 
the labor contribution so that they would not have to undergo 
the brusque change of climate entailed in the move to
Potosi. Therefore, sixteen provinces were obligated to con-
17tribute mitayos or mita workers, and fourteen others were 
exempted because of their climatic conditions.
There were approximately 95,000 eligible Indians in 
the subject provinces when the mita was begun# but only 4,500 
were needed at a time. In order to lessen the work respon­
sibility of each Indian, only one-seventh of the full 95,000 
or about 13*500 Indians actually went to Potosi at any given 
time, and each seventh was supposed to serve for one year.
The mine owners were to pay the travel expenses of the 
mitayos to Potosi. Actual expenses for workers from the more
distant provinces could exceed nine pesos, but owners were
18required to pay only five pesos.
Once the workers had arrived in Potosi# they began a 
three-week work cycle, with a third (4,500) working in the 
mines and refineries, while the remaining two-thirds (9,000) 
either rested or hired themselves out as mingados. After
17Canete, Historia Fisica. p. 151. 
•^ ■Qlbid.
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the 13,500 mitayos had spent one year in Potosi, they were 
free to return to their homes and to stay there for the next 
six years, or they could stay in Potosi as minqados. Only 
men between the ages of eighteen and fifty were subject to 
the mita, so that no Indian would have to go to Potosi more 
than three or four times, and once there, he would have to 
work only one week out of three.
Furthermore, in accordance with Emperor Charles V's 
decree of December 25, 1551, the viceroy ordered that the 
mitayos be paid in bars of assayed silver from the mines, 
and if this were not available, unassayed silver could be 
substituted. In Potosi, the mitayos1 salary was fixed at 
three and a half reales per day for labor in the mines. 
Indians who ground the ore or who worked in the smelters 
were to receive three reales, and all other mita workers got 
two and three-fourths reales per day. Mita workers were to
i q
be paid in advance every week. The day of payment was 
later fixed as Monday to prevent weekend debauchery.
The differential between what volunteer workers were 
paid before the mita was established; i.e., nine pesos (72 
reales) per week (about 13 per day) and later seven pesos 
(56 reales) per week (about 10 reales per day) versus three 
and a half reales per day under the mita, clearly indicates 
that the mita workers were paid less than the full market 
value of their labor. Most of these workers went to Potosi
•^Zimmerman, Francisco de Toledo, p. 184.
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only because they were compelled to do so. The mita, there­
fore, was a kind of government subsidy in the form of 
artificially cheap labor awarded to the mine owners to help 
sustain their production.
The mita created a situation in which to abuse the 
Indians was both easy and profitable. The greed of the 
Potosi miners was insatiable; and the ignorance and lack of 
organization of the Indians, as well as the remoteness of the
mining regions from metropolitan centers of authority,
allowed that greed to be exercised. That abuses were common 
can be shown by the repeated efforts of the Crown, and
occasionally of viceroys, to prevent them. Philip II, on
January 10, 1589, ordered that the Indians be worked 
moderately, and that their health be maintained. Concerned 
about fairness in the payment of Indians' wages, he decreed 
five years later that daily wages should be "competent and in 
proportion to the Indians’ work." He also ruled that the 
mine owners should pay the Indians' transportation costs to 
and from Potosi, and that royal officials should see that 
these expenses were paid. Philip charged the town justices 
(justicias del pueblo) with accompanying the mitayos to the 
work site and with defending their interests in any dispute 
over wages. The same law was issued twice more by Philip III, 
and again by Philip IV. In 1620, Philip III described and 
forbade an abuse that was to continue after his reign:
Many Indians assigned to work in the mines do not 
work in them because the mine owners to whom they have 
been assigned release the Indians from the responsibility,
17
and each week, the owners collect a certain amount 
of money [from the royal treasury] for each Indian 
they have excused, saying that with this money, they 
will hire other workers: and although it is true
that some actually do this, it is more common that 
these mine owners simply keep the money, and there 
is no one to work, so that Our Royal Fifths diminish:
We order the viceroys and Audiencias to proceed 
against those delinquent in this manner, not only 
depriving them of the use of Indian laborers, but also 
punishing them corporally and fining them.20
Viceroy Conde de Lemos made vigorous efforts to end 
abuses of the mita. Arriving in Peru in 1667, he began by 
re-establishing work days lasting from "sun to sun." This 
permitted the Indians to come down from the Cerro Rico 
after work and sleep in their houses, instead of remaining 
in the shafts. "It is not silver that is sent to Spain," he 
wrote to the King, "but the sweat and blood of the Indians." 
He also ordered the abolition of the practice of allowing 
Indians to pay money instead of serving in the mita. His 
assessment of the situation in 1669 was bleak: "The Indians
have been gravely hurt and oppressed, settlements failing, 
work periods not adhered to, their occupation reduced to 
slavery." The death of Conde de Lemos two years later 
weakened the enforcement of his reforms, and cleared the way 
for the immediate return of wrongdoings.21
Abuses of the mita system continued and increased in 
the 18th Century, and the rule prohibiting night work was 
disregarded, canete described a night's work in the mines
20Recopilaci6n de las leyes de los reinos. de las 
Indias {Madrid, 1791).
21Crespo Rodas, "La Mita de Potosi," p. 181.
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in the late 1700's:
One bad night in the mines is enough to break 
even a robust and healthy man. But for these 
wretches {the mitayos) all nights are bad. Over­
loaded with ore, they ascend and descend from caverns 
filled with horror and danger, and which resemble 
chambers of demons. The mineral vapors cause harm 
and combined with the abrupt temperature change 
incurred when the sweat-soaked Indians leave the hot 
mines for the freezing climate outside, they make the 
workers look like dead bodies. Their morning rest 
period consists of breaking up the ore they have 
removed during the night, twenty or thirty bagsfull, 
weighing about four arrobas each.22
During Sana's administration, an article appeared in 
the Mercurio Peruano which described conscription for the 
mita:
The Indians who go to the mines of Potosi depart 
from their villages somewhat desconsolate, for they 
know quite well that they may contract in the mines 
asthma or choco. which may quickly prove fatal.
Their day of departure is extremely sad: the con­
scripts parade before the priest who awaits them at 
the church door holding a cross. He blesses them 
with the customary prayers; then he says Mass, for 
which they pay, in order to ask the Almighty for a 
happy end to their journey. Afterwards, they go out 
to the square accompanied by their priest, relations 
and friends? and amidst mutual embraces and tears, 
they bid farewell, and followed by their children and 
wives, they sadly take the road. The grimness and 
melancholy of this scene is increased by the beating 
of drums, and the sound of church bells tolling for 
prayers.23
The mita then, was a system that was established soon 
after the founding of Potosi, to provide the mine owners with 
cheap labor. Viceroy Toledo based the mita on Inca
^ C a n e t e ,  Hi3toria Fisica. p. 167.
23John Lynch, Spanish-Colonial Administration, 1782 
1810. The Intendant System in the Vicerovalty of the Rio de 
la Plata (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 178.
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antecedents, and it was designed to have as few disruptive 
effects as possible on the individual Indians or on the 
native communities by limiting the time each Indian was to 
work and by subjecting only a seventh of the population of 
the subject provinces to the service at any given time.
Avarice and the corruption of royal officials, however, 
nullified the mitigating provisions of the mita and the 
service in actual practice degenerated into the kidnapping 
and enslavement of the Indians who could not pay the cor- 
regidores to exempt them.
Silver production in Potosi began to decline again 
when other mines were discovered, particularly after 1640.
It continued to decline steadily throughout the eighteenth 
century, despite desperate efforts to improve the methods by 
which the silver was exploited. Mining technology did not 
progress, and remained linked to the patio process for 
refining metals, which by the 1700's was uneconomical and 
rudimentary compared with more recently developed European 
techniques. Moreover, because subterranean archetecture was 
not adequate, mines were virtual caverns where faulty drain­
age and the lack of air in the galleries hampered and 
endangered the workers.
By 1779, the situation had worsened and Visitador 
Jorge Escobedo wrote to Jos6 de Galvez that the mining center 
suffered great poverty, "as much because the mines are flooded
Z^Martird, El Cddigo Carolino, p. 21.
as because of the ignorance of those who instruct in the art 
of mining." More outlandish efforts to increase production 
included attempts to locate the "source of silver," a large 
deposit of rich ore thought to exist within the mountain, 
but Canete ruefully wrote in 1797, "We should not hope to 
strike the source of silver which some believe to be hidden 
within the Cerro. because if it were there, some signs of it 
would have appeared already." He concluded that with 
excavations going down more than 700 varas. and with so many 
tunnels that "they cross each other like holes in a sponge," 
it should have been discovered. Furthermore, in addition to 
legitimate miners, cajchas— thieves more or less tolerated 
by the government— criss-crossed the tunnels, and neither 
they nor the established miners found any traces of the
O  C
imagined wealth.
Despite such wishful thinking, mining in Alto Peru 
never returned to what it had been during the great days of 
Viceroy Toledo. Between 1585 and 1624, an average of
1,700,000 pesos was produced annually at the Cerro Rico de 
Potosi. From 1600 to 1735, production fell steadily,2® and 
by the mid-eighteenth century, the Mountain was producing 
only about 250,000 pesos per year.27
25canete, Historica Fisica, p. 64.
2®Peter J. Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production 
in the Potosi District, 1550-1735," Jahrbuch Fur Geschichte 
von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, XII 
(1975), 86.
27Martir6, El COdigo Carolino, p. 21.
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Potosi's population dwindled along with her silver 
production. Where 160,000 inhabitants had lived in the 
1600's, only about 25,000 remained in the late 1700's.2®
The Indian population fell more noticeably than did the 
European population, creating severe labor shortages. The
15,000 mitayos originally assigned to work at Potosi were 
reduced to 3,500 by the early 1770's.^ In an officxal 
report dated March 31, 1788, Governor Juan del Pino Manrique 
stated that there was such confusion and disorder in the 
provinces that officials sometimes failed to send the proper 
list with the assigned mitayos, and often did not even com­
plete their quotas of Indians. He warned that if these 
defects were not "cut off at the roots," they would reduce 
the mita to a state of "irreparable decadence." Pino 
Manrique recommended that officials in each partido (province) 
send their full quotas immediately, under the supervision of 
qualified and well-paid captains, who would assume respon­
sibility for delivering the Indians to Potosi.2®
Manuel de Balvas, capitan mayor de la mita de Potosi. 
informed Pino in an official report that same year that "the 
Cerro Rico has suffered since the year of the revolutions
28canete, Historia Flsica, pp. 26-27.
29Alonso Carrion de la Vandera [Concolorcorvo], El 
Lazarillo de Ciegos Caminantes (Lima: 1773; reprint ed., 
Madrid: Ediciones Atl&s, 1959), p. 341.
30pino Manrique to Audiencia of Charcas^"sobre los 
vicios y defectos que la mita padece desde el ano de la 
rebelidn general de 1780," Potosi, March 31, 1788, ANB, 
Minas vol. 129.
from vices and defects which harm the public and the Royal 
Revenue."^1 These "vices and defects" included failure of 
some of the provinces to send their full allotments of 
workers, and the appointment of uncultured poor men as 
capitanes enteradores (officials who transported and cared 
for the workers during the journey to Potosi). Finally, he 
complained about provinces that permitted Indians to sub­
stitute payments for service in the mines, saying that the 
mine owners, being satisfied with these payments, did not 
work their holdings.
Balvas called the mita the principal support of the 
happiness of the state, without which mining could not 
progress, and he warned that unless the aforementioned 
wrongs were corrected, mining would become so decadent that 
it could never be re-established. He concluded that the 
Indians were showing "more and more independence, " and that 
unless action were taken, another civil war would ensue.^
The response of the Indians themselves to the forced 
labor system included several ways of avoiding it. Those 
threatened with the mita often paid the azoquero instead of 
serving. This was expensive, because the mitayo had to pay 
the mine owner enough to hire a minqado to replace him, which
3lBalvas was referring to the year 1780, when a
general Indian uprising led by Tupac Amaru and the Catari 
brothers devastated much of Upper Peru (see below).
33Balvas to Intendant Governor Galvez y Valenzuela 
of Chuquisaca, Potosi, February 26, 1788, ANB, Minas vol. 129.
33ibid.
23
necessarily cost considerably more than a mitayo would earn. 
Another response of the natives was simply to run away to a 
province that was exempt from the mita. Because of exten­
sive flight, the population of the subject provinces dropped 
drastically. As early as 1612, the President of the 
Audiencia of Charcas complained about the depopulation of 
the sixteen provinces subject to the mita. In order to make 
up the deficiency of available workers, the time cycle for 
serving in Potosi was reduced in 1620 from seven to two 
years, and once the workers were in Potosi, their rest period 
was reduced from two weeks to one. In 1628 an oidor of the 
Audiencia of Charcas, after a visita to the obligated 
provinces, wrote that two-thirds of the Indians attributed to 
the towns by the census were missing. Depopulation was even 
more evident in the eighteenth century.^
Another escape measure taken by some Indians was to 
enter the service of an hacienda as a yanacona or tied 
laborer. Yanaconas were exempt from mita service. In spite 
of these occurrences, the villages were still required to 
supply the same number of mitayos, or at least as many workers 
as possible. Pino Manrique blamed these difficulties on the 
bad treatment that the mitayos received despite his own 
efforts and the many laws protecting them. He noted that 
Indians were overworked by the mine owners, and as a result,
OC
many were becoming sick.
^Crespo Rodas, "La Mita de Potosi," p. 179.
35Ibid.
24
Indian resistance to the mita sometimes resulted in 
direct action. On several occasions during the Colonial 
Period, there were armed uprisings, specifically against 
forced labor. In the second half of the eighteenth century, 
for example, Juan Santos led a fourteen-year rebellion, an 
uprising occurred in Arequipa when a customshouse was 
established, and a serious conspiracy was discovered in 
Cuzco.
By far the most serious and best-organized Indian 
uprising in Spain’s colonies occurred between 1780 and 1783, 
and it affected much of the South American continent. Jos£ 
Gabriel Tupac Amaru, a cultured Indian of high birth, and a 
native of the Peruvian town of Tinta, sparked the smoulder­
ing resentment into open rebellion in 1780, and served as 
the leader of the movement during its early months. Jos£ 
Gabriel, himself a cacique who governed the Indians and 
collected their tribute payments, was frustrated in his 
efforts during the 1700's to be declared the rightful 
Marqu6s de Oropesa by the Audiencia of Lima. While in Lima, 
in 1777, he also presented petitions to the viceroy asking 
for relief from the mita for his own cacique ship and for 
several others nearby, saying that providing workers for the 
mines depopulated the region and created hardship. He asked 
that the viceroy enforce the many mitigating laws that 
applied to the mita, to end the maltreatment of the Indians. 
The superintendent of the mita in Potosi denied any wrong-
25
doing, and Tupac Amaru's humanitarian efforts were also 
blocked.^
In 1780, while Tupac Amaru was awaiting the outcome 
of his litigations, a dispute arose between the bishop of 
Cuzco, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, and the Corregidor of 
Tinta, Antonio de Arriaga, over the treatment of Indians. 
Arriaga was reportedly cruel in his dealings with the natives, 
and Jos6 Gabriel and his followers, frustrated in their 
attempts to achieve better treatment for the Indians within 
the legal system, captured the corregidor and executed him.
The uprising quickly spread to other parts of Peru and into 
the new Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata.
A separate but strikingly similar rebellion was in 
the making in Chayanta province, adjacent to Potosi, and a 
source of many mita workers. Tomas Catari, the instigator 
in Chayanta, was also a high-spirited Indian who sought 
redress in the Spanish courts for his grievances. He was an 
enemy of the cacique of his village, Macha, and accused him 
of dishonest collection of tribute. Presenting his case in 
Potosi, Catari won the right to collect tribute himself, but 
when he showed the order to the corregidor of Macha, it was 
disregarded, and Catari was imprisoned. When he was released, 
Tom&s journeyed to Buenos Aires to present his case to the 
Viceroy, who ordered that he be reinstated as tribute col­
lector. Returning to Macha, Catari began to collect the
Estelle Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), pp. 28-52.
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tribute, but was soon arrested by the unusually corrupt 
corregidor Joaquin Aids. Supporters of Catari freed him and 
he went to La Plata to ask for help from the audiencia, but 
was arrested a third time, sparking his followers to rebel 
openly. TomAs ’ s brother Dclmaso led the Indians who surrounded 
Aids's house and forced Tomds 1 s release. The Indians then 
killed many Europeans in Macha, respecting only priests.
During his freedom, TomAs Catari declared the 
tribute decreased, and the mita and repartimiento and other 
taxes extinguished. Word traveled quickly and the Cataris 
gained many supporters. The brothers knew of the activity 
of Tupac Amaru to the west and north, but it is uncertain 
whether the two groups communicated. The insurrection spread 
throughout Peru and the northern part of the Viceroyalty of 
Rio de la Plata. The cruel execution of Tupac Amaru in 
Cuzco, and the death in battle of TomAs Catari served only 
to solidify the rebels, and to gain them more adherents, 
among them, opportunistic Creoles. In Oruro, for example, 
the Creoles conspired with the Indians to overthrow the 
Europeans, and in early 1781, all of the Europeans in that 
city were murdered and their houses were looted. Potosi 
avoided this fate only because of the preparations of 
Governor Jorge Escobedo, who mobilized and fortified the city. 
Puno, Sorata, La Plata, Cuzco and La Paz were all besieged, 
with heavy casualties. In La Paz, one-third of the popula­
tion was lost in two sieges which together lasted six 
months. The revolt was finally quelled in 1783, after much
27
death and destruction, and the flight of many of the sur­
viving Europeans.37
Upper Peru was weakened and devastated by the insur­
rection; the Indian population, vital to the generation of 
wealth, was decreased. Many of the managerial class, the 
peninsulars, were either killed during the insurrection, or 
fled to other parts of the Empire.
During the ten-year period before S anz's arrival at 
his post in Potosi, the Spanish Government made an extensive 
effort to reverse the lack of productivity caused by cor­
ruption and war. Sweeping reforms in the administration of 
the colonies had been instituted even before the rebellion 
of 1780-83, among these reforms were the creation of the 
Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata in 1776, as well as the 
installation of the intendancy system. All of these changes 
affected Potosi.
37Ibid.
Chapter XI
POTOSI AND THE BOURBON REFORMS
Spain's power had reached its zenith under Philip II 
(1556-1598), and after his reign, it began to decline.
During the next century, Spain suffered military and economic 
setbacks. In Europe, Spain lost the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Cerdana, and Rousillon. In the New World, other European 
states set up colonies in the Lesser Antilles, the English 
captured Jamaica in 1655, and buccaneers harassed Spanish 
possessions in America. Spain itself suffered a decline in 
population during the first part of the century, and since 
the 1560’s, a shortage of workers in the manufacturing 
districts had necessitated increasing dependence on imported 
manufactured goods. In rural areas, depopulation accounted 
for a drop in agricultural production. Charles II, the last 
Hapsburg king of Spain, was physically and mentally unsuited 
to rule. He reigned from 1665 until his death in 1700; and 
because of his weakness, several factions at court, including 
those with French and Austrian leanings, vied to gain influ­
ence and control, neglecting the welfare of the country.
These problems continued and worsened until 1680, 
after which date Charles il’s government made some attempts
28
to solve them. Among the steps taken was the creation of 
the post of Superintendent General of Hacienda, in 1687.
The Superintendent General was to be a kind of financial 
overseer for the kingdom, following the pattern in France. 
Four years later superintendents were established in each of 
Castile's twenty-one provinces.1 These reforms were largely 
stillborn, however, because of national and international 
concern about who would inherit the Spanish Empire once 
Charles died without heir. Although a genetic defective, 
Charles had enough wits to act to preserve his patrimony by 
bequeathing it to Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV. 
After Charles II's death, the will was contested by England 
and Holland, and the War of the Spanish Succession followed. 
The encounter terminated with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, 
and Philip of Anjou, a Bourbon, was recognized as Philip V 
of Spain.
French influence became apparent as Philip V (1700- 
1746) began his long reign. He asked Louis XIV to send an 
expert to help reform the financial administration of Spain; 
and Louis d'Orry, the man he sent, helped to shape Spanish 
economic policy. An improvement resulted as factories were 
built and nascent industries were protected. Philip took 
advantage of the relatively peaceful period to unify the 
nation. By reducing internal customs barriers, he promoted
•^ Luis Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias (Seville 
Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1959), 
p. 7.
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commerce. Greater unity was achieved by ending the special 
privileges of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, and by merging 
their recalcitrant cortes with the cortes of Castile.
Philip further centralized his control over the government 
when he followed the Bourbon policy of appointing single 
ministers to fulfill specific responsibilities rather than 
delegating authority to committees (juntas) as the Hapsburgs 
had done.
Another measure to tighten royal control over Spain 
and later over the entire Empire was the adoption of the 
intendancy system. This was a most extensive change in the 
administration of the government, and it had as its model 
the system developed in France during the first half of the 
sixteenth century. Louis XIV later made the intendants de 
justice, police, et finance his principal royal officials in 
the thirty-four generalities, or political divisions of 
France. These officials held supreme power in their dis­
tricts and helped to consolidate royal authority.
Philip V, trying to accomplish the same end in Spain, 
established the system in 1718, with an intendant in each of 
the newly created provinces to oversee the government and 
one to oversee military finances. However, the cfedula that 
established the new offices was '/ague in its delegation of 
judicial powers. Confusion over jurisdiction between the new
2John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782- 
1810, The Intendant System m  the Viceroyalty of the Rio de 
la Plata (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 2.
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intendants and the traditional officials, the corregidores, 
resulted. Clashes occurred over authority in the provinces, 
which culminated in a March 1, 1721, decree by Philip V that 
revoked the judicial powers granted in the 1718 ordinance.
The decree also reduced the responsibilities of the provin­
cial intendants to merely seeing to the orderly collection 
of taxes. In spite of this decree, Philip was dissatisfied 
with the traditional system of financial administration. 
Spanish towns suffered abuses under the system of tax farming, 
and the King wanted more control over revenue collection, 
but the system remained as it was for the rest of his reign.^
Ferdinand VI tried to make revenue collection more 
efficient by increasing the power of the intendants in 1749. 
But this time, he made sure that there would be no conflict 
with the corregidores. He abolished the office of corregidor 
in all provincial capitals and gave the intendants the power 
to exercise their functions, including their judicial 
function.
The intendant system in Spain underwent several more 
changes during the last half of the eighteenth century. In 
1766, the function of corregidor de capital de provincia was 
again separated from that of intendant, because the inten­
dants were unable to handle the workload. In 1780 and 1787, 
the Grown created provincial and local committees to ease 
the burden. In 1799 the powers of the corregidor were again
^Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias, p. 9.
shifted to the intendant. The Spanish Bourbons strengthened 
the office of intendant by adding the duties of policia to 
his functions. His duties in this area were to encourage 
and foment mining, industry, agriculture, and shipping, and 
roadbuilding. The policia duties of the intendants formed 
the basis of Spain's hopes for economic recovery.^
Meanwhile, in the colonies, administration remained 
much as it had been since the sixteenth century. Philip V, 
noting the inefficiency with which the Empire was managed, 
had toyed with the idea of imposing the new system on the 
colonies, but he had not acted. Ferdinand VI, however, had 
appointed an Intendant of the Navy and Shipbuilding in 1756 
for Havana. Later, Charles III (1759-1788), who brought 
considerable managerial talent with him to the throne, was 
also interested in reforming colonial administration. After 
the Seven Years War, on February 14, 1765, a junta of com­
mercial experts proposed several remedies to the Crown to 
improve the administration of the colonies, and to increase 
revenue collection. Their first recommendation was that 
Spanish cities other than Cadiz be granted the privilege of 
trading with America. Charles III promptly followed this 
advice, and a royal decree of October 16, 1765, opened the 
ports of Cuba, Santo Domingo, Margarita, and Trinidad to 
trade not only from Cadiz, but also from Seville, Alicante, 
Cartagena, Malaga, Barcelona, Santander, Coruna, and Gigdn.
^Ibid., p. 12.
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The King also abolished the palmeo, tonelada, and other 
duties, and he replaced them with ad valorum taxes.
Thirteen years later, the entire Empire, except for New 
Spain and Venezuela, was opened to trade with the mother 
country, and the two exceptions were included in 1789.'’
This reform met demands in Cuba for freer commerce.
The British had occupied Havana in 1762, during the Seven 
Years War, and demonstrated that with good management the 
port could handle more commerce and produce more revenue 
than it had done in the past. To help supervise the new 
arrangement in Havana, an intendancy was created in 1765.
The new intendant was given charge of treasury and war 
matters on the island, while the captain-general remained as 
political chief. The transition was smooth except for the 
reluctance of the incumbent bureaucrats to relinquish their 
control of revenue. Bourbon authorities, nevertheless, were 
sufficiently satisfied with the results of the experiment to 
be interested in extending the system to other parts of the
Empire.^
Before attempting to apply the intendancy to other
colonies, royal authorities sent Jos6 de Galvez on his now
famous visita to New Spain in 1767. Included in the visitor's
instructions was an order to
. . . ascertain . . . whether it will be useful and 
conducive to the good of my service and of my vassals
5Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 19.
6Ibid., p. 51.
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to establish one or more intendancies in New Spain 
on the same model as those of Spain, or with some 
limitations or amplifications.7
In Galvez's report to the Grown dated 1768, he decried the 
corruption and poor administration of the governors, 
corregidores, and alcaldes mavores in Mexico, and he recom­
mended that the existing system be placed by intendancies. 
High salaries for intendants, he reasoned, would attract 
better officials, and would eliminate much of the dishonesty 
practiced under the unpaid corregidores and alcaldes 
mavores.Q
Galvez's suggestions were approved, and in 1768 
Galvez and Viceroy Carlos Francisco de Croix cautiously 
began to establish the system in Mexico. Only two governors 
were given intendancy powers, and there was no general 
ordinance that formerly applied the system as there had been 
in Spain. 8
The new form of government met with opposition in 
Mexico for the same reasons it had been opposed in Spain and 
in Cuba— -it threatened the positions of established bureau­
crats. The next viceroy, Antonio Bucareli, was an able 
opponent of the new system, and through his efforts, its 
general application in Mexico was forestalled for 18 years.
7Herbert Ingram Priestley, Josfe de Galvez. Visitor- 
General of New Spain (1765-1771) (Berkeley: University of
Califomia Press, 1916) , p. 411.
8Ibid.. p. 292.
9Navarro Garcia, Intendentes en Indias, p. 25.
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After the attempt to establish the intendancy system 
to the entire viceroyalty of New Spain had met with resis­
tance, Spanish authorities created two local intendancies in 
the territory: one in Sonora and the other in California.
An intendant of Sonora, Pedro CorbalAn, was appointed in 
1771, and actually served until the general application of 
the system in 1786. An intendancy was created in California, 
but because of Galvez's illness, no one took the office 
until 1786.10
Meanwhile (1768-1783), the Portuguese were showing 
aggressiveness under Pombal, and together with their British 
allies, they were eyeing the weaker fringes of the Spanish 
Empire. Adjacent to Portuguese territory, the sprawling and 
sparsely populated Rio de la Plata was particularly vulner­
able. It was envied not only because of its value for 
livestock production, but also as a potential inroad to the 
heart of Spanish South America. To strengthen this flank,
Tom As Alvarez de Acevedo, the Fiscal of the Audiencia of 
Charcas in 1771, proposed to the Crown the creation of a new 
viceroyalty which would include the province of Cuyo (to be 
separated from the captaincy-general of Chile) and the 
districts of Paraguay, Buenos Aires, and TucumAn. Viceroy 
Manuel de Amat y Junient of Peru expressed a similar opinion 
in July, 1775, adding that a new viceroyalty would need a
10Ibid., p. 26.
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11source of revenue to succeed.
These recommendations reached Charles XIX at a time 
when he was concerned with boundary disagreements with 
Portugal, particularly in the Banda Oriental. Taking 
advantage of the distraction of the British in North America 
in 1776, Charles mounted the largest military expedition 
that Spain had thus far sent to South America to capture the 
Portuguese colony of Sacramento. Pedro Cevallos, a veteran 
soldier and former governor of Buenos Aires, headed the 
force. Cevallos convinced the king that he also would need 
political authority to be an effective military leader, and 
that in order to strengthen his position, he would need more 
resources than Buenos Aires and Paraguay contained. Cevallos 
was therefore granted the title of viceroy in 1776, and his 
jurisdiction included not only Buenos Aires and Paraguay, but 
also Tucumin, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Potosi, and the 
entire territory of the Audiencis of Charcas. At the same 
time that Cevallos was made viceroy, the quartermaster of his 
expedition, Manuel Fernandez, was given charge of the finances 
of the region. When the new viceroyalty was permanently 
incorporated in October, 1777, Fernandez was named superin­
tendent and Juan Jose Virtiz y Salcedo was named to succeed
12Cevallos as viceroy. Virtiz served from 1778 until 1784.
Cevallos, in an effort to foster economic development 
in the new viceroyalty, decreed in July, 1777, that gold and
^Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 38.
•^Ibid., p. 43.
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silver bullion could not be exported from the Viceroyalty of 
Rio de la Plata to Peru. He also authorized free trade 
between the cities of the viceroyalty. Previously, Upper 
Peruvian silver had been required to flow to Lima to pay for 
European imports and manufactures, and trade between Buenos 
Aires and Upper Peru had been illegal. Now Potosi silver 
was attracted to Buenos Aires by the lower prices of imports 
there (because of more direct shipping), and by the avail­
ability there of mules, hides and cattle. This arrangement 
was convenient for both Buenos Aires and Upper Peru: the
former could now legally get silver needed for foreign
exchange, and the latter could get imports and manufactures
13more cheaply than before.
The Viceroyalty of Peru, meanwhile, was stripped of 
over half of its territory, including its richest silver 
mines. It was left out of the stimulating and lucrative new 
trading arrangement, and its government naturally opposed 
the changes. In 1779, Viceroy Manuel Guirior of Peru wrote 
the Council of the Indies that the creation of the new vice­
royalty was a mistake because merchants and common people 
were apprehensive about property that they held within the 
boundaries of the new viceroyalty. Furthermore, he indicated 
that the division of Peru would cause rivalry over mining 
rights, and it would weaken the military strength of both
13Jose Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, 4 vols. 
(La Paz: Editorial "Los Amigos del Libro," 1968), 1:72.
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viceroy alt ies. ^  The protest from Peru was in vain, however, 
and Lima did not regain her exclusive and profitable right 
to sell imports in Upper Peru.^
Royal authorities perceived an opportunity to extend
the intendant system to the newly created Viceroyalty of Rio
de la Plata because it lacked population and an entrenched
bureaucracy to resist administrative reforms. Charles III
issued the Ordinance of Intendants for the Rio de la Plata
Viceroyalty in 1782. The document contained two hundred
seventy-six articles, a preamble, and an index. The first
eleven articles explained the new system, and the rest dealt
with each of the four administrative divisions of the
intendancy. The final article established the Ordinance as
the legal code for the entire colony and nullified any
contradictory laws made earlier. The new viceroyalty would
include eight intendancies: Buenos Aires, Ausncidn, Tucum^n,
Santa Cruz de la Sierra, La Paz, Mendoza, La Plata, and
Potosi; and three provinces: Mojos, Chiquitos, and
16Misiones. The Patagonia Coast and the Malvinas Islands 
were later incorporated into another intendancy, and juris- 
diction over the intendancy of Puno was transferred to
14Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina, trans. 
William S. Robertson (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc.,
1963), pp. 82-83.
15Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 40.
•^Ordenanza General Formada de Orden de S.M., y 
Mandada Imprimir y Publicar para el qobiemo e Ins truce i6n 
de Intendentes, Subdelegados y dem&s empleados en Indias 
(Madrid: La Imprinta de la Viuda de Ibarra, 1803).
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Buenos Aires from Lima for a short period.
Proceeding cautiously, Spanish royal authorities 
postponed formal establishment of the Ordinance in the Rio 
de la Plata area, but secretly sent copies of the Code to 
Viceroy V6rtiz and to Superintendent FemSndez, as well as 
to the President of the Audiencia of Charcas, and to the 
Governors of Potosl and other important districts in the 
viceroyalty for their opinions and suggestions. Reactions 
were positive and frank. In,a joint reply, vertiz and 
Fernandez indicated that for the reform to succeed, qualified 
men had to be appointed as intendants and subdelegates, and 
that reforms would be less abrupt and more palatable if the 
new officials retained their old title of governor. They 
also suggested that mestizos and mulattoes be exempted from 
paying tribute as Indians, since many individuals of those 
groups had resented these payments enough to join the Indian 
insurrection of 1780. V6rtiz privately expressed displeasure 
with the division of his duties and powers and with sharing 
them with the superintendent. Many of the official' s sug­
gestions were taken into account as the Ordinance was issued.
The intendant governors received their titles in November,
171783, and the superintendent remained a fixture.
The new arrangement in Upper Peru would bring funda­
mental changes to Potosi. The Ordinance declared that gold 
was now to be smelted at the Money House, and since there
-^Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, pp. 59-61.
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was no assayer in Potosi capable of the task, instructions 
had to be requested from Lima. Mindful of the recent Indian 
insurrection, the Grown, in an effort to break with the past, 
changed the name of territorial divisions from provincias to 
partidos, and substituted the title subdelegado for the hated 
offices of corregidor and alcalde mayor. But, "like the 
former officials [the subdelegados], will administer justice 
and fulfill the same obligations and duties that are partic­
ular to their districts." The subdelegates were also to be
subordinate to their intendants, and to observe the new 
18Ordinance.
The Ordinance provided for more than just a super­
ficial change of terminology. The repartimiento of goods to 
the Indians, a much-abused system by which officials compelled 
natives to buy merchandise— often unneeded and usually at 
inflated prices— was strictly prohibited. The extension of 
this prohibition to intendants, subdelegates, other royal 
employees, and even to priests, and the provision that even 
necessary goods could not be distributed in this way, 
indicates that misusage was extensive. Legitimate commerce 
was liberalized and intendants and subdelegates were to guard 
against fraud. Reemphasis of the laws protecting Indian 
welfare, however, did not mean that the natives were free to 
return to idleness. The mita was retained virtually intact, 
and "in conformity with past laws, officials shall stimulate
18Ordenanza General.
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Indians to application and industry, preferring persuasion, 
rewards and other humane means, and when these fail, the
punishments employed shall in no way deprive the natives of
19good treatment or liberty."
In Potosl, Juan del Pino Manrique, the incumbent
governor, was retained as intendant when the Ordinance was
established. Pino, an Andalusian lawyer, and career colonial
civil servant, had been appointed Governor of Potosi in 1781,
in the midst of a raging Indian insurrection. He had
fortified and prepared the mining city for an attack, and
thariks to his efforts, Potosi had avoided siege or invasion.
The next challenge he faced was to oversee the application
of the administrative reforms in Potosi beginning in 1782.
20In the secret report that Galvez had requested concerning 
the application of the Ordinance, Pino Manrique described 
the decaying state of affairs he saw in Potosi, indicated 
that reform was a proper course of action, and suggested a 
drastic change for the administration of Upper Peru.
Pino Manrique wrote that being governor of Potosi was 
like being "a minister exiled to Siberia, " because of the 
inclement weather. High prices and the remoteness of the 
place added to the discomfort. He complained about confusion 
and disorder in the region which made cheating and malfeasance 
easy to conceal. "The people lack appreciation for honest,
19Ibid.
29Pino Manrique to Galvez (Informe reservado), Potosi, 
February 16, 1783, ANB, Minas Vol. 129. The remaining quota­
tions in this chapter were taken from this report.
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regular work, and merit has lost its esteem because of 
neglect. . . . Confusion is valued since it hides the cor­
ruption, ignorance, and lack of method in business . . .  it 
[confusion] absolves the negligent and protects the corrupt."
Pino Manrique saw the Ordinance of Intendants as a 
way to improve the situation, regretting that it had not 
been proposed a hundred and fifty years earlier and that "it 
comes after disorder, confusion, and the lack of intelligence 
. . . have been allowed to proceed for so many years." He 
reasoned, "Just because something has been done for two 
hundred years is not a reason to continue erring." He wrote 
that it would be practically impossible to govern America 
with the exactness of government in Europe, but that the best 
medicine for the problem seemed to be the new Ordinance if 
applied in the correct dosage and "with the care and prudence 
that the long infirmity and the old ills of the patient 
require."
The unusual proposal that the Governor made was to 
establish the capital of the new viceroyalty not in far-away 
Buenos Aires, but in Cuzco. Cuzco would be more appropriate, 
he argued because customs, dress, ways of thinking, and 
commerce differed so much between the lowland Buenos Aires 
and Upper Peru. Cuzco, being a part of Upper Peru, was more 
suitable as the seat of government. Furthermore, Upper Peru 
terminated in Jujuy, four hundred leagues from Buenos Aires, 
and communication would always be difficult. Pino Manrique 
declared:
43
I affirm, and it can be documented, that in Buenos 
Aires, they understand nothing about Peru, and since 
the viceroyalty has been established, not one appro­
priate decision has been made there concerning Upper 
Peru. . . . They have done nothing to matriculate 
Indians [for the mital or about tribute. It is under­
standable that they never know about these things 
because those who serve in that city have no other 
Knowledge about Peru than what they can perceive from 
a distance of four hundred leagues.
Pino's suggestion to change the site of the capital 
was not followed, but he continued to serve ably in his post 
in Potosi until 1788, when he was appointed alcalde de 
crimen of the Audiencia of Lima. He later served as an oidor 
of that audiencia.
The Bourbon Reforms in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la 
Plata changed the structure of government there. It was 
recognized that the success of the effort would depend on the 
quality of the men appointed to the newly created positions. 
Pino Manrique, a hardworking and well-trained functionary 
who did not fear change, had set a high standard for Potosi's 
next intendant, Francisco de Paula Sanz.
Chapter III
SANZ BEFORE COMING TO POTOSI
Francisco de Paula Sanz y Espinosa de los Monteros 
was born in Malaga and was baptized soon afterwardr on 
July 5, 1745, in the Parroquia de los Santos Mdrtires of 
that city. His parents, Don Josd Sanz and Dona Maria 
Manuela Espinosa de los Monteros, had been married in the 
same church twelve years earlier. His legitimacy was thus 
established and was reaffirmed in his mother's will of 
December 7, 1777. According to testimony of the Escribano 
Real y del Ayuntamiento (City government) de la Villa de 
Biar, near M&laga, Sanz's family was classified as nobility 
on both sides, and they were entitled to consideration as 
“Magnificos Nobles y Caballeros Ciudadanos," a distinction 
reserved only for illustrious families. The records of the 
Ayuntamiento of Mdlaga show that on March 18, 1773, Sanz was 
listed as a noble on the rolls of that city because his 
parental grandfather had been a noble. On the same day 
Dona Maria Manuela was also ranked as being of noble lineage. 
Sanz, therefore, qualified as a noble by blood from both 
lines of kinship. His nobility made Sanz eligible for 
membership in the prestigeous Royal and Distinguished Order
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Charles III which entitled him to a pension. The documenta­
tion that Sanz presented for membership in the Order traced 
his ancestry on both sides for several generations. On 
April 23, 1780, the King awarded Sanz the Supernumerary 
Cross of the Order.1
The summary of documentation in Spain indicates that 
Sanz was descended from nobility and that he was legitimate. 
Legitimacy, however, was only a legal term, and it did not 
necessarily bear out biological facts. Under law, if a woman 
was married at the time she gave birth, her husband was the 
legal father. It is possible, therefore, that Don Jos6 Sanz 
was not Francisco de Paula's real father. A rumor persisted 
that Sanz was not only illegitimate but also that he was the 
bastard son of King Charles III. The source of this belief 
is unknown, but several authors have upheld it. Gabriel 
Rene-Moreno wrote that Sanz was "reputed to be of royal 
Blood.1,2 The earliest reference to Sanz's royal heritage, 
and perhaps the source of the rumors, is found in Francesco 
Becatini's biography of Charles III, in which he noted that 
when Charles left Naples for Spain on October 6, 1759, a 
squadron of sixteen Spanish ships carried him and his 
entourage. Charles III, his wife Maria Amalia de Saxonia,
1
Adolfo Morales, "La Discutida filiacidn del 
Goberaador de Potosi, D. Francisco de Paula Sanz," La Raz6n 
(La Paz, Bolivia), February 8, 1948, sec. 2, p. 2.
2Ibid
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and their son Charles Antonio Diego, later Charles IV,
embarked aboard the F6nix. The other children sailed aboard
the Triunfante.
On the same ship, in the care of his tutor, was 
Don Francisco de Paula, the bastard son of Charles 
III and a Neopolitan princess. This child was 
carefully educated in Madrid in the bosom of the 
royal family and was later sent to America on an 
important mission.3
The sensational story spread, especially after Sanz's 
death. During the War for Independence, a legend-clouded 
figure named Juan Huallparrimachi fought alongside Juana 
Azurduy de Padilla against the royalist regime that his 
alleged father had died defending. Huallparrimachi, born in 
Potosi in 1793, was reputed to be the fruit of an illicit 
union between Sanz and Marla Sahuaraura, an Indian woman who 
claimed to be descended from Inca royalty. The union of 
European and Indian royalty provided a rallying point to 
attract supporters to the revolutionary cause, and this was a 
possible motive for publicizing Sanz's alleged royal 
parentage,4 but Morales found no records of Huallparrimachi's 
baptism.
People sumamed Sanz in Sucre and in Potosi have 
claimed to be related to the Governor and thus to his supposed 
royal father. Sanz was married to Dona Manuela Cespedes and 
had only one daughter, Maria Josef a Sanz y C6spedes. Maria
^Francesco Becatini, Vida de Carlos III, 2 vols.
(Madrid: J. Doblado, 1790).
^Morales, "La Discutida Filiacidn," sec. 2, p. 2.
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Josefa later married royalist colonel Jos6 Ignacio del Rio, 
so Sanz left no legitimate male heir to bear his name. Con­
fusion has resulted from the fact that there was in La Plata 
another Spaniard named Francisco de Paula Sanz. This man 
left many descendants, some of whom confused their ancestor 
with the intendant Governor of nearby Potosi, and helped to 
propagate the idea of his royal filiation.'*
It is not likely that Francisco de Paula Sanz was 
actually a bastard prince of Spain. His mother and father 
had lived in the same small parish in Malaga for at least 
twelve years before his birth, and Charles III had been in 
Naples for fourteen years at the time of Sanz's birth. It is 
doubtful that Dona Maria Manuela Espinosa de Sanz would have 
left home after nearly twelve years of marriage, traveled to 
Naples, become pregnant by the King, and then hurried home to 
have her son and to baptize him in Malaga. But there is 
another reason to reject the idea that Sanz was Charles Ill's 
son, and that is the King's austere life-style and his 
celebrated devotion to his queen, Maria Amalia of Sajonia. 
Moreover, Charles III maintained a "chaste widowerhood.If 
Sanz did have such a lofty origin, he presumably could have 
found an occupation in Spain that was more comfortable and 
less dangerous than the positions he held in the Viceroyalty
5Ibid.
^Humberto Vasquez-Machicado, "Un Comentario MAs 
Sobre la Filiacidn de Paula Sanz," La Raz6n (La Paz, Bolivia), 
February 22, 1948, sec. 2, p. 1.
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of Rio de la Plata. Also, if Sanz's career in the service of 
the king had depended on Charles III, it would not have 
progressed for twenty-two years after he died, as it did.
Another rumor later circulated in Buenos Aires and
Upper Peru that Sanz was the illegitimate son of Jose de
Galvez, Minister of the Indies. vasquez -Machicado related
that Bernardo Gonzalez Arrili, an Argentine author, put forth
this idea to explain Sanz' s advancement in colonial adminis-
7
tration despite accusations of corruption and incompetence.
It also seems doubtful that Galvez was Sanz's father, because 
if this were true, Sanz probably could have gotten a more 
profitable position, and then returned to Spain for a more 
comfortable life. Moreover, Sanz's career continued for a 
generation after Galvez died in 1787.
If those who succeeded Galvez had suspected Sanz's 
honesty they certainly would not have sent him to Potosi, the 
major source of specie for the entire viceroyalty, as 
intendant governor and director of the mint. But Sanz was 
sent to Potosi the year after Galvez died, and he remained 
governor there until his own death in 1810. Nationalistic 
Argentine writers like Gonzalez Arrili, Gregorio Runes, and 
Vicente Fidel L6pez, often villified royalist officials, 
especially those like Sanz, who had actively fought against 
independence. In any case, although Sanz’s legitimacy or 
bastardy can never be irrefutably proven, it does not appear
7ibid.
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probable--judging from the information available and from the
i
events that occurred— that he was the son of either Charles 
III or of Jos6 de Galvez.
Sanz was educated in Spain and reached maturity there.
This young Andalucian nobleman saw a career opportunity
materialize suddenly in 1776, when Charles III established
the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. Hundreds of colonial
positions were created, and educated peninsulares had good
prospects of filling them because Bourbon authorities esteemed
competence and European birth. Sanz promptly made known his
desire to serve in the new colony, and he obtained an
important appointment there. A royal cfedula dated October 31,
1777, San Lorenzo, stated:
Since I have established my Tobacco Monopoly, the 
provinces of Buenos Aires and the others that com­
pose the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, and 
considering the talents, instruction, and other good 
qualities possessed by Don Francisco de Paula Sanz,
I have resolved to name him Director of that Monopoly, 
with an annual salary of 3000 pesos: Therefore, I
command that the Viceroy, Governor and Captain General 
of the Provinces: that when this C6dula be presented
by . . . Sanz [those officials] shall install him as 
director of the Tobacco Monopoly and that he shall 
serve according to his instructions . . . and that he 
shall be paid his 3,000 pesos annually from the royal 
treasury. °
On the ship coming to America, Sanz met Francisco de 
Paula Saubidet, who had been appointed cajero escribiente 
(treasury accountant) by the corregidor of Huaylas, in Lower 
Peru north of Lima. Sanz persuaded Saubidet to become his
®Real C6dula, San Lorenzo, October 31, 1777, AGI, 
Tomas de Razbn, tomo 1, foja 9.
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assistant director, and to accompany him in his travels.
Later, in 1794, Saubidet served as General Administrator of 
Tobacco and Playing Cards when the subsequent director was 
ill and unable to serve.
Centralization and better organization were hall­
marks of the Bourbon reforms in the colonies. Tobacco pro­
duction and distribution, and the sale of playing cards were 
activities that, if well organized and carefully administered, 
could produce considerable revenue for the Crown. Earlier 
government attempts to control tobacco distribution had met 
resistence. Sanz, after he had arrived in Buenos Aires, 
attributed this to the "decadence, bad faith, and tyranny" 
of the officials involved. He noted that many tobacco 
administrations throughout the territory had ceased to exist, 
leaving nothing but a "universal hatred not only for local 
tobacco officials, but also for the entire Monopoly." The 
new director studied tobacco records for the past two decades, 
and observed the current attitudes of the people toward the 
Monopoly. He learned that the previous director had been 
burned in effigy in the Plaza of Tucuman and his conclusions 
made him fear that he "could not find a subject who would 
submit to the (tobacco) offices without violence."^
Nevertheless, he set about his job: the reestablish-
%jibro de Infoxmes de la Visita de Tabacos y 
DescripciOn de las Provincias del Rio de la Plata y una 
RazOn al Reyno de Chile, 1779 (hereafter Libro de Informes), 
ANB, Ruck 81.
51
ment of the Monopoly under rules issued by Jos£ de Galvez 
on March 17, 1778, at El Pardo. These regulations outlined 
the duties of the Administrator, Accountant, and Warehouse 
Inspector, the three principal officials of the Tobacco 
Monopoly, whom Sanz was to appoint in each province. The 
regulations charged the administrator with receiving tobacco 
shipments and immediately depositing them in the local 
tobacco warehouse, also to be designated by the Director. 
Most of the rules dealt with weighing and storing tobacco, 
and with accounting procedures for noting receipts and dis­
patches of the tobacco. Spanish attention to checks and 
balances is evident in rules requiring that there be three 
separate warehouse keys (one for each of the officials), 
that all three officials sign shipment orders and receipts, 
and that all witness the weighing of incoming and outgoing 
shipments. The administrator was to be held responsible for 
the tobacco stored in his warehouse.
The establishment of the Tobacco Monopoly in the 
Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata would involve an inspection 
tour of the entire territory, an awesome assignment in 1777. 
Sanz would have to travel by ship, riverboat, on horseback, 
and on foot to reach the remote provincial seats. He would 
face danger from Indians, illness, and the general hardships 
of travel. The jungles of Paraguay and the eastern lowlands 
of present-day Bolivia, not to mention the freezing plateaus
■'■^ Reglamento de la Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, 
copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
52
and cordilleras of Alto Peru contrasted sharply with the 
Mediterranean breezes of Sanz's native Malaga.
After much study and preparation, Sanz boarded a 
ship for Montevideo in July, 1778. He established the 
Monopoly in that city and in missions along the Paraguay 
River and then returned to Buenos Aires, completing the first 
leg of the visita. Sanz left the capital again in February, 
1779, accompanied by his family and an amanuensis. He had 
also secured from the viceroy a military escort, consisting 
of a corporal and four soldiers, to prevent a recurrence of 
the Tucruman debacle. The party stopped first at Santa Fe, 
then continued up the river to Asuncion, back to Corrientes 
and Misiones, and COrdoba before returning to Buenos Aires 
late in the year. The next year, he resumed the visita 
going westward to Mendoza, and crossing the Andes to Chile. 
From Valparaiso, he sailed north to Arica, and ascended from 
there to Upper Peru. In the highlands, Sanz visited such 
small provinces as Juliaca near Lake Titicaca and Azanzaro 
in the Yungas, where to his amazement and disgust, "not even 
the name of the Monopoly is known." Sanz completed his 
mission in Upper Peru and returned to the capital in June or
July 1781 after traveling more than five thousand leagues
ITover extremely difficult territory.
The Director's first stop on the second leg of the
1-^ Sanz to Valdfez, March 16, 1789, no. 11, AGX, 
Charcas 439.
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visita was Santa Fe, where he established the tobacco ware­
house in February, 1779. Sanz appointed men to fill the 
three principal Monopoly offices, and set their salaries.
In accordance with his orders, he specified that neither the 
new officials nor members of their families would be allowed 
to have other business interests. After this successful 
beginning, Sanz journeyed up the Paraguay River to continue 
the visita.
When Sanz arrived in Paraguay in March, 1779, that 
colony was unique in Spain's empire, and it had a tradition 
of independence. Spanish interest in Paraguay had waned 
when no minerals were discovered there, and further decline 
ensued when Buenos Aires was removed from Asuncion's 
control in 1617. Paraguayans then hoped that the trade 
route from Buenos Aires to the Andean silver mines would 
pass through the Chaco, but the established route that 
developed passed far to the west of Paraguay, leaving the 
population to fend for itself. Paraguayan distaste for 
Spanish rule and taxes surfaced in 1721 with the Comunero 
Revolt, which lasted until 1735. Moreover, most of Paraguay 
had been controlled by Jesuit missionaries whose autonomy 
was one of the reasons for their esqpulsion from the colonies 
in 1767.13
Since there was little in Paraguay to interest Spain,
•^ Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
13Harris Gaylord Warren, Paraguay, An Informal History
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949), p. 136.
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royal interference in local affairs was minimal. The
Asuncion Cabildo was the primary agency of local government,
and it exercised executive and legislative as well as
judicial functions, trying civil and criminal cases.
Cabildo elections were free, and for many years, the body
had endeavored to defend local interests against Spanish
bureaucrats like Sanz.^ He described the capitulares
(members of the cabildo) as "not usually patricians, but
individuals who perhaps sought refuge in this Province, or
bankrupt merchants obliged by poverty to remain there." He
added that the community never decided anything that the
15aabildo had not determined beforehand.
The lack of currency or specie hampered economic 
activity in the colony, and barter was common. Bills and 
taxes were paid with com, beans, manioc, hogs, fowls, 
cotton cloth, and tobacco. The cabildo assigned values for 
specific amounts of produce and for iron wedges which some­
times circulated as money, but speculation was prevalent. 
Sanz noted in a letter to the Tobacco Monopoly headquarters 
that "tobacco is the good most commonly exchanged, although 
yerba mate and cotton are more highly valued (at twice the 
value of tobacco)." The Royal Post Master in Asuncibn 
informed Sanz that tobacco, yerba mate, and cotton were
l4Ibid.
15Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, April 13, 
1779, copy in Libro de Informes. ANB, Ruck 81.
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accepted as postage payment and that the rates in tobacco 
were:
For a one-page letter, four pounds of tobacco; 
for a two-page letter, five and a half pounds of 
tobacco; for a three-page letter, eight pounds of 
tobacco; for a one-ounce letter, eleven pounds of 
tobacco.^®
The capitulares profited, according to Sanz, from 
their power to set exchange rates by contracting to buy 
tobacco from fanners at a certain rate, and then using the 
product to pay their own debts and taxes at a higher rate. 
Moreover, inferior tobacco, often unfit for consumption, 
sometimes circulated until it disintegrated.
The Paraguayans evaluated barter goods in terms of 
"imaginary pesos" instead of real, silver pesos. Like the 
silver peso, the imaginary one was divided into eight reales, 
but it was worth only a fraction of the real peso, and dif­
ferent individuals or agencies converted imaginary pesos to 
silver at different rates. Sanz's objective in Paraguay was 
to induce the producers to sell their tobacco to the Monopoly 
for real pesos. This would eliminate the use of tobacco as 
a barter good, and supply silver currency to the province to 
replace it as a medium of exchange. Paraguay would then be 
a part of the economic system of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la 
Plata, and more susceptible to central political control
Agreement between Nicolas de Ygareda, Director of 
the Tobacco Monopoly, and Fernando de Pinedo, Governor and 
Captain-General of Paraguay, Asuncion, 1775, copy in Libro 
de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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from Buenos Aires. The capitulares predictably resisted the 
new Director and Sanz faced the first of many conflicts 
during his career.
Sanz attended a meeting of the cabildo on March 26, 
1779, and announced that the Monopoly would purchase all 
available tobacco from growers at ten silver reales per 
arroba (25 pounds) for pito (the name given to the common 
grade) tobacco, and fourteen silver reales per arroba of oja 
(a better grade) tobacco. This was a two real increase in 
the official price. The capitulares thought the price of 
tobacco should be set much higher, and they expressed strong 
displeasure at Sanz's interference. Knowing that they would 
not document defiance and open hostility to an official of 
the crown, Sanz requested that they put their objections in 
writing. The resulting exchange is a part of Sanz's visita 
report, and demonstrates the motives of the capitulares as 
well as Sanz's ability as a polemicist.
17The capitulares1 petition is dated April 5, 1779. 
They reviewed the acts of the March 29 cabildo meeting and 
emphasized that the city "does not in the least pretend to 
contradict, with this petition, royal orders," but only to 
exercise its divine and natural right to discuss. They then 
stated that tobacco had never had a fixed value in silver in
17Representaci6n de los Capitulares de la Provincia 
de Paraguay a D. Francisco de Paula Sanz, Director de la 
Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Asuncion, April 5, 1779, 
copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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the province. The ecclesiastic and secular courts accepted 
an arroba of pito tobacco as three silver pesos in payment 
of court costs and fines, and the same rate applied for 
tribute and debt payment. However, the Municipal Junta of 
Temporalidades valued an arroba of pito at twelve reales, 
and the royal post office gave 17% silver reales credit for 
each arroba. It had been accepted for as little as six 
reales per arroba. The capitulares lamented that sometimes 
tobacco prices were set by law and sometimes by the demand 
in Buenos Aires and Corrientes. Therefore, it would be 
impossible for the royal government to set a fair exchange 
rate. The cabildo appealed to Sanz not to set the price of 
tobacco for three reasons: first, if growers were required
to sell to the government, they could only sell good quality 
tobacco, and the volume of their product and profit would 
decline greatly because growers must pluck and discard most 
of the leaves to insure that the remaining ones were first 
rate; second, all of the growers were members of the militia 
and therefore did not have the time necessary to produce high 
quality tobacco; third, it was impossible to keep and breed 
horses because of maurading Indians and the only way that 
growers could procure more animals was to transport tobacco 
to Corrientes where they could trade an arroba for six silver 
pesos or a horse. If Sanz imposed a standard price on 
tobacco and forced growers to sell only to the crown, an 
arroba of tobacco would not buy half as many horses and the 
militia could not effectively defend the province. Finally,
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the capitulares complained that the growers were made even 
poorer by merchants from Buenos Aires who made inordinate 
profits by trading their goods for tobacco in Paraguay and 
then selling the tobacco in the capital for many times the 
value of their trading goods.
Sanz responded to the cabildo petition on April 10,
181779. His reply addressed the capitulares1 objections 
one by one and demonstrated the Director's ability to debate 
effectively and diplomatically. He reminded the cabildo 
that all other European monarchs controlled tobacco in their 
countries and he quickly made the point that the King was 
offering Paraguay the right to produce tobacco for the 
entire viceroyalty, and that this would bring about the use 
of royal stamped money. He contended that this would aid the 
province by permitting it to buy goods from other parts of 
the viceroyalty. Using tobacco for money was wasteful 
because it encouraged farmers to grow only that plant in order 
to amass arrobas of it to pay their debts. Since tobacco was 
difficult and eaqpensive to cultivate, the farmers would gain 
by using their time and land to cultivate other crops for 
their own use and for sale. The adoption of silver currency 
would give the farmers more time to cultivate other crops. 
Furthermore, the tobacco then produced in Paraguay was of 
such poor quality that it was difficult to sell outside the 
province.
^®Sanz to Asuncion Cabildo, Asunci6n, April 10, 1779, 
copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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To the argument that since the courts accepted fines 
and tribute payments in tobacco at one rate and the Royal 
Post Office accepted them at a different rate, there should 
be no official rate of exchange for tobacco, Sanz answered 
that some of the laws that set these rates were over two 
centuries old. He pointed out that in the case of mulattoes' 
tribute payments, the low rate used was an effort by the 
Crown to ease the burden of its mulatto subjects. Those 
rates were never intended to transcend business and commerce. 
Moreover, the Crown would be harmed by generally accepting 
tobacco at such low rates. Sanz also warned that the Crown 
would not purchase inferior tobacco, but that this was no 
cause for alarm because higher quality tobacco, when properly 
cured, was heavier and worth more than the current product.
The Director demolished the capitulares' case that a 
single official rate of tobacco for silver would cut the 
number of horses that Paraguayans could buy to defend their 
province. He wrote that to buy a horse, a grower would have 
to pay transportation fares and freight costs for his tobacco 
down the river to Corrientes, or else buy a canoe for forty 
or fifty pesos. Once there, the grower would have to pay for 
transporting the tobacco in carts from the docks to the ware­
houses where he would have to pay storage fees while he 
sought someone willing to exchange a horse for an arroba of 
tobacco, and that only a poor horse could be bought for that 
price anyway. Transporting the horses overland back to 
Asuncion was another problem because duties had to be paid
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to cross the Parana River, and all the while the animals and 
their new owners would be exposed to considerable danger.
Sanz concluded that the growers would be better off to sell 
their crop in Asuncion and then buy horses there for as much 
as sixteen pesos a head.
In much the same way, Sanz met the argument that 
merchants from Buenos Aires made exorbitant profits. He 
cited transport costs and duties that they would owe, and 
added that if growers transported their own crops to the 
capital, they would lose time and money.
The response of the capitulares concluded with a 
defense of the use of silver money in Paraguay and a pro­
jected scenario for the economic development of the province. 
Sanz predicted that the growers would benefit by producing 
high quality tobacco and selling it to the government because 
the entire province could then count on a specific income 
each year without the wild fluctuation caused by specula­
tion. Since the farmers would not have to amass tobacco to 
pay their debts if silver money were used in the province, 
they could produce other crops and sell them. The profits 
gained from this would permit farmers to pay debts and to 
hire peons to assist them. Sanz hoped that the tobacco 
growers, motivated by the desire for profits, would begin to
l^This "specific income'1 can be compared with the 
modern concept of Gross National Product.
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process Brazilian torcido negro^0 tobacco, a much sought
after commodity that could be exported to attract still more
silver to the province. The laborers hired to produce
torcido negro would receive wages, and this would help to
decrease poverty in Paraguay. The Director of the Tobacco
Monopoly believed that the circulation of silver money would
break the wasteful chain of circumstances that had forced
growers to accumulate bales of useless tobacco leaves, and
to offer them as payment to merchants who had to accept them
to pay off their own debts in Buenos Aires. He wrote:
[You] understand better than I the necessity of 
money and the benefits that could result from its 
use here, and you know that the best way to intro­
duce it is as the King proposes; that is, by 
selling the tobacco to the Crown for silver. The 
growers are dependent on what tyou] resolve because 
until now, they have not been presenting their crops 
to the Monopoly. If [youl make the benefits known 
to them, they will do so.21
Finally, Sanz warned the cabildo that he had instruc­
tions from the Superintendent General in Buenos Aires to
O O
offer the tobacco contract to "other part s." ^  He hoped that 
this would not prove necessary because he was interested in 
improving conditions in Paraguay. He added that the 
proposed contract would be limited to just three or four
20The term meant "Twisted Black" and referred to an 
esteemed type of Brazilian smoking tobacco ,that was manu­
factured in rope-like twists.
2^Sanz to Asuncion Cabildo, Asuncion, April 10, 1779, 
copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
22Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Asuncion,
i^ pril 12, 1779, copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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years so that the price paid for tobacco could be raised 
later if the revenues to the King were sufficient.
The capitulares realized that the installation of 
the Tobacco Monopoly in Paraguay was inevitable because the 
decision had already been made in Spain. Their resistance 
was aimed at persuading Sanz to set a higher purchase price 
on tobacco so that they, as tobacco growers themselves, or 
as holders of huge quantities of the product, could profit 
and take advantage of the small tobacco growers. Sanz 
expressed this suspicion in a confidential letter to the 
Tobacco Monopoly headquarters. In another letter to the 
Monopoly headquarters in Buenos Aires, Sanz complained that 
the capitulares of the cabildo had tried to discourage the 
small farmers from selling tobacco to the Monopoly by 
spreading rumors of low payments and cheating by Monopoly 
officials. As a result of the capitulares1 campaign, many 
merchants were hesitant to accept tobacco as payment for 
their goods, fearing that they would not receive fair treat­
ment when they presented it to the Monopoly in exchange for 
silver. A representative of the cabildo even confronted 
Sanz at the house where he was staying and warned that he 
would "have to answer to the growers for his. action."
i The cabildo members again wrote to Sanz' in response
f „
to his Contestacidn. This time they conceded that the
^Capitulares de Paraguay to Sanz, Asuncion, April
17, 1779, copy in Libro de Informes. ANB, Ruck 81.
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establishment of the Monopoly and the adoption of silver 
money would benefit the province, but they took issue with 
the price Sanz had set saying that they wanted more money 
for their tobacco. They expressed offense at Sanz's threat 
to withdraw the contract for supplying tobacco and wrote 
that their original petition was not a challenge to Sanz's 
authority. The city had merely "gathered and presented 
without delay, oral and written evidence for the considera­
tion of your faculties (although these faculties have yet to 
be seen)," information which Sanz himself had requested.
The capitulares regretted that Sanz was offended and offered 
obedience to whatever practices or terms he established.
They concluded with a threat to appeal to a higher authority 
than the Director of the Tobacco Monopoly. "The City remains 
with the indelible hope that the doors of justice are fair 
and generous in the palaces of the Royal Piety, where the 
City will direct copies of this communication."
Sanz was not bluffing when he threatened to offer 
the tobacco contract to another region. He secretly wrote 
to Monopoly headquarters that when he was satisfied that he 
had done all he could to get the Paraguayans to accept his 
offer, he would make the same offer to the province of 
Misiones.24 He added that he would not offer the Paraguayans 
more money than he already had for their tobacco without the
24Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Asuncion,
April 17, 1779, copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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superintendent's permission. Sanz apparently received that 
permission because he revised the price to twelve reales 
(one and a half peso) per arroba for pito tobacco, and two 
pesos per arroba of oia, and the cabildo accepted the offer. 
Sanz also warned the superintendent that he expected the 
cabildo to appeal to the viceroy or even to the Council of 
the Indies in Spain, but he expressed confidence that if his 
own written arguments were also presented, the authorities 
would consider unjust the "clamors and complaints of the 
capitulares."25
Sanz left Asuncion in late May, 1779, knowing that 
he had won his first colonial confrontation. The Governor 
of Paraguay, Pedro Melo de Portugal, had appropriated an 
abandoned Jesuit school for the tobacco warehouse, and he 
had also set aside land near Asuncidn for an experimental 
tobacco farm that Sanz wanted to establish. The growers had 
already presented so much tobacco at the warehouse or factory 
by May 17, that Sanz had had to issue an edict limiting each 
grower's deliveries of larger than twenty arrobas to one 
every eight days, "to avoid the confusion that has occurred 
in the receipt of tobaccos at the Factory."^6 By the time 
he left, they had delivered more than 7,000 arrobas of
2^Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la Historia Civil de 
Buenos Aires. TucumAn. y Paraguay (Buenos Airess Imprenta 
Bonaerense, 1856), p. 223.
2®Sanz, "Edicto para Evitar Confusion en el Recibo 
de Tabacos, Asuncion, May 17, 1779, copy in Libro de 
Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
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tobacco, and officials had not even had time to arrange the
tobacco inside the warehouse. Two months later Sanz wrote:
I note with the greatest satisfaction before I 
left Paraguay the large deliveries that the growers 
and merchants were making to the Factory, and the 
care with which they were planting and raising more 
tobacco plants, offering to sell their future produc­
tion to the government.27
So much tobacco was offered for sale, that when Sanz arrived 
in Corrientes, the Factor of Asuncion advised him that they 
were out of silver to pay the growers. Sanz had to send the 
factor more currency from the royal treasury in Corrientes.
After subduing the Asuncion Cabildo and successfully 
setting up the Royal Tobacco Monopoly there, Sanz traveled 
to other cities to install the Monopoly, to establish ware­
houses and to appoint officers. By the time he reached 
Tucumdn in February, 1780, Sanz had traveled many leagues 
over roads that were at times barely perceptible, and had 
spent many nights in rude "hospitals," huts for travelers.
A weary and ill Sanz wrote from TucumOn that in "all the 
sixty leagues from C6rdoba to TucumSn, one finds nothing but 
the greatest misery that I believe exists in the universe,
jo
and the people are rustic to excess."**0 He fretted about 
their lack of religion and culture and said: "I met a young
woman who had never confessed and had attended mass only
27Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Corrientes, 
July, 1779, copy in Libro de Informes, ANB, Ruck 81.
o q
Sanz to Real Renta de Tabacos y Naipes, Tucum&n, 
February 13, 1780, copy in Libro de Informes. ANB, Ruck 81.
6 6
once in her life, and most of the people speak no Spanish,
only what they call 'Quichoa' or the language of Cuzco." He
adjudged the village of Santiago (del Estero) as "quite
miserable," and its straw huts as undeserving of the name
house. He had suffered a bad fall from his horse on the day
he arrived in Santiago, and after finishing his official
duties there, he headed for TucumSn. He described the
miserable journey:
The second day of the trip, X fell ill with a burning 
fever. I had to continue traveling, although with 
frequent pauses since it was difficult for me to stay 
on the horse. There was not even a farm but at which 
to stop, and I forced myself to the limit to reach 
Tucuman because I had heard that there was a well 
known French doctor there; but five leagues before I 
reached that city, I was attacked by such strange and 
severe symptoms, that X thought my life was in its 
final stage. I had to stop at a miserable farm where 
there was nothing to eat. Acting as my own physician 
and druggist, I took a vomitive, then felt well enough 
to walk the last five leagues; but on the way I 
became ill again and felt even worse when I arrived in 
TucumSn and discovered that the doctor had already 
left. Thanks to the medicine I concocted there, I 
rested and ate and the fever left, although I was still 
weak.29
Sanz recovered and continued to set up tobacco 
factories in Upper Peru. In Puno, he found that the indo­
lence of the tobacco administrators was "incredible" and they 
answered his suggestions to change their ways with, "It has 
always been done this way." Sanz appointed new officials 
and proceeded to La Paz where he found corruption and abuse 
in the tobacco administration.
Much tobacco was grown in the Yungas, high valleys
29Ibid.
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to the north and east of La Paz, and sold illegally in the 
city. Sanz discovered that most of the tobacco that the 
Administration in La Paz did sell was made into paper 
cigarettes by Administration workers, who sold them at 
excessive prices. They also illegally procured cheap 
tobacco from the Yungas, and profited by selling it at the 
official rate. To remedy the situation, Sanz encouraged 
Administration workers to make and sell cigarettes officially, 
and thus increase the Monopoly's profits. He also persuaded 
the incumbent tobacco administrator of La Paz to resign to 
avoid prosecution, and finally, Sanz proposed that a ronda. 
or police force, patrol the roads leading up from the Yungas 
and capture contraband tobacco.
More intense problems awaited Sanz in southern Alto 
Peru. Indian insurrections had been raging for a year when 
he entered the region. The province of Cochabamba was an 
important objective of Tupac Amaru because it was the major 
food-growing area for Upper Peru, and many battles were 
fought within its borders. In the city itself there were 
seditious movements that included creole as well as mestizo 
and Indian elements. Citizens were taking precautions in 
January, 1781, to defend the city if necessary, and they were 
preparing to send aid to other parts of the province. Sanz 
was in Cochabamba at that time, and to raise revenue to 
purchase cannons and pay soldiers, he increased the price of 
cigars to twenty-four for one real from 40 per real. This 
caused an outcry among the Indians and mestizos who had came
6 8
to be greatly feared since the massacre at Oruro. Lampoons
appeared overnight accusing Sanz and the Monopoly of imposing
unjust tax burdens on the common people. The distressed
citizens held a cabildo abierto. and convinced Director Sanz
to lower the price of cigars to forty for a real and to sell
tobacco at its former price. This measure calmed the
Indians and mestizos temporarily, and Sanz continued his
visita to La Plata. Royalist troops eventually suppressed
30the uprisings in Cochabamba after much bloodshed.
The next month, Sanz was in La Plata where the 
insurrection posed an even more serious threat. The Indians 
under DSmaso Catari had besieged the city, food was running 
low and an attack seemed imminent. Adding to the distress 
was the disagreement among the citizens over what to do.
The audiencia judges wanted to send soldiers and citizens 
out to confront the Indians, but military commandant Ignacio 
Flores refused to do so. By February 16, 1781, the situation 
had become desperate. Francisco de Paula Sanz and Alfonso 
Gonzalez Perez favored attacking the enemy, and on that 
morning, they led a group of forty mounted men out of the 
city to face the Indians who were camped on the sides of the 
Hills of Punilla. The Spaniards soon realized their disad­
vantage and one of their number returned to La Plata for help. 
As the rest of the volunteers retreated, foot' soldiers from
^^Lillian Estelle Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), p. 160.
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the city under Flores marched out to join them. They fought 
the insurgents to a standstill until lack of ammunition 
forced the Spaniards to withdraw and return to the city. On 
February 20, after the Indians had sent an insulting message 
to the city, the vascillating Flores was again goaded into 
action. Over one thousand soldiers aided by armed citizens, 
including priests and women, returned to Punilla and 
desperately charged the Indians* position in the heights.
The Spaniards broke through the natives1 defense, killing 
three hundred and forcing the others to flee. Thus the siege
■51
was finally ended.-
During the siege, Sanz had shown bravery and initia­
tive that had sparked Flores and the others to act. When it
was over, Sanz returned to Buenos Aires where he continued
o o
to administer the Royal Tobacco Monopoly. He probably 
possessed by this time (1782) more first-hand knowledge and 
experience of conditions throughout the viceroyalty than any 
other official. This expertise coupled with his record of 
thoroughness and bravery helped him gain a promotion.
Royal authorities in Spain had created the Vice­
royalty of Rio de la Plata in 1776 to strengthen their control 
over the area. For the same reason, they appointed Manuel
31pedro de Angelis, RelaciOn HistOrica de los 
Sucesos de la Rebelibn de Jo's6 Gabriel Tupac Amaru en las 
Provincias del Pertt. en el Ano de 1780 (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta del Estado, 1836), pp. 13-14.
^Sanz to Valdez, Potosi, March 16, 1789, no. 11,
AGI, Chareas 439.
Ignacio Fem&ndez Superintendent General of War and Finance 
in 1777. Fernandez had been intendant general of the army 
in the Cevallos expedition. A royal decree of March 21,
1778, officially bestowed the title on Fernandez and defined 
his duties. The Superintendency in Buenos Aires, a branch 
of the General Superintendency of the Indies in Madrid, was 
to have complete independence from the viceroy in matters of 
finance, in the economic aspects of military affairs, and in 
the control of the funds of cities in the viceroyalty. To 
help Fernandez to carry out his duties, the Crown created a 
junta superior de Real Hacienda from senior members of the 
Tribunal of the Superintendency and the fiscal of the 
treasury.^ After 1785 when the Crown created the Audiencia 
of Buenos Aires, certain audiencia members were added to the 
junta. The Crown also created in 1785, the post of teniente 
letrado (legal assistant) to advise the superintendent and 
to substitute for him in case of vacancy.
FernAndez was aggressive in carrying out his duties 
as superintendent and in protecting his prerogatives. In 
disputes with the Buenos Aires Cabildo over control of a 
defense fund, FemAndez moved quickly to receive royal 
confirmation of his pre-eminence in municipal finances. He 
denied the Cabildo*s right to administer finances, and the 
Crown upheld his contentions in a royal order of March 12,
33John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782- 
1810. The Intendant System in the Rio de la Plata (New York; 
Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 125-26.
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1779. Femdndez also forced the Cabildo to establish 
standard weights and measures in the interest of fair 
commerce.
He completed his term as Superintendent General of 
War and Finance for the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata in 
1783. A royal decree of March 24, 1783, named Francisco de 
Paula Sanz to succeed him in that post and also gave Sanz 
the post of intendant governor of the Intendancy of Buenos 
Aires. Sanz was thirty-seven years old. Meanwhile, in 
1777, Juan Josd Vdrtiz y Salcedo had replaced Cevallos as 
viceroy, and it was with him that Sanz would have to share 
the administration of the viceroyalty. This situation could 
produce friction, and only a year before, Vdrtiz’s secret 
report to Galvez (on the applicability of the Ordinance of 
Intendants) had expressed misgivings about the superinten­
dent's proposed financial autonomy, especially in the event 
of a disagreement between the two authorities. A royal 
order assured Vdrtiz that in an emergency situation, the 
superintendent would be obliged to cooperate with the vice­
roy. Femfindez had worked well with V6rtiz for nearly five 
years. Sanz also seems to have cooperated with Vdrtiz since 
there were no serious disputes or record of friction between 
the two during the one-year period they served together, and 
several ambitious projects were undertaken in that year.
Article 59 of the Ordinance of Intendants stated 
that "the upkeep of roads, the cleanliness, uniformity and 
decoration of the streets, plazas, and buildings of the
cities,“ were the responsibility of the intendants. Sanz, 
as Intendant Governor of Buenos Aires, took this duty 
seriously. Inspired by a plan for resurfacing the streets 
of Madrid, he proposed to do the same thing in his capital, 
and in 1784, he set forth a twenty-four point resurfacing
program. House owners were to beautify the fronts of their
homes and to maintain the sidewalks that passed in front of 
their property. This requirement also applied to churches. 
Streets were to be paved with large square stones at public 
expense. Sanz prohibited anyone, including church officials, 
from allowing pigs to run through the streets, from dragging 
garbage through the streets on hides as was the custom, and
from dumping sewage from buildings into the streets. The
punishment for these crimes included twenty peso fines, jail 
terms, and the loss of offending draft animals. To prevent 
unhealthy mud puddles in the streets, the Intendant pro­
hibited the entry of freight carts, and established a freight 
depot and warehouse on the edge of the city
Addressing Joaquin Antonio de Mosquera, chief 
engineer of the city improvement project, Sanz wrote, "In 
some streets, I have seen manure taken from the gutters and 
left there until it decomposes or until the water carries it 
a w a y .  He added that those who owned the horses were not
S^Testimonio de las Providencias de Gobiemo dadas 
por el Sr. D. Francisco de Paula Sanz durante su mando de la 
Capital de Buenos Aires, 1788, AGN, Biblioteca Nacional 200.
35Ibid.
73
entitled to offend the public in this manner, and he recom­
mended that horse owners pay for the removal of the droppings 
to the countryside where perhaps they could be of some use. 
Sanz affirmed that the manure, although unpleasant, was not 
a health hazard. The real danger came from the dust, and he 
suggested sweeping and dampening the streets as a remedy. 
Sanz's bans, proclamations, and correspondence regarding 
street repair and improvement in Buenos Aires were extensive 
and some improvement resulted.
However, individuals and groups resisted the twenty- 
four ordinances. One citizen wrote to Sanz that his neighbor 
had ridiculed official efforts to remove manure from the 
front of his house, and had called Sanz a fool, saying
Og
"vaya VM (Sanz) a la mierda." Religious groups such as 
the Franciscans objected to the obligatory contributions for 
curbs, garbage collection, and sidewalks, and a royal decree 
exempted that order from responsibility for the abovementioned 
contributions.
In March, 1784, Nicolds del Campo, the Marquds de 
Loreto, replaced V6rtiz as viceroy. Five weeks after he took 
office, Loreto exempted convents from paying for civic 
improvements. This precipitated a feud between him and 
Superintendent Sanz that would last for the remainder of 
Sanz's tenure in Buenos Aires, and would extend into many
3^Vicente Quesada G., Vireinato del Rio de la Plata, 
1776-1810 (Buenos Aires: Tipografla de M. Biedma, 1881),
p. 451.
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different issues. Loreto criticized Mosquera's and Sanz's
efforts as being too expensive and as presenting vast
opportunities for corruption. The new Viceroy advocated
proceeding little by little with the project, beginning with
the worst puddles and ruts, instead of quickly completing
the entire job as Sanz wanted to do. Loreto was against
paving the streets, saying that that would necessitate putting
iron tires on all wagons and shoeing all horses, and iron was
scarce in Buenos Aires. Instead, he suggested covering
muddy areas of the streets with rubble and mortar and
covering that with sand, and using cleaned cow skeletons
37from the slaughterhouse to fill in the holes. Loreto had
clearly overstepped the bounds of his commission by becoming
involved in civic improvement, an area reserved for the
intendant. In another case, Loreto's interference was
officially reprimanded. Sanz complained in 1785 that the
Viceroy had prevented the departure for Arica of a ship
loaded with mercury, which was badly needed in Upper Peru.
Loreto was told that the superintendent had exclusive powers
38in matters of mines and mercury.
The next issue upon which the Superintendent and the 
Viceroy clashed was whether or not to continue permitting a 
limited amount of trade with the Portuguese. Under V£rtiz,
3^Juan Maria Gutierrez, "El Virreinato de Riode la 
Plata durante la AdministraciOn del Marques de Loreto,"
Revista del Rio de la Plata, VIII (1874), 230-40.
S^Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 100.
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Negroes and tobacco from Portuguese ships had been imported. 
Spanish authorities strictly limited the quantities of the 
imports and collected duties. A royal order of June 8,
1780, had condoned this practice and provided for similar 
transactions in the future, at the viceroy's discretion. 
V6rtiz later permitted Manuel Cipriano de Melo, a customs 
official, to import Negroes and wood from Brazil to the 
amount of 32,000 pesos held in credit by Spanish merchants. 
Sanz, as intendant, had been a party to this arrangement, 
but when Loreto arrived, disagreement ensued. The Viceroy 
argued that the Portuguese sold more than they were entitled 
to sell to the willing Spaniards, and that this was harmful 
to legitimate Spanish commerce. Loreto conveyed his appre­
hension to Sanz, who believed that the permits should be 
continued. Cipriano de Melo continued the importations, 
and Loreto had him arrested.
Sanz protested to Jos6 de Galvez that Loreto's 
arrest of Cipriano de Melo was unfair, since Melo was only 
executing a policy that had been authorized by Sanz and 
vertiz. More significantly, Sanz was accusing Loreto of 
interfering with the superintendent's authority. Galvez 
turned the matter over to the Council of the Indies, which 
ruled that Melo should be freed. A royal order of July 29, 
1786, however, approved Loreto's suspension of imports, but 
clearly stated that all matters of commerce, whether external 
or internal, were the business of the superintendent, and
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ordered the Viceroy to hand over all materials on the case 
to Sanz.^9
That Loreto's suspicions were justified, however, is 
shown in another difference between the two officials, that 
concerned Francisco de Medina, who wanted to purchase a royal 
estancia or cattle ranch in order to salt meat. Sanz 
believed that since the royal court was in need of funds, 
and because Medina had made a good offer and wanted the land 
for a good purpose, the estancia should be sold. Loreto 
objected to the proposal, saying that Medina had been 
involved in frauds earlier, and the sale was cancelled.
Bitter discussions ensued and in his memoria. Loreto accused 
Sanz of using government money to aid Medina. The two 
officials sought other opportunities to provoke and censure 
each other.
Still more contention arose because Loreto wanted to 
end abuses in the treasury which had been occurring since 
the administration of V6rtiz. The most glaring example 
involved Francisco Jimenez de Mesa, the Treasurer of the 
Buenos Aires Customshouse. Mesa could only produce a small 
fraction of the money that records showed he was supposed to 
have. Loreto, in his memoria stated that such corruption 
was common in the financial administration of the viceroyalty, 
and he blamed the head of the branch of government,
40Sigfrido A. Radaelli, ed., Memorias de los Vrrreyes 
del Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Editorial Bajel, 1945i,
pp. 308-15.
Francisco de Paula Sanz.^"
The wasteful slaughter of wild cattle by hide dealers 
in the Banda Oriental, and how to deal with this problem 
provided yet another battleground for Sanz and Loreto. They 
agreed that it was undesirable to allow the animals to be 
exterminated, but Sanz wanted to prevent future abuses by 
means of the inspection of ranches and the control of royal 
ranges, while Loreto advocated a retroactive law whereby 
past offenders would be prosecuted. Other advisers sided 
with Sanz, and the Superintendent sent investigators to the 
Banda Oriental. Loreto secretly sent his own people to 
investigate the problem, and he also ordered the governor of 
Montevideo to report on the suspect conduct of Antonio 
Pereyra, a military commander there. Still without con­
sulting Sanz, the Viceroy removed the governor as investi­
gator and named as his replacement Colonel JosS Reseguin who 
had already been designated intendant governor of Puno in 
Upper Peru. This action was another encroachment upon the 
authority of the superintendent because Reseguin, as an 
intendant, was Sanz's subordinate. Furthermore, Reseguin 
became over zealous in Montevideo, arresting people and 
interfering with the operation of the customshouse. Sanz, 
meanwhile, was humiliated by this disrespect for his 
authority, and he complained to the Minister of the Indies 
about Loreto's shadow investigation in Montevideo. In Madrid,
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Galvez forwarded Sanz's and Loreto's communication to the 
Council of the Indies. It ruled that Loreto had indeed 
ranged out of the realm of his authority. A royal order to 
Loreto echoed this opinion on June 3, 1786, and redefined
the Viceroy's duties emphasizing that they did not include
4-2financial administration. The mutual dislike of the two 
officials intensified as time went by, and accusations were 
common. Sanz accused Loreto of "trying to manage this 
kingdom . . .  as though it were his own domestic affair.1,43
The quarrel spread to other people and agencies.
The Buenos Aires Cabildo, still resenting the loss of its 
control of city funds to the superintendency, sided with 
Loreto while the Junta Superior de Real Hacienda, which had 
been created by the Ordinance to assist the Superintendent, 
supported Sanz. The Audiencia of Buenos Aires also sup­
ported the Viceroy.
The final disagreement occurred over a proposal to 
move the offices of the commissioners of audit (tribunal de 
cuentas) to a building formerly owned by the departed Jesuits. 
Sanz supported the move, but the audiencia objected because 
the Jesuit building was distant from their offices. Loreto 
objected to the cost of purchasing the building. When Sanz 
invited members of the audiencia to inspect the old building 
that was housing the offices, the dean of the audiencia said
43Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 97.
43Ibid.. p. 99.
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that since it was Holy Week, there was no need for immediate
action. Sanz impulsively replied, "Does the King not pay
your wages during Holy Week? 1 The matter was not resolved,
but the Council of the Indies reprimanded Sanz for his 
44bluntness.
The separate branches of government in Buenos Aires 
were aligned against each other so that actual administration 
was hampered. Divesting the viceroy of financial control 
and creating the superintendency to exercise that function 
had been a principal part of the reforms introduced by Jos6 
de Galvez. After his death in June, 1787, Fr. Antonio 
Vald6z y Baz&n, who had a more conservative outlook, 
succeeded Galvez as Minister of War and Hacienda of the 
Indies. Vald6z was distressed by the dissention in the 
colonies. Barely six weeks after Galvez's death, Vald6z 
ordered Jorge Escobedo, Superintendent of the Viceroyalty of 
Lima and former Governor of Potosi, to relinquish his post, 
and the function of superintendent reverted to the viceroy.
On October 2, 1787, the same message was sent to the Super­
intendent of New Spain.4  ^ In view of these changes, Sanz 
must have realized that his position as superintendent was 
tenuous, and on May 9, 1788, Spanish authorities wrote him:
The King, desiring that for now, the office of 
superintendents subdelegado de la real hacienda de
44Ibid., p. 104.
4^John Fisher, Government and Society in Colonial 
Peru: The Intendant System. 1784-1814 (London: Athlone
Press, 1970), p. 60.
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Indias be united under the control of the viceroy, 
and since this has already been carried out in Lima 
and in Mexico: has resolved that it be carried out
in that capital [Buenos Aires] and I give notice to 
[you] on the order of [the King] that on receipt of 
this, [you] shall deliver the office of superintendent 
that [you] exercise to the viceroy of those pro­
vinces with all its corresponding papers and effects.
And once this is done, [you] will take charge of the 
government of Potosi, enjoying the same salary that 
[you] currently receive as superintendent [10,000 
pesos] because of the care and prudence required to 
administer the wealth of that city.46
The institution of the superintendency had been 
based on the doubtful assumption that the viceroy would 
willingly give up his control of finances and then cooperate 
with the new officials. There had been misgivings from the 
outset. Viceroy Pedro de Cevallos of Rio de la Plata feared 
that stripping his office of economic control would weaken 
him as a military leader. Escobedo had also predicted the 
inevitable clash of authority between the viceroy and the 
superintendent.4?
The royal government had acted to end the squabbling 
in the viceroyalty by discontinuing the superintendency and 
returning the duties of the office to the viceroy. The 
other office that Sanz filled, Intendant Governor of Buenos 
Aires Intendancy, was not abolished nor was it joined with 
the viceroyalty. When Sanz left for Potosi, the post was 
filled by his teniente letrado. Dr. Vicente Garcia Grande y
46Ibid., p. 31.
47sanz to Vald6z, Potosi, March 16, 1789, no. 11, 
AGI, Charcas 439.
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C&rdenas, and the duties and prerogatives remained unchanged. 
When the royal messages arrived in Buenos Aires on August 23, 
1788, Sanz prepared to leave for Upper Peru. He arrived in 
Potosi on December 15, 1788.48
After serving as superintendent of the viceroyalty
and Intendent Governor of the Intendancy of Buenos Aires for
five turbulent years, Sanz would have to have his record
scrutinized in a residencia. This after-the-fact examination
of an official's performance was headed by one man, often a
member of the audiencia. The Fiscal of the Audiencia of
Buenos Aires conducted Sanz's residencia, and it began in
November, 1789 after Sanz had left Buenos Aires. The results
were announced on February 16, 1790:
In the residencia that has been conducted of Francisco 
de Paula Sanz, intendant-governor of this capital and 
province and of his asesor. Dr. Vicente Garcia Grande, 
and his ministers and officials and all others who have 
exercised royal jurisdiction and who are included among 
those upon whom H.M. commissioned me to conduct 
residencia: . . .  I declare that . . .  Sanz has fulfilled 
as he should, the obligations of his position and is 
held responsible for no wrongdoing, but on the contrary, 
he has served in such a way as to merit the thanks of 
the royal piety, as have his associates, and the Sr. 
Residenciador verifies public satisfaction.49
Sanz had served for eleven years in the Viceroyalty, 
first as Director of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly, and then as 
Intendant Governor of Buenos Aires and Superintendent General 
of the entire viceroyalty. In these years he had proved
48Juicio de Residencia de Francisco de Paula Sanz, 
Intendente de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, AGN, Tribunales, 
Legajo 58, Expediente 7.
49Ibid.
himself in the face of physical hardships and danger and, 
more importantly, he had fought bitter battles within the 
colonial bureaucracy and had usually prevailed. Accusations 
of corruption and incompetence had withered in the light of 
a residencia presided over by a member of the very audiencia 
that he had often opposed. Much more conflict and even 
physical hardship awaited the forty-three year old Sanz as 
he took office in the high and cold mining town.
Chapter XV
SANZ'S EARLY EFFORTS TO INCREASE PRODUCTION
AT POTOSI
The forty-three year old intendant governor-designate 
of the wealthy intendancy of Potosi left Buenos Aires in 
November, 1788, to take up his post in Upper Peru. He had 
traveled the same route before as Director of the Tobacco 
Monopoly, slowly climbing across half a continent until he 
reached the mountains and plateaus of Alto Peru. Sanz 
arrived during the rainy season, and he must have been 
nearly to the city when he first spotted the barren solitary 
peak of the Cerro de Potosi on December 15, 1788.
Those who had awaited the new intendant governor 
proudly showed him the Casa de Moneda, the town1s finest 
building, completed in 1773. The massive stone building was 
two stories high, covered an entire block and housed offices 
of the exchequer and the intendant and the machinery to roll 
metal and stamp coins. Opening onto the building's first 
patio were the living quarters of all of the officials of 
the Casa. An apartment in the building was the official
•^Sanz to Vald6z, Potosi, January 30, 1789, no. 1,
AGI, Charcas 439.
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residence of the superintendent of the Casa, but Sanz as
intendant governor would inhabit the pretorial, a separate
building that faced the west side of the plaza. The same
architects who had designed the mint in Lima also designed
the Casa de Moneda of Potosi, and the two buildings were
similar in design. Pedro Vicente Canete, who with his large
family occupied the superintendent's quarters in the Casa,
complained that while this design was appropriate for Lima's
o
balmy climate, it was barely habitable in frigid potosi. 
Surrounding the second patio were offices, the rooms con­
taining the coining machinery, and quarters for the Negro 
slaves who powered the presses.
Silver production in Potosi had reached a low point 
in the mid-eighteenth century. This decline was the culmina­
tion of a long-term trend that began in the previous century. 
The recent Indian insurrection in Upper Peru had slowed the 
recovery. Royal authorities hoped that by placing Sanz in 
charge of the financial as well as the political operations, 
they would see an increase in production and hence in royal 
revenues. Sanz would hold four posts concurrently in 
Potosi: Intendant Governor, Superintendent of the Royal
Bank of San Carlos, Superintendent of the Casa de Moneda, 
and Superintendent of Mita.
As intendant governor, Sanz would have many of the
Pedro Vicente Canete, Historia Fisica y Politica de 
la Provincia de Potosi, ed. Gunnar Mendoza (La Paz:
FundaciCn Universitaria ’'Simon I. Patino,” 1952), p. 32.
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same responsibilities he had had in Buenos Aires where he 
held that office as well as the Superintendency of the Army 
and Treasury. As the chief executive of the intendancy, he 
was responsible for the defense and administration of Potosi, 
and since economic affairs were of such importance there, 
his other offices took on increased significance.
The Royal Bank of San Carlos began in 1747 as a fund 
to foment silver mining and refining in Potosi. Joseph 
Hervoso, an inspector working for the Royal Treasury, was in 
Potosi at that time trying to increase production without 
costly disbursements from the Treasury. He suggested that 
the miners and azogueros establish and administer their own 
fund for that purpose.’* On January 12, 1747, a junta of the 
azogueros voted to accumulate the fund by withholding two and 
three-quarters reales from each mark (usually about sixty- 
four reales) that was sold to the Casa de Moneda. In other 
words, each mark brought by the mint would be discounted by 
two and three-fourths reales, and this was to be the base 
for the fund. Azogueros would be eligible to make loans 
from this fund to purchase mining equipment or mercury, to 
hire workers or to pay the leguaje (travel expenses for 
unpaid Indian workers assigned to them). The association of
3
Joaquin Blanco Antolinez, "Proyecto EconGmico pide 
providencias para evitar los Robos en esta real Casa [de 
Moneda] Impugna, como es justo los crecidos aumentos de la 
fundaciGn mayor: quiere aclarar el procedemiento de las
crecidas fallas de la oficina de Fielatura" (unpublished 
manusacript, Potosi, 1808), ANB, Ruck 256. Cited hereafter 
as "Proyecto EconGmico."
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azogueros named a protector of the fund from their number 
who was to hold one of the three keys to the chest where the 
money would be kept. Government officials were to hold the 
other keys. Over the next four years, the azogueros 
contributed with each sale to the mint, and loans were made 
from the fund that accumulated.
In February, 1751, the zealous Ventura de Santelices 
took office as governor of Potosi. He noted from the accounts 
that there should be 164,794 pesos in the azogueros1 fund, 
but when he ordered the chest opened, he found only thirteen 
pesos, six reales.4 Santelices continued to exact the 
contribution from silver presented at the Casa de Moneda, 
but he administered the fund himself. He established a bank 
in 1752, which the Crown approved, and he personally con­
trolled its operation. When the King chartered the bank, 
there were 57,800 pesos in the fund— not enough to cover the 
demand for loans by azogueros. Ventura Santelices therefore 
transferred to the bank 10,000 pesos from the Royal Treasury,
c
along with 2,000 pesos of his own salary. The Bank began 
purchasing the silver that the azogueros produced, and 
making yearly loans to them. The Governor and his carefully 
chosen assistants ran the Bank efficiently but arbitrarily, 
without setting down formal rules and procedures. They 
carefully inspected the chests each week to be sure that
4Ibid.
5Canete, Historia Flsica, p. 198.
87
they contained the proper amount. He also guarded the iron 
and mercury that the Bank lent to azogueros under the same 
conditions that it lent money. By February, 1762, when 
Ventura Santelices left office, the baxik claimed 817,140
6pesos worth of assets, and it had helped many azogueros.
Jaime Sanjust succeeded Santelices and was more
trusting to subordinates than his predecessor. Abuses
occurred and irregular deficits resulted. The government of
Peru in 1766, commissioned Pedro de Tagle to investigate the
problem and to superintend the Bank. He found that over a
quarter of a million pesos worth of silver and iron was
missing, so he replaced faulty administrators and in 1770,
issued provisional rules for the Bank's operation. By the
time Tagle left office in 1775, the deficit had decreased
7
substantially.
The Royal Government, which had helped to support 
the Bank with its funds under Santelices, disliked the 
erratic fortunes of the institution. In October, 1776, 
Charles III ordered that the Bank lend no more than 50,000 
pesos in money and material, or order to prevent "the risks
g
and disturbances of the past." He also stipulated that the 
superintendent not increase this limit until the fund was 
larger. Viceregal authorities in Lima sent Jorge Escobedo y 
Alarcdn to Potosi in 1777 to investigate the latest losses
6Ibid.. p. 199. 7Ibid.. p. 202.
O
Blanco Antolinez, "Proyecto EconOmico," ANB, Ruck 256.
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and to assume the governorship and superintendency. After 
studying the Bank 1s accounts, Escobedo recommended that the 
Royal Government take the Bank over and administer it. The 
Audiencia of Lima and the Council of the Indies approved 
this proposal in the same year, and the Royal Bank of San 
Carlos was founded in 1779. Tagle's rules, Escobedo's 
additions, and royal amendments were gathered and they later 
became a part of the Ordinance of Intendants.
The Bank had two principal purposes: to buy any
silver that was offered for sale in Potosi for subsequent 
resale to the Casa de Moneda, and to lend money or materials 
to the azogueros. Officials of the Bank included the Admin­
istrator, who purchased the metal and had to be an expert 
metallurgist able to determine the purity of the metal from 
just looking and touching; the Treasurer, who made payments 
for silver received; and the Accountant who kept records of 
transactions. In charge of all Bank operations was the 
superintendent. He and the other officials held keys to the 
chest where the money was kept, and they were responsible for 
its safe keeping. The superintendent was to preside at 
meetings of the junta of azogueros. and he signed all weekly
accounts. Concerning his“responsibilities, the Ordinance stated;
The connection between the Casa de Moneda and the Bank, 
and the cooperation necessary between the two, make it 
convenient that both offices be held by one individual: 
therefore the Superintendent of the Casa de Moneda will 
also be the Superintendent of the Bank.^
^Ibid.
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The line separating the two positions was not clear, and by 
appointing one man to fill both offices plus the intendant 
governorship, conflicts like the one between Sanz and Loreto 
in Buenos Aires could be avoided.
Soon after Jaime Villarroel filed the first silver 
claim in Potosi in 1545, the early miners set up an official 
furnace to smelt and assay gold and silver. Nearby, they 
built a workshop where workmen using hammers struck off a 
few crude coins bearing the impression of the cross.
Viceroy Toledo during his visit to Potosi in the 1570's 
recognized the need for a real mint in the mining region 
because, in spite of the proximity of the mines, royal coins 
were scarce and barter was common. The few coins that were 
available had to be imported from Spain. Toledo wanted to 
encourage commerce among the natives and bring them into the 
economic system and thus under royal influence. He also 
wanted officials to be able to collect the royal fifth more 
efficiently. In 1572, therefore, he established the Royal 
Casa de la Moneda de Potosi, which housed royal financial 
offices and the mint. Three years later the building for 
the Casa de Moneda that Toledo established, was completed, 
and it was equipped with three smelting furnaces and 
machinery to strike coins. Mechanization increased Potosi's 
coin output and royal officials at the mint exacted taxes as 
the silver was presented. Silver production had increased 
by the early 1500’s so that the Mint's capacity also had to
be increased.
When he founded the Casa de Moneda, Viceroy Toledo 
also issued ordinances to govern its operation. Under the 
Toledan Ordinances, the Audiencia of La Plata had jurisdic­
tion over the operation of the Mint. Close surveillance of 
the assaying and coining in Potosi from La Plata was not 
possible and as a result, corrupt employees of the Casa de 
Moneda began manufacturing coins of insufficient silver 
content. Several investigations of the illegal debasement 
of currency took place during the seventeenth century, and 
the problem continued into the next century. By 1750, 
corruption in Potosi had convinced authorities to unite the 
offices of Superintendent of the Casa de Moneda with that of 
Corregidor of Potosi. Ventura de Santelices was the first 
man to hold this expanded office.
Santelices urged other reforms when he took office. 
He believed that the two hundred year old Money House was 
too small for the volume of business that it did, and that 
its equally antiquated coining machinery should be replaced. 
Ferdinand VX in 1750, approved the plan to construct a new 
Money House in the same location as the old one. Because of 
funding delays, construction of the new Casa de Moneda did 
not begin until two years later. Spanish engineers super­
vised the project, and it was not completed until 1773. 
Charles III, upon learning that the total cost of the new
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mint amounted to 1,482,452 pesos, is said to have remarked, 
“This building must be made of silver."^®
The third Casa de Moneda began operation with the 
original ordinances that Toledo had issued. These laws 
determined the type of coins to be minted and gave the mint 
the dual function of striking coins and exacting the royal 
taxes on silver presented there. The Ordinance of Inten- 
dants included an extensive revision of the Toledan laws. 
Since the time of Toledo, the Casa de Moneda had depended on 
individual merchants to supply it with silver for coining, 
but Santelices changed the procedure, so that the Bank of 
San Carlos would supply the mint.
In the late eighteenth century, amalgamators still 
refined silver in much the same wasteful way that they had 
been doing it for two centuries. Using the "patio process," 
Indian workers at the ingenios (refineries) spread the pella 
(wet mixture of ground ore and mercury) on a paved floor, and 
allowed it to warm in the sun stirring it occasionally by 
treading on it. Tending the pella was a particularly onerous 
occupation because it exposed the half-naked workers to the 
freezing climate as they slogged about in the cold mixture, 
and many of them caught pneumonia. Mercury poisoning and 
inhalation of the dust also took their tolls. There were 
many "recipes" for speedy amalgamation, some of them calling 
for the addition of iron, lime or salt, but all of them
10Ibid.
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based on guesswork. After about a month, the mixture was 
rewashed and the silver and mercury adhered together and 
settled to the bottom of the washtub. Next, workers wrapped 
the mercury and silver in cloth and pressed it to extract 
the mercury, and then heated the silver to remove the 
remaining mercury. Finally the amalgamators melted the 
silver and poured it into conical-shaped molds. They called 
the ingots pinas or pineapples, because of their shape, and
presented them at the Casa de Moneda to be assayed and
.11taxed.
The process was wasteful at every point of ore,
mercury, and manpower. In the crushing mills, the wind blew
away dust that contained silver. The paving stones of the
patios were oval-shaped, so that ore and mercury escaped
between them. While metallurgy and mining technology had
progressed very little between 1575 and 1775, important gains
had been made in Europe, particularly in the mining regions
of Saxony, Poland, and Hungary. Charles III was interested
in whatever would increase revenues from his colonies, and
in 1786, he ordered that German-trained experts by hired and
sent to instruct the operators of his mines in Mexico and
Peru. Acting on the king's orders, Jos6 de Galvez named
12Fausto Elhuyar, a Basque, to head the expedition.
•^Marie Helmer, "Potosi a la Fin de XVIIIe Siecle, " 
Journal de la Soci6t£ des AmSricanistes (Paris), XL (1951), 
21-50.
12Rose Marie Buechler, "Technical Aid to Upper Peru: 
The Nordenflicht Mission," Journal of Latin American Studies, 
I (May, 1973), 37-77.
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Elhuyar had studied metallurgy and mining at Freiburg 
and in Sweden, and taught at the College of Mineralogy in 
Asturias. He was studying Ignaz von Bom's method of amalga­
mation in Saxony when he received the appointment, which 
also requested that he recruit German scientists to teach 
metallurgy in Peru. Elhuyar contacted the Swedish Baron 
Thaddeus von Nordenflicht with whom he had studied, and who 
had been in the service of the King of Poland; and the Baron 
agreed to lead an expedition for Charles III, provided that 
his Protestantism would be tolerated, and that he receive a 
pension for life. Royal authorities agreed to the condi­
tions, and engaged three more German experts to go to Peru: 
Daniel Weber, Anton Zacharias Helms, and Gottlob Fredrich 
Mothes. Meanwhile, Elhuyar went to New Spain. Nordenflicht 
and his party traveled first to Spain, and from there, sailed 
for Buenos Aires, where they arrived in July, 1788.
The next month, Sanz, who was still Superintendent
General of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, learned of
13his transfer to Potosi. Alert to the opportunity to 
improve mineral production in his future intendancy, Sanz 
requested that the Germans journey overland to Lima and 
instruct in Potosi on the way, instead of sailing around the 
continent. Loreto grudgingly approved the change, and the 
party set out from Buenos Aires-in October, 1788, and
■^Eduardo Matir6, El COdigo Carolino de Ordenanzas 
Reales de las Minas de Potosi y DemAs Procincias del Rio de 
la~Plata (1794) de Pedro Vicente Cafle't'e (Buenos Aires: 
Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 21.
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journeyed for nearly three months before reaching the mining 
center.^
Some of the miners and other residents of Potosi 
greeted the arrival of the European experts with optimism. 
Like many Spanish colonials and Europeans during the Enlight­
enment, they believed that huge amounts of precious metals 
still existed throughout the Spanish Empire, and that their 
successful exploitation awaited only the application of 
sophisticated European technology. Weber later wrote that 
miners in Potosi were poor "not because their mineral veins 
had stopped being rich, but because of ignorance of the arts 
and the lack of a remedy for abuses and disorders, " and that 
"there are hardly any other mines on earth that equal in 
abundance those in this country." Members of the expedition 
quickly suggested some simple measures that, while hardly 
examples of sophisticated European technology, did produce 
improvement. They pointed out that pulverized ore should 
be sifted indoors to avoid loss in the wind, and they 
suggested the use of square paving stones in the amalgama­
tion patios to prevent waste. They also noted that labor
was wasted by the unhealthy conditions that prevailed in the
. . 15mining process.
One of the major obstacles to mineral production in
■^Sanz to Loreto, Potosi, March 16, 1789,no. 5, AGI, 
Charcas 439.
15Martir6, El COdigo Carolino, p. 21.
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Potosi was the flooding of mine shafts. Gottlob Mothes 
inspected the drainage shaft under construction in the 
Cerro Rico, and pronounced it inadequate because it was in 
the wrong position to drain the maximum number of mines. He 
suggested a new location for the shaft in his report for the 
intendant governor. Sanz studied the report and rode around 
the circumference of the Cerro with Mothes to inspect the 
proposed shaft site, and he ordered that construction begin 
on the Socavon de Berrios, based on Mothes' plan.
The responsibilities of corregidores and intendants
had long included an annual inspection of the mines. Before
Sanz, chief officials in Potosi had been content with a
prefunctory visit to a safe mine each year. Sanz, however,
personally entered and carefully inspected many mines.
Furthermore, he ordered that mine owners keep exact records
of tunneling progress and expenses, so that he could monitor
their efforts. This increased vigilance quickly stimulated
more tunneling in the Cerro. as well as a sharp rise in
16silver production over that of the previous year.
The greatest losses and inefficiencies in the Potosi 
mining industry occurred in the refining process, and 
Nordenflicht believed that the greatest gains could conse­
quently be made by improving that process. In Europe, the 
Baron had studied the "barrel method" of refining that his 
teacher, Ignaz von Born had developed. The machine used in
16Ibid,
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this process consisted of a wood and iron framework that 
supported axles on which six, eight, or even twelve large 
wooden barrels turned. Each barrel could hold hundreds of 
pounds of pella so that all the parts of the machine had to 
be strong and well made. To amalgamate, the operator filled 
each barrel with ground ore, mercury, and water; he sealed 
the barrels and then put the machine in motion with water 
or mule power. The machine agitated the mixture for one day, 
during which amalgamation took place. At the end of the day, 
the operator removed the mercury and silver and separated 
them in the usual way. The potential advantages of the 
barrel method, that it took only one day compared with about 
thirty for the "patio process," and that it consumed less 
mercury, naturally caused considerable excitement in 
Potosi.17
The wonderful machines were expensive, however, and 
Sanz diverted royal funds for the contruction of a prototype. 
On March 16, 1789, Sanz wrote to Viceroy Loreto asking for 
permission to use more royal funds for the machines and for 
a mining academy. Sanz's letter was optimistic, saying that 
Nordenflicht1s experiments had shown that the azogueros 
could produce 200 percent more silver, with new techniques. 
With more royal aid, these improvements would materialize, 
the Royal Treasury would benefit by collecting more taxes,
17Ibid.. p. 22.
97
18"and Potosi will return to its ancient wealth. " Sanz also 
mailed a copy of this rosy report to Fr. Antonio Vald6z,
IQ
Minister of War and Hacienda for the Indies.
The feud between Sanz and Viceroy Loreto had not 
diminished with Sanz's removal from the capital, however. 
After Sanz's departure, the Viceroy and Pedro Dionisio de 
Galvez, who had succeeded Sanz as Director of the Tobacco 
Monopoly, accused Sanz of having embezzled royal funds and 
of having spent an excessive amount ten years earlier when 
he made the epic visita. Sanz pointed out that the sup­
posedly embezzled money was in another account and he was 
exonerated. At Valdfiz's request, the Intendant Governor also 
justified his expenses for the three-year visita, which 
amounted to 66,792 pesos. Hacienda authorities in Spain 
again found in Sanz's favor and reprimanded Galvez for
Jn
making the accusation.
Loreto predictably opposed his old rival's projects 
in Potosi, reprehending him for delaying the Norderflicht 
Mission's journey to Lima, and for risking royal funds.
18Sanz to Loreto, Potosi, March 16, 1789, no. 5,
AGI, Charcas 439.
•^8Sanz to Valdfez, Potosi, March 16, 1789, no. 2,
AGI, Charcas 439.
20sanz, "Sobre las incidencias habidas entre el 
Intendente [Sanz] y el Director de la Renta de Tabacos 
[Galvez] con raotivo de la denuncia que 6ste le hizo de un 
Fraude de Tabaco y otra de fraudes en la Tesoria. . . , " 
n.p., November 20, 1788, AGN, Reales Ordenes, Libro 18,
Foja 326.
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Sanz disregarded Loreto's scolding and continued to fund the 
projects. Moreover, Loreto's term as viceroy was coming to 
an end, and his replacement, Nicolas de Arredondo, was 
already en route to Buenos Aires from Lima at the time of 
Sanz's communication with Loreto, and he stopped at the 
mining center to inspect it. Arredondo was interested in 
Sanz's efforts to increase production, and encouraged him.
He wrote:
Through the singular zeal of the Intendant Governor,
I was instructed on the operations involved in the 
new method of amalgamation ahout to be established 
hy the mineralogists, which will begin to function 
as soon as the necessary machinery has been com­
pleted. There is no doubt but that if they correspond 
to the promises of the experts, they will produce the 
most advantageous results. . . .21
Sanz therefore was in optimistic spirits in his 
first year as intendant governor, Loreto was leaving the 
viceroyalty and being replaced by the more sympathetic and 
compatible Arredondo. Sanz and many others had faith that 
silver production was about to rise rapidly because of German 
technology. Many thought that the town would recapture its 
former wealth and splendor. Loreto's reprimand was forgotten, 
and the King sent a c6dula approving Sanz's efforts and 
authorizing him to lend more royal funds to individuals
interested in building barrel machines. Sanz heavily publi-
22cized the initial test of the first machine.
2^Buechler, "Technical Aid," p. 56.
22Martir6 , El Cddigo Carolino, p. 82.
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In January, 1790, a large crowd had assembled to 
witness the debut of the machine that would make them rich.
The operators self-importantly loaded each barrel with several 
hundredweights of pella and the machine was activated. The 
curious witnesses did not have to wait long for the results, 
because the frame of the machine broke when the barrels began 
to turn. Much disappointment, derision, and anti-German 
feeling ensued. The experts went back to work, and blamed 
the failure on the lack of skill of Potosi's artisans and on 
the poor quality of the materials available there. After 
five months, a second machine was ready, and this time it was 
privately tested before a small selected audience. The 
results of the second test were unclear, but they indicated 
that the machine could extract slightly more silver from the 
ore than could the patio process, but more importantly, the 
test showed that the barrel method economized on the con­
sumption of mercury. Sanz publicized the success and an 
article in the Mercurio Peruano stated, "We are pleased to 
communicate to the public the news that good results have come 
from the use of the barrel machine in Potosi. We are inter­
ested, as true patriots, in the advancement of the mining 
industry upon which depend the health and restoration of this 
Kingdom."23
Sanz and Daniel Weber, wanting conclusive and con­
crete results with which to prove the superiority of the
23"Adiciones de la Sociedad," Mercurio Peruano, 1:23 
(March 20, 1791), 220.
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barrel method over the patio process, and to train workers in 
the new method, decided to initiate long-term experiments to 
last through 1791. Before the experiments could begin, however, 
Sanz became seriously ill and could not work for several 
months. During this interlude, conservative amalgamators 
organized opposition to the experiments. Most Potosi amalga­
mators were little more than charlatans and the prevailing 
ignorance of scientific procedures for refining silver hid 
their incompetence and allowed them to cheat mine owners and 
the government. The adoption of the new more efficient 
techniques advocated by the northern Europeans would either 
force the amalgamators out of business or force them to learn 
the new method. Therefore, during Sanz's incapacitation, they 
spread rumors that the Germans were dishonest and that the 
machine would cause unemployment among the minqados. They 
also conspired to keep Weber from acquiring the ore necessary 
for his experiments.2^
Weber resented the azogueros' behavior, and wrote 
that he had to withstand "imponderable opposition and hostil­
ity produced by the attitude of the party of azogueros in 
this city." He complained that:
In Potosi, the ministers and the inhabitants have not 
only opposed me, but they have acted like ruffians 
and have tried to throw down all of my efforts. The 
opposition reached such extremes that there was no 
place where they did not direct defamatory letters and
2^The remaining information and quotations in this 
chapter were taken from MartirS, El Cbdigo Carolino, unless 
otherwise cited.
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treatises against my honor, with the most injust treat­
ment of my person. Meanwhile, I was working without 
rest for their advancement and good.
The attacks were printed in the Mercurio Peruano of Lima, 
where an anonymous writer who used the pseudonym "Serrano" 
tried to "discredit the barrel method and at the same time to 
discredit me with unjust impostures and falsehoods, the 
product of a man seditious, cunning, and ignorant to the last 
degree." In order to protect his good name, Weber felt com­
pelled to answer publically the affronts and he did so in 
several issues of the Mercurio Peruano during 1791.
After Sanz recovered, he quickly reasserted his 
authority and ordered the amalgamators to supply the needed 
ore. Two Basque merchants, Luis de Orueta and Juan Bautista 
J&uregui had recently acquired holdings in Potosi, and 
sponsored the construction of a twelve-barrel refining 
machine near Potosi. This machine worked properly and it 
showed a definite advantage over the patio process. For more 
than a year, men using the machine consistently produced more 
silver than men using the old method, when both groups 
started with the same amount of pella. Following the experi­
ment, Weber wrote, "The advantages of an established and 
improved system of barrel amalgamation are evident, and can­
not be denied, when confirmed by fourteen months of contin­
uous experience."
The Nordenflicht Mission to Upper Peru did not alter 
production methods in Potosi for several reasons. First, the 
barrel machines were extremely costly and there was little
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financial capital available.in the jaded mining center.
Second, the machines were more practicable in Europe than in 
isolated Potosi because shilled European blacksmiths, 
carpenters, and coopers were able to assemble and maintain 
the complicated machines and potosino artisans were unaccus­
tomed to such exacting work. Finally, many azogueros were 
organized against the introduction of new techniques, and 
they did not cooperate with efforts to establish it. After 
more than a year in Potosi, Nordenflicht, Helms, and Mothes 
departed for Lima, while Weber remained in Potosi to super­
vise the operation of the few barrel machines that had been 
constructed.
In 1792, Weber wrote to Viceroy Arredondo. His 
letter showed bitter disappointment that the azogueros had 
not readily accepted the instruction offered by the Teutonic 
mission. He complained that Potosi mining was only super­
ficial and that much more ore could be extracted if the miners 
were more knowledgeable. He warned that the ores currently 
being taken from the mines were just the remains of the under­
ground bridges left by past miners, and that such an operation 
could only end in disaster. He blamed these difficulties 
partly on the "indolence to which those who work in the mines 
and refineries are accustomed, and on their capriciousness." 
"The resulting disorder," he wrote, "inhibits production in 
royal refineries and in those of the azogueros." The Germans 
saw the problem, therefore as originating with the ignorance 
and laziness of the Americans.
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Sanz had made a genuine effort to improve Potosi's 
silver production. Even before taking office as intendant 
governor there, he had maneuvered to get authorization for 
the Nordenflicht Mission to stop in Potosi. Once the Expedi­
tion had reached Upper Peru, Sanz endeavored to find financial 
support for their experiments. When azogueros failed to 
cooperate with the mission, he ordered that they do so. 
Technical improvement imparted by foreigners was, in Sanz's 
opinion, only one method of raising production. When he saw 
that new shafts and improved techniques would not generate 
the expected increases in production and in royal revenue, 
Intendant Governor Sanz began to pursue other remedies. 
Attempts to apply two means of improving silver production- 
tighter administration and more forced Indian labor in the 
mines and refineries— were important issues during much of 
the remainder of his career. Sanz's involvement with a 
reform of the legal system, which included an extension of 
the mita, dated back to his days as superintendent general of 
the viceroyalty.
Fausto Elhuyar had translated the Mining Laws of 
Saxony into Spanish some years earlier and this translation 
served as a model for the progressive Mining Ordinance of New 
Spain that Charles III issued in 1783. The King considered 
applying the same Ordinance to the newly created viceroyalty 
of Rio de la Plata. He believed that mineral production in 
the new colony might improve if the new mining laws were 
applied along the Ordinance of Intendants. When copies of
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Ordinance of Intendants were distributed to the governors of 
mining intendancies, a copy of the new mining code was 
included with instructions that the officials study it and 
give their opinion as to whether or not its adoption would 
help silver production.
For two years no decision was made about applying 
the Mexican Code. Then in 1785, Jos6 de Galvez wrote to 
Superintendent Sanz informing him that the King, concerned 
with the decadent state of mining caused by "the lack of 
method with which the mining centers are governed" and by 
frequent and prolonged litigations between miners, had 
decided to apply the Mining Code of New Spain to Rio de la 
Plata. Galvez continued that the application of the new code 
would be left to local authorities.
The most important aspect of the Mexican Ordinance 
was the creation of the Royal Tribunal General of the 
Important Body of Mining of New Spain, which was to have con­
trol of all the administrative and economic functions of 
mining in New Spain. In particular, it would be aware of the 
discoveries, claims, ownership, extent of drainage, destruc­
tion of pillars in mines, and all that should occur in 
violation of the ordinance. The Viceroy was to appoint
members of the powerful tribunal from the ranks of practicing
25mine proprietors with at least ten years experience. In 
the Rio de la Plata, Charles III intended that the Tribunal
^5Maria Becerra, Derecho Minero de Mfexico (Mexico 
City: Editorial Limusa-Wiley, 1963), p. 69.
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be established in Potosi and that necessary judges and 
deputies be appointed in other mining centers when needed.
The Intendant Governor of Potosi would preside over the 
Tribunal instead of a special Administrator General as in 
Mexico.
Sanz knew that this radical change might be unpopular 
in Upper Peru. He also knew that Juan del Pino Manrique was a 
favorite of the powerful Galvez. The Superintendent shrewdly 
withheld any comment on the desirability of applying the 
Mexican Code in Potosi. Without delay, he forwarded the 
correspondence from Madrid to the Intendant Governor of 
Potosi along with a flattering note asking for his recommenda­
tions.
Six months after receiving this correspondence, Pino 
Manrique sent a long reply to Sanz. The Intendant of the 
mining center was aided in the preparation of this letter by 
his brilliant and ambitious teniente asesor, Pedro Vicente 
Canete, whose advancement in colonial government was frus­
trated only by his Creole birth in Asuncidn in 1754. Their 
report began by describing the organization and functioning 
of the Tribunal General of New Spain, and speculating on how 
such a body would work in Potosi. They noted that since Pino 
had served for years in Mexico, he was equally familiar with 
both areas and qualified to comment. Pino and Canete empha­
sized the differences between Mexico and Upper Peru, especially 
their contrasting geological deposits and levels of mining 
development. They wrote that New Spain had a first rate
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capital city with a population of over half a million, and 
that it was connected to the mining regions by good roads. 
Potosi, on the other hand, was just a mining town of scarcely 
40,000, and other mining sites, many of them almost inacces­
sible, were scattered over a large area. The mining towns of 
Mexico were more permanent while in Upper Peru, the mining 
camps were set up around one mine, and abandoned when the 
mine was depleted.
Another reason that Pino and Canete gave for not 
establishing a mining tribunal in Potosi was that Upper Peru 
lacked knowledgeable, technically qualified miners to serve 
on one. Mexico, though, had the advantage of many competent 
miners who were anxious to share their proficiency. Moreover 
there was much rivalry among the azogueros of Potosi over the 
distribution of available assistance funds and mita workers, 
and the intendant governor and his advisor feared that any 
azogueros who were appointed would use their positions to 
accommodate themselves and their allies and to harm their 
enemies. Therefore, they believed that it would be better 
not to divide the power to administer funds and workers among
members of a locally elected tribunal, but to leave it con-
27centrated in the hands of the intendant governor.
26Qunnar Mendoza, El doctor don Pedro Vicente Canete 
y su Historia flsica y polltica de Potosi (Sucre: Univ'ersidad
de San Francisco Xavier, 1954), p. 127.
27Ibid
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The petition from Potosi contained other arguments 
why a mining tribunal was inappropriate for Upper Peru. The 
Crown had proposed that the Casa de Moneda charge an additional 
real for each mark of silver it acquired in order to finance 
the tribunal. This charge, according to Pino and Canete, 
would work a hardship on the local producers, induce them to 
sell illegally to private merchants, and thus cost the Crown 
the royal tenths it would have earned. The Mexican Ordinance 
provided for redoing the subterranean architecture in the 
mines, to which the Potosi officials replied that the Cerro 
Rico was already so riddled with tunnels and caverns that any 
attempt to improve the tunnel work could result in a disas- 
terous collapse. Another provision of the Mexican law that 
they objected to was that only four percent of the Indian 
population was subject to the mita. They argued that by 
subjecting a larger number of Indians to the service, the 
work would be divided and a smaller burden assumed by each 
native. Under the Toledan Ordinance, which they defended as 
durable and adequate, a full seventh of the Indian population 
was subject to the service. A part of the Mexican Code that 
they did agree with was the establishment of a mining academy, 
but they requested the appointment of professors who were 
familiar with Alto Peruvian ores, "which are distinct from 
those found elsewhere, " and that modern European textbooks be 
purchased.28
28ibid., p. 130.
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Pino and Canete concluded their report by reiterating 
that a Mining Tribunal in Potosi was not feasible and sug­
gested that the existing Azogueros * Guild of Potosi retain 
its powers of recommendation but that it not be given 
judicial powers. The teniente asesor would retain these. 
Concerning the Toledan laws that currently governed mining in 
Upper Peru, they recognized the possibility for improvement 
and recommended examination of the two hundred year old code, 
former Governor Escobedo's provisions for the Banco de San 
Carlos, and the Mining Code for New Spain; and the adoption 
of appropriate parts of each group of rules. Finally, Pino 
Manrique volunteered to begin working on such a Mining Code
for Potosi using his own "short talents" and Canete's 
9 9assistance.
When Superintendent Sanz received the report in 
September, 1786, he immediately forwarded it to Galvez in 
Madrid, along with his enthusiastic approval of the plan for 
a new mining code, and praise for the well-connected Pino, 
saying that he was well qualified to compile the ordinances. 
The next year when Galvez received the proposal and its 
accompanying endorsement, he approved the plan for new 
ordinances for Potosi and Charles III concurred. Galvez wrote 
Sanz on April 8 , 1787, saying that the King agreed that there 
would be problems involved in applying the Mexican Code to 
Upper Peru, and that only the appropriate laws of the Code
29Ibid.
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should be combined into a new code for Upper Peru. The laws 
were to be put into effect by the Viceroy as soon as they 
were ready provided that no objections were raised in Potosi.
Pino Manrique meanwhile busied himself preparing the 
Code. He had quarreled with Canete over the expanded judicial 
role of the teniente asesor that they had both advocated . 
earlier, so the intendant governor compiled a code by himself. 
Pino sent his laws to Sanz on November 16, 1787, and they 
were similar to the Mining Code of New Spain that he had 
maligned the year before. They provided for the creation of 
a tribunal of azogueros to administer mineral affairs in 
Upper Peru. With Galvez dead, however, Sanz was not as 
receptive and praising of Pino Manrique1s work as he had been 
earlier. The Superintendent wrote the Intendant Governor 
that he needed time to study his new Ordinance, and he 
omitted the exaggerated praise of Pino that he had included 
in previous letters. Bureaucratic confusion in Spain and 
bureaucratic stalling in Buenos Aires prevented the new laws 
from being accepted in spite of Galvez's decree of April 8 , 
1787, approving the proposal. When Pino Manrique left Potosi 
for Lima in 1788 he was bitter because nothing more was done 
to pass his code.
In 1790 after Sanz had become intendant governor of 
Potosi, Canete requested permission to continue working on 
the code. Sanz agreed that new legislation was desirable.
He mailed Canete's proposal along with his own endorsement to 
Viceroy Arredondo who forwarded the information to Spain, but
no action was taken at that time.
The next year, the Crown sent orders transferring 
Canete to the asesoria of La Paz. When the orders arrived, 
Sanz again endorsed the proposed legislation and requested 
that Canete be allowed to stay in Potosi to complete the work. 
The Spanish authorities took Sanz's advice and Canete 
remained.
One of the reforms that Nordenflicht had recommended 
was the creation of new and rational mining laws for Upper 
Peru based on the ones in Saxony, Bohemia, and Harz district, 
Prussia, and other regions of Europe. Sanz and Canete used 
the Germans1 criticisms of the existing mining code to induce 
Spanish authorities to give them a free hand in the prepara­
tion of a new code. While the Mission was in Potosi, Canete 
wrote to Pr. Vald6 z and criticized production techniques in 
Potosi, suggesting that they could be improved with better 
laws.
Sanz made a visita to a mine and reported, "After 
only a short observation, I began to recognize that the 
economy practiced in the management of the mines has been 
entirely empirical and common practice has had more bearing 
on how silver was mined than have royal orders so that it 
[common practice] has more importance than the law. " Sanz 
went on to decry archaic methods, floods, landslides, and the
3®Sanz to Gardoqui, Potosi, September 26, 1792, AGI, 
Charcas 440.
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ignorance that pervaded the industry. He expressed hope that 
the new body of legislation that he and Canete were charged 
with compiling would resolve many of those problems. Sanz 
wrote that the passage of time and changes of technique had 
rendered the Toledan Ordinance out of date. In his report, 
Sanz called the mita "the prime mover of mining in Potosi, " 
and he proposed better laws to protect the Indians from abuse. 
"I judge it indispensible," he concluded, "that a new judicial 
code be formed in order to include needed provisions missing 
from the present code, correcting the enormous abuses and 
determining more carefully each official's function.
The request obtained the desired results. On June 3, 
1791, Minister Pedro Ldpez de Lerena of the Council of the 
Indies sent a royal order to Viceroy Arredondo stating that 
Charles IV had learned with satisfaction of the results 
obtained with the barrel method, and he had decided to approve 
whatever provision that Sanz wanted to issue to improve pro­
duction. He agreed to enlarge the fund of the Banco de San 
Carlos to 200,000 pesos to help the miners and to pay for more 
barrel machines. In answer to Sanz's special request, the 
Crown consented to his proposal to revise the mining laws in 
Potosl, making them applicable to local problems and indicated 
that the code that Sanz and Canete had produced would be 
approved as long as the azoqueros concurred, since they would 
be most directly affected. Lerena also informed Arredondo 
that it was the King's will that once he (Arredondo) approved 
the new law, it should be put into effect.
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Not all of Sanz's efforts to influence powerful
authorities in Spain succeeded., however. Jacinto Sanchez, an
agent of Sanz's in Spain, requested in 1793 that the Governor
be appointed a Minister of the Council of the Indies.
Sanchez cited Sanz's previous experience and dependability as
qualifications. In the margin of Sanchez's letter, an official
noted, "see if the interested party [Sanz] has made a similar
application; if not, wait until he does so by way of the
viceroy, as he should." Apparently, Sanz never personally
31repeated the request, and he remained in Potosi.
Meanwhile, Canete and Sanz continued to work on the 
new Mining Code and by 1794, it was completed. However, a 
royal c6dula dated February 5, 1794, named Pedro Melo de 
Portugal to replace Arredondo as Viceroy, but he was not to 
take office until the following year. Sanz, therefore, sent 
the finished Cddigo Carolino de ordenanzas reales de las 
minas de Potosi y dem&s Provincias del Rio de la Plata to 
Arredondo. In his accompanying letter, Sanz criticized Pino 
Manrique's code of 1787 as being too similar to the Mexican 
Ordinance that Pino himself had denounced the year before 
(1786). Sanz continued that "laws well received are laws 
well observed," and he noted that most of the azogueros 
admired and praised the Cddigo Carolino.
The Code that Cafiete prepared with Intendant Governor
^Jacinto Sanches to Crown, Madrid, December 3, 
1793, AGI, Charcas 434.
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Sanz's cooperation and approval was not an original piece of 
legislation. It was a compilation of parts of the old laws 
for Peru issued by Toledo and other authorities, of the 
mining code for New Spain of 1783, and of royal orders from 
the past two centuries. Parts of the Code that dealt with 
local issues such as the favored treatment of those azogueros 
who rented rather than owned their holdings, and the strict 
regulation of capchas (gleaners who were allowed to enter the 
mines on weekends) made it unique. The lengthy code was 544 
double-faced pages long and it was divided into three books 
containing titles and ordinances.
Perhaps the greatest departure from previous regula­
tions and certainly the part of the Code that caused the most 
controversy was Title VIII of Book II. Ordinances I and II 
of this title called for a new repartimiento of Indians based 
on the latest census figures. Since there had been no new 
repartimiento since 1692, a new census would reveal more 
Indians and the seventh destined for the mita would conse- 
quently be larger. In Ordinance VI, Canete denounced the 
"notorious excesses in assignments (of Indians) made by 
Viceroy Conde de Monclova in 1692, saying that forty workers 
had been assigned to each silver mine and refinery to do work 
that could be done by thirteen men working in shifts of four 
with one alternate. The result of this carelessness was that 
the workers barely produced enough to pay for the food that 
they ate and they suffered from the disorderliness. Canete's 
remedy for the situation was to limit to thirteen the number
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of Indians assigned to each refinery. "But since the present 
state of the Cerro Rico de Potosi necessitates many more 
workers than before for the removal of metals," seventy-five 
Indians should be assigned to each head of a mine in addition 
to the thirteen already assigned to all refinery heads.
In title VIII, Book II of the Cddigo Carolino, Sanz 
and Canete accomplished a seemingly paradoxical end by 
decreeing there would be an increase in the number of mita 
workers in Potosi while declaring that too many of them were 
employed in the refineries. In order to acquire the approval 
of the azogueros that was mentioned in the Royal Order of 
June 3, 1791, Sanz and Caflete had the entire code read aloud 
before a dozen representatives of the Gremio de Azogueros, 
and all but one, Joaquin de la Quintana, signed it. Quintana 
wrote Viceroy Arredondo in 1794 that the azogueros 1 examina­
tion of the Code had been precursory and that they had been 
subjected to pressure from Sanz and Canete to sign it. He 
also alleged that only a few wealthy azogueros would benefit.
Quintana was quickly joined by Fiscal Victorian de 
Villava of the Audiencia of Charcas in opposing the adoption 
of the new Code. Other azogueros later expressed to the 
Viceroy displeasure with the new laws. Arredondo in the next 
few months received much correspondence in favor of and 
against the Cddigo Carolino, and he did not want to put it 
into effect just as he was leaving office. He therefore sent 
the Code to Madrid for the Council of the Indies to accept or 
reject. After the members of a junta of the Council read the
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laws, they criticized them for being too long and full of 
inappropriate historical allusions. They censured Canete for 
presuming— with his lack of mining experience— to issue 
singlehandedly a mineral code to supplant the one of the 
great Toledo. The junta did not formally reject the Code but 
they struck at its heart by recommending that the mita not be 
extended and that new grants of Indian mita workers be revoked.
The real issue in whether or not to accept the Sanz- 
Canete Cddigo Carolino was the extension of the mita. Villava 
had already written an eloquent indictment of the service-^ 
and hoping to sway influential opinions in the Viceroyalty and 
in Spain, Sanz wrote a defence of the mita. Most of Sanz's 
energy for the remainder of the decade would be spent 
debating this issue.
-^“Discurso Sobre la Mita de Potosi," La Plata, 
March 9, 1793, copy in Ricardo Levene, Vida y Escritos de 
Victorian de Villava (Buenos Aires: Peuser, S\a ., 1946),
pp. xxx-xxix. See Ch. V.
Chapter V
POLEMICS OVER THE MITA
After the Nordenflicht Mission had left Potosi and 
Loreto had left Buenos Aires, San2 was ahle to devote his 
time and energy to local issues. The principal issue that 
he faced during the 1790's was the preservation of the right 
of Potosi miners to force highland Indians to work in their 
mines. Churchmen and statesmen over the years had attacked 
the mita system as inhumane. The latest opponent was 
Victorian de Villava, Fiscal of the Audiencia of charcas. 
Villava called the system not only barbaric, but also unpro­
ductive. These two Spaniards published broadsides and 
exchanged caustic letters on the issue. Their frantic 
appeals were read by officials of the superior government in 
Buenos Aires, and eventually reached the attention of 
officials at the royal court in Spain. By 1795 the debate 
had become more specific and its focus had shifted from the 
moral propriety of compulsory Indian labor to whether the 
natives fared better working in the mines of Potosi or 
laboring on Church haciendas in the adjacent province of 
Chayanta. In this latter phase of the debate, Sanz and the 
azogueros argued one way while Villava and the priests of
Ch. ay ant a argued another.
Attracting or compelling laborers to work in Potosi's 
mines had been a continuing problem of the mine operators 
there since shortly after the discovery# and the labor short­
age continued into the eighteenth century. A letter from 
officials of the Caja Real to the Crown dated May 28, 1714,^ 
complained that after Viceroy Toledo had fixed the number of 
Indians to be sent from each village to work in Potosi# that 
number had been reduced greatly by Viceroy Conde de Monclova 
in 1692. They wrote that the number of mita Indians was 
diminishing every day because of the falling population, but 
that the priests still retained the same number of Indian 
workers on their missions as always. The officers of the 
Caja Real suggested that fewer Indians be assigned to the 
missions so more would be available to work in the mines# 
since "it is certain that the larger the number of people 
working in the mines# the more silver can be taken from them." 
The idea that the priests deprived the mita of workers would 
be a major theme of the azogueros and their advocates for the 
remainder of the century.
Another document, "The Rules of the Presidio del 
Cerro, " issued by Sanz in May of 1791, provides more
^■Officials of the Caja Real to Crown, Potosi, May 28, 
1714, Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones Histdricas 
(Potosi, Bolivia), Vol. I (1959-60), 52.
^Sanz, Reglamento del Presidio del Cerro, Potosi,
May, 1791, Revista de Investiqacion, 53-61.
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evidence of the shortage of labor as well as an interesting 
insight into Spanish colonial penology. In this document it 
was specified that criminals could be sentenced to the mines. 
The regulations specified that the warden should keep records 
of the names, nationalities, and ages of the prisoners, and 
count his charges every day. The warden was to take care to 
prevent any association between prisoners to avoid a dangerous 
escape conspiracy and "recognizing that some prisoners live 
with too much familiarity, and that a bad example or scandal 
might result, the warden will not permit them to associate 
either inside or outside their cells."
The rules described in detail how the prison was to 
be run, even stating what the inmates were to be fed and the 
exact salaries of the warden and guards. Subtly mentioned 
within the text was perhaps the main point of the regulations: 
"Since they are criminals who have deprived people of the 
fruits of their industry, they must repay society by working 
in the mines for six hours daily."
The need for forced workers in Potosi increased in 
the 1790's. Pressure from Spain to expand royal revenues 
from mining was evident in the Bourbon Reforms. The Council 
of the Indies nearly applied the Mining Code of New Spain to 
Peru. This move was headed off by the maneuverings of Sanz 
(then Superintendent of Hacienda), Canete and Juan del Pino 
Manrique (Governor of Potosi). Under these laws, any unpro­
ductive mine would have been confiscated. Indeed, there was 
pressure on azogueros just to make a living in that depressed
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hill which had already been intensely mined for 250 years. 
Lucrative abuses of the mita were rampant. In the last years 
of Spanish control, some "miners" who no longer worked their 
holdings still retained the right to receive mita workers, 
whose services they sold to operating miners. Others with no 
intention of operating their mines chose to receive the 
rezago or payment in money instead of labor. This cash was 
forcefully collected from subject Indians by enteradores. 
officials charged with getting the Indians to the mines or 
collecting their rezaqos.^  Productively or illicitly, the 
mita Indians were responsible for a great deal of the silver 
produced and the money earned in Potosi. Sin mita no habr3 
Potosi^ was a recurrent theme in representations of the 
azogueros to the Crown and in the writings of Sanz.
A powerful and interested group such as the azogueros 
who profited from the mita would understandably oppose any 
effort to decrease or abolish the institution. Therefore, 
when Victorian de Villava released his damning Discurso 
Sobre la Mita de Potosi on March 9, 1793, he triggered a 
prolonged and arduous debate over the mita. Sanz, already in 
the process of expanding the mita, responded to Villava's 
opening volley by issuing the ContestaciOn al Discurso Sobre
^Maria del Carmen Cortes Salinas, "Una PolSmica en 
Tomo a la Mita de Potosi a Pines del Siglo XVIII. El 
Discurso de Francisco de Paula Sanz a Favor de Ella,"
Revista de Indias (enero-diciembre, 1970), p. 173.
^Without the mita, there would be no Potosi.
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la Mita de Potosi, which was dated November 19, 1794. Sanz 
depended on the aid of his legal advisor Teniente Asesor 
Pedro Vicente Canete for help with this and other writings 
on the mita. Villava answered Stanz and Canete promptly with 
the Contrarr^plica a la Contestaci6n de Paula Sanz released 
on January 3, 1795. These three documents constitute the 
first round of the mita polemics of the 1790's. The second 
round began in 1795, and included personal insults, threats, 
and legal connivance.
Villava, the catalyst of the debate, was the son of 
a wealthy family in Aragon, where his father was a minister 
of the royal audiencia. As a young man, Villava was a law 
professor at the University of Huesca, as well as a practicing 
attorney. In 1783, Villava applied for a post in the newly 
reestablished Audiencia of Rio de la Plata but was disap­
pointed and returned to the University. He was interested 
in economics, and in 1784 translated Readings in Commerce or 
Civil Economics by Antonio Genovesi of the University of 
Napoles. Six years after losing his first bid for a position 
in the colonies, Villava was designated Fiscal of the
C
Audiencia of Charcas.
The new official arrived in Buenos Aires in May of 
1790 and was required to remain there for one year to act as 
juez residencidor for the departing Viceroy Marqu6s de
5Ricardo Levene, Vida v Escritos de Victorian de 
Villava (Buenos Aires: Peuser, S.A., 1946), p. 14.
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Loreto. Following the residencia, he proceeded to his new 
post in La Plata. In the highlands, Villava was appalled by 
the spectacle of thousands of Indian mita workers in Potosi 
and thousands more forced to work in religious parishes and 
on haciendas. Their suffering and economic waste inspired 
the liberal Fiscal to write his Discurso Sobre la Mita de 
Potosi.
Villava introduced his treatise by saying that much 
had been written, pro and con, about forced labor since 1545, 
and that almost always "the voices of Interests have pre­
vailed and suffocated the voices of humanity." Furthermore,
If my thoughts add nothing to what has already been 
written, the soundness of my intention will excuse my 
iirqpertinence: but if I am able to render doubtful
some of the propositions which have been accepted as 
true and to verify others which have been held 
doubtful, I will have accomplished the purpose of my 
work.
The introduction continued that it had been supposed that 
mining was public and that the indolence of the Indians was 
incontestable; therefore, they could justly be forced to work. 
Villava stated his purposes to be proving that the mines of 
Potosi were not public utilities any more than were farms or 
factories, and that the Indian was not indifferent to work 
especially when he was assured of his earnings. For clarity 
and order, the Fiscal divided his Discurso into four points: 
(1 ) that the work in the mines is not public; (2 ) that even 
if it were public, it would not justify forced Indian labor;
(3) that the Indian is not as indolent as is thought; and
(4) that even if the Indian were extremely indolent, he
should not be compelled to do this work.
Villava marshaled strong arguments in this succinct 
and logically tight paper, which manifested his expertise in 
the new science of economics. His statement in part one 
that gold and silver were valuable only as a medium of 
exchange, and that vast accumulations of precious metals held 
no advantage for a country, was a reflection of the Enlight- 
ment challenge to the established mercantilistic view of 
economics. Moreover, he recognized in the same section that 
wealth produced by farming found its way into the economic 
cycle just as mineral wealth did.
The Potosi miners and refiners were scandalized and 
frightened by the theory and the proposals of Villava, 
especially after the Discurso had been widely circulated.
They feared that Villava would focus opposition on the 
crumbling institution and, with his position as fiscal and 
his eloquence, strike at its legal foundation. Indians and 
their representatives took seriously the fiscal's other title, 
protector of Indians, and began to address pleas to him for 
relief from the mita. When a copy of the Discurso reached 
Sanz, he realized that a man like Villava could tilt the
g
balance of influential opinion against the mita. Therefore 
he and Canete gathered voluminous evidence to refute 
Villava's Discurso. and to reduce its effect. The result is 
Sanz's Contestaci6n al discurso Sobre la mita de Potosi
Q
Cortes Salinas, "Una Pol&nica," p. 175.
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which circulated during 1794.
The ContestaciOn is ponderous and at times overly 
thorough. It consists of ninety handwritten pages and nine 
statistical tables, while the document it answers is only 
twelve pages long. Sanz used the same four-point format as 
Villava and provided a conservative rebuttal for all of the 
Fiscal's arguments. Under the title, Sanz quoted Cicero,
"The well-being of the state is the first and principal law," 
which was one of Sanz's major themes. Sanz's introduction 
commended Villava's erudition and energy but regretted his 
ignorance of the practical aspects of mining and the mita. 
The Governor added that the Discurso had tinjustly maligned 
the teniente asesor, the azogueros, and Sanz himself as the 
cruelest of men. The Sanz-Canete rejoinder expressed the 
view of most of the azogueros in Potosi as well as a con­
servative counter-view to Villava's economic liberalism.
The first point of the Contestaci6n was "The work of 
the mines of Potosi should not be considered with the other 
private occupations of the republic, but should justly and 
properly be called public." By public," Sanz meant that 
mines were always a part of the Spanish king's property. He 
cited examples of other European monarchs who retained 
possession of their mineral deposits. No individual, there­
fore, could own a mine since they were "public." Sanz 
supported his second point that "The Indian is even more
7Ibid.. pp. 171-214
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indolent than described by the author of the Discurso." with 
numerous examples. He blamed the use of coca for the 
"subjugation of the rational part of the Indian to his animal 
instincts." He pictured the natives as subhumans, just as 
they had been presented by encomenderos and miners since the 
time of Columbus. Sanz emphasized that the mita brought the 
Indian into contact with civilization, from which he would 
benefit from religion and culture. This argument had been 
used before and was in contrast with the Enlightenment view 
of man and the concept of the "Noble Savage."
Point III was entitled "Granting this indolence, 
whatever its cause, the service of the mita is useful and 
beneficial to the Indian." Sanz alleged that the mita 
benefited the Indians by keeping them profitably employed in 
the mining industry, which saved them from trying to farm in 
a land that was more suited for mining than for agriculture. 
Sanz acknowledged that abuses of mita workers may have 
existed in the past, but he gave assurances that working 
conditions had improved greatly. The title of the final 
point, "The mita is advantageous to the State, consequently 
the Indian can justly be compelled to work," sums up Sanz's 
arguments and expresses how he viewed the situation. This 
point together with his first point, that the mines were 
"public" suggested that compelling the Indians to work in 
mines was justified since it was for the public good.
Shortly after Sanz's paper was released in November, 
1794, Villava received several testimonies against the
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service from disgruntled Indians and their legal representa­
tives.8 Francisco de Viedma, Governor of Cochabamba, wrote 
and described the choco (lung disease) suffered by the 
Indians of his province who worked in the ingenios. He 
emphasized the harmful effects of the mita on Cochabamba.
The Marquds de Casa Hermosa, Governor of Chucuito, wrote a 
similar letter dated December 6 , 1794, and explained how the 
Indians were either not paid or were paid in credit from 
pulperias at an enormous interest rate. He added that "What 
is certain is that the Indians have a horror worse than 
panic of the mita, " and that those who could, paid the 
corrupt caciques as much as one hundred pesos to avoid the 
service.
Hoping to win more support for his cause, Villava 
quickly replied to Sanz's paper. His Contrarreplica a la 
"Contestacidn de Paula Sanz"9 was in keeping with his concise 
style, but he occasionally resorted to sarcasm to scorn the 
Potosi government, and the debate began to degenerate into a 
feud. He alluded again to his impertinence in criticizing 
the mita but pointed out that, he was in the company of other 
impertinent critics who included two former viceroys, Conde 
de Lemus and Conde de Monclova, as well as King Phillip III. 
Responding to Sanz's first point, Villava wrote that he did
8Informes dirigidas por diversas personas al Dr. 
Victori&n de Villava contra la mita de Potosi, ANB, Minas 
vol. 129, no. VII.
^Levene, Vida v Escritos, pp. XXXIX-LIV.
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not need the "great jurisconsult" to explain to him the 
King's right of eminent domain, but that mine owners like 
landowners had the right to sell, give, or bequeath their 
holdings, something they could not do if they were merely 
stewards. The Fiscal showed mock surprise that owners of 
land did not have subsurface rights, and could not even dig 
wells on their property. "I even thought that if someone 
found veins of metal on his property, and revealed them to 
the government as prescribed by the mining laws, he could 
work the veins."
Villava scorned the new Code of the Intendents as 
being just a change of names. The Indian was still oppressed, 
and "it is of little importance to him whether the oppressors 
call themselves Governors, Subdelegates, Asesores, or 
Corregidores." "The-Indian is not stupid," he continued,
"but a product of his misery, oppression, and lack of con­
fidence." He complained that none of the mitigating laws of 
the mita was obeyed, and that if Indians were used only to 
transport ore, as Sanz wrote, "burros could easily be 
substituted. The truth is that the mitayo does everything 
in the mines for a small amount of money, which only benefits 
the azogueros."
The Fiscal questioned the validity of the copious 
figures and tables which Sanz presented as evidence in the 
Contestacidn. Tribute lists were doubtful sources of popula­
tion data because the number of contributors reported varied 
from year to year with the zeal of the revis itadores (census
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takers) and the corruption of the subdelecrados (who some­
times reported fewer Indians than there really were in order 
to collect their tribute and keep it themselves). Villava 
ridiculed the financial accounts that Sanz included in his 
paper. The total amount of chica reportedly consumed by the 
mitayos. when divided by the number of Indians equaled more 
than an arroba per day.
Repeating his economic arguments, Villava wrote that 
agriculture and commerce were more important than mining and 
that if there were no demand for food products, the mita 
Indians should be free to plant timber or raise other products 
for which a demand existed. He concluded by stating that his 
purpose in writing the Discurso was to comply with Law 23,
Book 6 , Title 12, of the Recopilacidn which stated that 
royal officials, especially fiscals, must be on guard against 
any enlargement of the mita and against abuses to the Indians.
These three papers, constituting the first round of 
the mita debate, reached a large audience of educated and 
interested individuals in Upper Peru. The royal authorities 
in Spain also read the papers with important consequences to 
be discussed later. Several themes ran through the exchanges. 
The most important were: whether or not serving in the mita
was harmful to Indians, the right of a person to be idle and 
of the government to force him to work, whether mining was a 
public activity, the value of precious metals for a govern­
ment, and the economic usefulness of the mita.
Humane treatment of the Indians, although a minor
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point, was not the most important theme of the polonies.
More energy was devoted to the economic justification or 
discreditation of the Potosi mita than to other issues. 
Earning royal revenues was, after all, the principal purpose 
of Spain's colonial empire. Villava, however, questioned 
the value which had always been placed on the accumulation 
of gold and silver. Steeped in liberal economic thought, he 
advocated farming and commerce as better means of producing 
and accumulating wealth. He also held that precious metals 
were only good as a circulating means of exchange. Sanz, on 
the other hand, upheld the traditional view that specie 
represented strength and that governments should amass large 
treasuries. The two men's differing opinions of the decadant 
state of Potosi showed the mercantilistic and liberal view­
points on the purpose of colonies. Villava saw Potosi as a 
desolate area devoid of impressive public buildings, and he 
recommended that people be allowed to pursue their own 
economic interests which would in turn benefit the entire 
Kingdom. To Sanz, however, Potosi was already serving the 
realm as a "fountain which diffused wealth throughout the 
Kingdom." The mita debate is of interest because it is an 
example of a confrontation between the mercantilistic and 
the liberal conceptions of the importance of specie and of 
how colonies should be used.
Villava, with his university background in political 
economy and law, was clearly superior to Sanz and Canete as 
a polimicist; but Upper Peru was not a university debating
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hall and Sanz was not intimidated. He was fortified with 
nearly twenty years of experience in colonial administration. 
The teniente asesor had already prepared the Cddiqo Carolino 
which would have expanded the mita to nearly double its size. 
The governor had secured royal permission10 for an increase 
in mita workers small in number but large in consequence.
This "neuva mita" was to consume the energy and even the 
health of both antagonists for the next several years. Legal 
maneuvering and evasion were Sanz's strong points, and he 
would be able to thwart Villava and the impotent Audiencia 
of Charcas on several issues and at least keep the mita from 
being decreased.
After the first exchange with Villava, Sanz reworked 
and reissued some of the arguments that the mita was not 
harmful— indeed that it was beneficial to the Indian. But 
most of the pro-mita debate that came out of the Potosi 
pretorial in the late 1790's affirmed the azogueros' right to 
bring even more Indians to Potosi from Chayanta, to the north. 
In 1789 the King had rewarded several wealthy azogueros with 
the right to use additional workers from the seventh of the 
Indian population that was to be sent from that partido "to 
reward the merit, disbursements, suffering, and fatigue that 
they had expended in the construction of an extremely costly
10Real Orden al virrey de Buenos Aires, Madrid, 
May 5, 1793, ANB, Minas vol. 41, foja 15.
refining [barrel] machine.11
The Potosi azocyueros. however, were not the only ones 
interested in the Chayanta Indian's labor. In November,
1794, Pedro Francisco de Arizmendi, the subdelegate (regional 
governor) of the partido of Chayanta, described the diffi­
culties of the Indians in his district, including fatigue 
and disease resulting from serving in the mita. Arizmendi 
noted that in addition to having to worh in the mines, the 
Indians from his province were called upon to perform 
excessive services for the priests of Chayanta. To lighten 
their burden, he recommended fair application of the existing
mita laws by the secular authorities, and moderation by the
12priests. The priests objected to the larger labor con­
tribution expected of Chayanta, and the partido sent only the 
usual allotment to Potosi in 1794. The Potosi government 
(Sanz and Caflete) reacted by setting up a pezquiza (investi­
gation) and a hearing, with the ultimate purpose of bringing 
legal action against the priests. This raised the point of 
whether ecclesiastics should be subject to secular law, and 
added a new dimension to the debate.
Villava responded to this tactic by circulating an 
essay called "Reflections on the Proceedings in Potosi 
Relative to the Conduct of the Priests of Chayanta, " which
1-*-Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, December 22, 
1796, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
1 2Arizmendi to Audiencia of Charcas, Pocoata, April 
22, 1795, ANB, Minas, vol. 129, no. XV.
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was signed "the Marques of Parana, " and dated Asuncion, 
February 10, 1795.^ Villava did this to foster the belief 
that his position was gaining the acceptance of important 
people throughout the viceroyalty. He began the essay by 
accusing Canete of "Usurping the sacred fueros (exemptions 
from secular laws), deprecating ecclesiastic authority, 
sustaining the triumph of the ’Maximum Tyrant' " by intro­
ducing the pezquiza. He called the judicial decree "nothing 
more than a cunning condemnation of the priests without 
trial and without legally examining their depositions, " and 
a case of a secular magistrate passing judgment independently 
of the prelate on the priests.
The "Marques of Par an A" concluded that there may 
actually have been "delinquencies and excesses" on the part 
of the priests, just as the writ from Potosi had charged.
He added, however, that if this were so, "only their prelate 
has been charged by God and the King with correcting and 
reforming their customs." Moreover, in only a few extreme 
cases in the history of Spanish law have secular authorities 
been given the power to try priests, and the priests of 
Chayanta had only been charged with moderate resistance to 
the orders of the subdelegate to send the Indians— not an 
extreme crime. According to Villava, Sanz's and Canete's
^Villava [El Marqufis de Parana], "Reflexiones sobre 
las actuaciones obradas en la Intendencia de Potosi, relativas 
a la conducta de los Curas de Chayanta, " Asuncion [actually 
La Plata], February 10, 1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. VI.
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prosecution of the priests went against Spanish legal tradi­
tion and even violated the law, and therefore the two could 
be accused of treason. The author of the essay also charged 
that the officials in Potosi were "endangering the govern­
ment, making justice groan, disturbing the tranquility, and 
arousing the malice of the Indians," by talking against the 
priests who held authority over them. He concluded that the 
priests had a moderating influence on the Chayanta Indians, 
having helped them since 1634, by building schools for them 
and by teaching them to stop living in concubinage and 
drunkenness.
Villava's pseudonymous essay of 1794 set the tone of 
the. debate for the next few years, and raised the major 
issues that he would argue with Sanz and Canete. The 
priests' right to use the Indians 1 labor versus the Potosi 
government's right to include the natives in the mita seventh 
was the principal point of disagreement.
Sanz and Cafiete defended their action of prosecuting 
the priests in answering the charges leveled by the Fiscal. 
Sanz wrote the Audiencia of Charcas and informed it that its 
Fiscal doubtless had the best of motives for the fears of an 
insurrection that he had expressed to the Sovereign, "in 
spite of the fact that the other members of the audiencia, 
the viceroy, and I are absolutely ignorant of them. " Sanz 
wrote that perhaps these motives had their origins in the 
fact that some self-interested individuals (the priests) 
wanted to make the audiencia fear that an uprising in
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Chayanta was imminent, and it was that false suspicion that 
caused the audiencia to issue prohibitions against the 
extension of the service in that province.1^ In another 
letter to the audiencia, Sanz wrote that just before the new 
mita was to be dispatched from Chayanta, the four priests 
there in an effort to thwart the action, raised the voice of 
opposition to the service among the Indians, and warned that 
a rebellion was possible. Villava repeated this warning to 
the audiencia, and they acted on the information.
Sanz had conceded that Chayanta "is the most belli­
cose province in these regions," and that it was the first 
to "raise the standards of independence in 1780 and 1781."
He warned that Indians in other mita provinces closely 
observed what was happening in Chayanta and could again 
imitate her example. Therefore the mita should be orderly 
dispatched since "who knows if they have already planned a 
general sedition, and the object of their indignation might 
be Potosi. Those against the mita (the priests and Villava)
have painted Potosi as a city of tyrants and assassins who
X6are enemies of the Indians ' health."
^Sanz to Audiencia, Potosi, December 22, 1796, ANB, 
Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
15Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15, 
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XV. In which Sanz recounted 
the Audiencia's action.
^Expediente instruido por [Sanz] sobre defectos con 
que corre hoy la mita del cerro y la ribera de dicha villa en 
los distintos partidos que la contribuyen, Potosi, December 
9, 1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V. Hereafter cited as 
Expediente instruido por Sanz.
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Pedro Francisco de Arizmendi resided in Pocoata, the 
seat of the partido1s government, and was perhaps better 
able to understand and assess the situation there. In a 
letter to the audiencia, he noted that rumors were being 
spread by "bad-intentioned people" that his territory was on 
the verge of an uprising and he felt obligated to explain to 
the audiencia what he believed was actually happening. 
Arizmendi did affirm that a disturbance had occurred in 
Pocoata, but that it was only the efforts of an ambitious 
Indian, Victoriano Ayra, aided by his followers to assume a 
vacant cacicazco. They spread rumors that there was no 
royal order for a new mita from Chayanta, and that the 
enlarged assignment was just the result of an intrigue by 
the caciques, subdelegates, and the Governor of Potosi, and 
these rumors had stimulated the disturbance. Arizmendi 
complained that the Indians in his district were overworked 
from having to serve both the Church and the azogueros in 
Potosi. He asked both of these groups to curtail their 
demands on the natives and requested that the audiencia 
establish precisely what each group could demand from the 
Indians. "If an agreement is made between the secular and 
the ecclesiastical authorities, harmony, peace, and produc­
tivity will prevail in Chayanta. But if not, I will not be
17responsible for the upheaval that will result." '
•^Arizmendi to Audiencia of Charcas, Pocoata, April 
22, 1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
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Sanz perceived the situation in Chayanta as one in 
which there was potential danger of an Indian revolt, but 
not immediate danger. He agreed that the Indians were over­
worked, but not because they fulfilled their obligation to 
serve in the mita. The Governor blamed the priests for 
burdening the Indians excessively, to the detriment of the 
mining industry, and he believed that those same prients 
were spreading rumors of an impending uprising. Indian 
revolts in Upper Peru, whether real or imagined, were reason 
for alarm since Potosi had barely escaped devastation during 
the 1780 uprising, and La Plata had been besieged (see 
Chapter III). Therefore in 1795, when a Chayanta Indian 
named Lupa appeared in La Plata and told stories of a revolt 
brewing against the mita in Chayanta, the citizens became 
apprehensive. Villava and other opponents of the mita, 
however, were eager to use this information as evidence in 
the growing debate and warned that mita requirements should 
be reduced.
Sanz, in a dramatic effort to defend the increased
t
use of Chayanta workers for the mita, decided to inspect the 
partido personally to determine whether the possibility of a 
revolt existed. Another purpose of his visita was to observe 
and comment on the priests' treatment of the Indians. The 
Intendant Governor asked the Archbishop of Charcas to 
accompany him on the tour in order to investigate this, but
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18the Prelate refused. Sanz later chided him for not going, 
saying that he supposed the churchman "feared that the
i q
results would cover him with guilt, shame, and confusion,"
and that the artful priests used him in their own interests.
The visita was carried out in October, 1795 and, in order
not to alarm the Indians and cause them to flee or even
precipitate a revolt, Sanz decided to forego the bodyguard
of soldiers that normally accompanied him abroad, and took
20only his secretary.
The Governor began his tour in Pocoata where the sub­
delegate of the partido customarily dispatched the mitayos. 
This time, Sanz ordered that all Indians who were subject to 
the mita should gather in the town's plaza, as usual. There 
in the midst of the natives, Sanz
. . . inspected each Indian according to the rolls of 
his respective neighborhood. I heard their problems 
and satisfied their complaints. I was always surrounded 
by countless unfortunates who showed their humility and 
satisfaction at seeing me among them without wearing my 
sword. I did not perceive among the two or three 
thousand who surrounded me, nor even among those 
destined for the mita, the pathetic picture of the 
departure for Potosi that the Fiscal painted in his 
first Discourse against the service. I would like 
to have had him at my side so that he could have seen
*^®Expediente instruido por Sanz, Potosi, December 9,
1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V.
■^Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, December 22,
1796, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V.
^°Sanz to Pedro Melo de Portugal, Mataca (a country 
home where Sanz had gone to recuperate from an illness), 
October 24, 1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. IX.
137
all of the Indians dancing in circles and cele­
brating .21
Sanz then personally dispatched the workers whose turn it 
was to go to Potosi, and he reported no difficulty in doing 
so.
Later in a report to the audiencia, the Intendant 
Governor indicated that there was no reason to fear a revolt 
from these Indians against their mita duties. He reminded 
the oidores that even in April, 1781, when the revolt broke 
out in Pocoata, the mita detachment was sent to Potosi 
tranquilly and promptly, and the mitayos helped to defend 
the city against their rebellious compatriots. Also Sanz 
wrote that the caciques as a group and individually had dis­
credited Lupa, the Indian who spread the story of revolt in 
the partido, and that Lupa's parish priest had characterized
pp
him as an imposter. Sanz observed that the Indians there 
were always prompt to serve in the mita and that they did not 
show displeasure.
The Governor did not neglect the other purpose of 
his visita, to observe the priests' treatment of the Indians 
in Chayanta and to report any abuse he encountered. After 
he had dispatched the mita at Pocoata, he met with all of 
the caciques in the partido in the only church in the town. 
Many of them had petitions against the excessive number of
21Ibid.
22Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, December 22, 
1796, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V.
-their people who were employed in the obligatory church 
functions and services. To justify their petitions, they 
presented Indians who had served the priests that year and 
the year before, and these workers testified that they had 
received very little pay. Sanz heard the complaints, 
expressed indignation, and ordered the Indians not to per­
form any more labor for the priests.
Several Indian leaders bitterly complained to Sanz
of the excessive duties that their priests exacted from them.
They reported that the churchmen had used violence and
threats to force the natives to pay for burials, weddings
and Masses. They asked to be freed from the obligation to
provide the priests with food in addition to what they
already had to contribute for church services and fiestas.
Sanz added that some areas simply did not have enough
population to send mita workers to Potosi, and had therefore
received special ten-year exemptions from the service.
Others, however, like the community of Acazio, had more than
enough Indians to fill their mita quotas, but were unable to
do so because the priests employed them in personal 
24.services.^
As he continued the tour, Sanz commented on other 
improprieties that he observed in the behavior of the 
"shepherds toward their flock."
^Sanz to Melo de Portugal, Mataca, October 24, 1795, 
ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. IX.
24Ibid.
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In one after another of the parcialidades [of Chayanta]
I followed the same procedures xn reporting on the state 
of the partido. Afterwards, I retired to form my 
opinion on the basis of what I saw, as was my obligation 
as a minister of the government and as a Catholic.25
He expressed outrage at the "indecorous and hateful super­
stition that the priests scandalously practice in the name 
of our sacred religion," and he described an All Saints1 Day 
ceremony in which the priests displayed the dead bodies of 
relatives of their parishioners as they asked for alms, and 
charged the Indians three or four pesos for a benediction 
from Christ, the Virgin, or any other saint.2^
Sanz cited these observations to support the charges 
that he and Cahete had made earlier, that the priests abused 
the Indians and inculcated in them the idea that the mita was 
unjust and that the Potosi azogueros were tyrants. He 
accused them of imprisoning the Indians so that the officials 
could not send them to Potosi, while the Fiscal did nothing 
to prevent it. Sanz concluded his report by writing that the 
priests "look for more and more opportunities to inflict
0*7
their natural ferocity on the natives."'w
The Potosi officials speculated on the motives of the 
priests and Villava for committing these abuses and they con­
cluded that the priests simply wanted to continue enjoying 
their control over the natives of Chayanta and to profit 
from their unpaid labor. The statement made by Sanz that 
"the mita has as many opponents as there are people interested
25Ibid. 26Ibid. 2?Ibid.
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in profiting from the Indian," sums up his feelings about
the matter. He and his assistant also accused the Fiscal of
the Audiencia of Chareas of trying to eliminate the mita in
an effort to make himself famous. The hand of the verbose
Canete is apparent in the hyperbolic language and classical
allusions of a brief that characterized Villava as having
undergone an “admirable metamorphosis that transformed him
from protector of the natives into the staunch advocate of
tyrants and oppressors," and of proceeding
. . . with unbelievable energy desiring to make him­
self famous . . .  by following the Luciferian maxim 
celebramus nomen nostrum, which in antiquity disinte­
grated those insensitive people who insulted the 
Allmighty by laying the foundations of the Tower of 
Babel, that monument to their lunacy.28
Sanz and Cafiete blamed Villava for disrupting and 
endangering the new mita detachment which was working quietly 
and peacefully in Potosi. Finally, they expressed sympathy 
for the plight of the Indians who had to endure such cruel 
treatment from their priests, and they again complained that 
the Fiscal, as protector of the natives, was doing nothing
pQ
about it. They claimed that if church abuses could be 
ended, much improvement would result in the condition of the 
Indians, and not incidently, the increase in the number of 
Indians subject to the mita would benefit the mining industry,
^Expediente instruido por Sanz, Potosi December 9, 
1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. V.
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the most profitable in the region, and royal revenues would 
rise.^0
Reflecting on his visit a, Sanz wrote that it had 
assured him of the harm done to the Indians by the multitude 
of contributions in money and labor that the priests forced 
them to make. While he agreed that some funding was neces­
sary to provide for the religious needs of the Indians, 
substantial reductions could be made in their compulsory 
contributions. He intended to "erase all impressions of the 
theocracy which they [the priests] want to prevail in these
on
remote provinces."J4-
To improve the Indians * situation, Sanz ordered that
the caciques, under pain of deposition from their positions,
not assign to the priests Indian servants, muleteers, field-
hands, overseers, or any other workers who could otherwise
be serving in the mita, and that instead, they assign to each
priest three boys and two Indian women for cooks and that
02these servants be paid just salaries
The vis it a to Chayanta and the accounts of the 
priests' mistreatment of the natives there were efforts by 
Sanz and Caftete to retain the use of the laborers of the
30Sanz to Melo de Portugal, Mataca, October 24, 1795, 
ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. IX. ^
33-Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15, 
1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
^Sanz to Melo de Portugal, Mataca, October 24,
1795, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. IX.
142
Orueta and J^uregui assignments. By publicizing the 
excessive contributions in labor and in money that the 
priests exacted from the Indians, they hoped to convince 
royal authorities that the natives would receive better 
treatment as paid mitayos than as "slaves to the theocratic 
despots," and Sanz did not fail to defend the way the 
Indians were treated in Potosi.
The governor wrote to Pedro Melo de Portugal, Vice­
roy of Rio de la Plata, to persuade him and other authorities 
that the mita was not as detrimental to the Indians as 
Villava had written. The report contained a description of 
the natives' celebration prior to leaving for the mita, 
which contrasted with the somber description of the event in 
a Mercurio Peruano article that Villava had mentioned in the 
Discurso.
Sanz contended that virtually all of the deaths and 
illnesses among the mitayos in the past had resulted from 
choco, or lung disease, which was contracted only in the 
crushing mills. The risks entailed in the other mita occupa­
tions in Potosi were minimal, since only two Indians had 
died in accidents on the Cerro during Sanz's administration. 
Sanz wrote that he conferred with the leader of each allyo 
(Indian village) to try to learn the cause of choco, and 
that he talked with each Indian who suffered from the malady, 
and he had determined that it was caused by working in 
unventilated crushing mills. Next, he moved to allay the 
mitayos1 fears saying that the offending mills were being
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rebuilt with sufficient ventilation to prevent the 
disease.33
Later, he wrote the audiencia and defended the mita
and the conduct of the Potosi government:
The Governor and the Asesor head a government that 
tries to impede whatever abuses can be introduced 
and that come to its [the government's] attention.
[The Indians] can complain of any mistreatment and 
be satisfied immediately. [.The government] takes 
care that the mitayos are paid with cash given into 
their own hands, without even half a real's deficiency, 
they have a hospital in which to recover should they 
become ill. Each Indian is assigned to a religious 
parish for his own well-being, and he is assisted 
with whatever spiritual or temporal needs he might 
have. In other areas where free labor is used, such 
as some of the mines in Cochabamba, there are no such 
advantages, and the Indians are paid in goods and 
credits? and they are overcharged at stores where they 
use these credits. More inhumanity is experienced 
at non-mita mines than at Potosi.34
Another argument that Sanz developed to prove that 
the mita did not "depopulate" areas subject to the service, 
as Villava had suggested, was to compare the population 
figures of the partido of Chayanta in 1786 with the figures 
for 1792. He ordered in 1797, that the lists of tribute- 
paying Indians be compiled for those two years. The results 
showed that in 1786, there were 8,419 tribute-paying Indians 
in the ten parishes of Chayanta and they paid 49,034 pesos, 
but that in 1792 there were 9,658 Indians, an increase of 
1,239 over the earlier year, who paid 69,648 pesos in 
tribute. This growth had occurred in spite of the contribu­
tions in manpower that the partido had made to the Potosi
33Ibid.
S^informe, Sanz to Audiencia of Chareas, Potosi, 
March 15, 1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
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35mita, and of the extension that was declared in 1789.
The Potosi government was embarrassed by the fact 
that one of the most detailed and damning accounts of the 
Indians 1 sufferings sustained in the mita service had been 
written a few years earlier by none other than the pro-mita 
teniente asesor, Pedro Vicente Canete as a part of his 
Historica Fisica v Politica de la Provicia de Potosi.
Villava seized upon a copy of this work before it was printed 
and quoted from it to support his arguments against the mita. 
He wrote that he doubted that the book would ever be printed 
unless the section describing the mita were deleted. "It 
seems strange," he continued, "that the person who wrote this 
[Canetej would condemn those who now write against the mita, 
but do not say half as much as he did against the service."'30
This put Sanz in an awkward position, and he 
responded by disclaiming any responsibility for the contra­
diction between what his government stood for and what Canete 
had described. He explained that Canete had made clear to 
the azogueros that in his book he was referring to abuses 
that occurred at the time he was writing, and he pointed out 
that the present government was taking precautions and 
remedies to insure the comfort and well-being of the workers.
35Ibid.
3®Villava to Sanz, La Plata, June 6 , 1797, ANB,
Minas vol. 129, No. XV.
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The AzocrueroB 1 Guild then ordered Canete to write an appen­
dix3  ^for his book "that would explain the present state of
OQ
affairs of the mita and what was being done to improve it. 
The problem of Canete's book was temporarily but not per­
manently laid to rest in this manner.
The arguments on both sides had become repetitive by 
this time (1797) and Sanz apoligized, "If I repeat the facts 
and my reflections, it is because until now [Villava^ has 
done nothing about the first or answered the second, and I 
want the superior authorities to understand that he flees 
from difficulties that he cannot solve. Why does he not 
explain to us why the Indians have come peacefully to serve
O Q
in the mita, even during the years of Rebellion?" In the 
meantime, Sanz had been maneuvering to arrange a de facto 
acceptance of the new mita.
Villava and the anti-mita forces had apparently 
gained a victory with the issue of the royal order of August 
3, 1796, which stated that the king (Charles IV) together 
with a junta from the Council of the Indies, concurred with 
the Fiscal of the Audiencia of Charcas, its President, and 
the Archbishop of the district, and they resolved that the
37See "Apendice," Pedro Vicente Canete, Historia 
Fisica y Politica de la Provincia de Potosi, ed. Gunnar 
Mendoza (La Paz: Fundacidn Universitaria "Simon I. Patino,"
1952).
3®Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15, 
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
39Ibid
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provisions of the Governor of Potosi should be suspended, 
but that no alteration be made in the ancient Ordinance 
governing the matter or in "the present state of the 
mita."^® The audiencia joyously received this order, and 
distributed copies of it throughout the territory, much to 
Sanz's and Canete*s dismay.
Control by the authorities in Spain over colonial 
officials was necessarily loose because of slow communica­
tions, and it was sometimes possible for officials to 
interpret in several ways recently-received communications 
that had been written in Europe half a year before. Upon 
receiving the August 3 order, Sanz understood it differently 
from the way it was construed in La Plata. On March 15, 
1797, Sanz wrote the Audiencia regarding the August 3 pro­
vision. One of the Indians who had complained to Villava 
about the establishment of a new mita in Chayanta was Felipe 
Acarachi of the Chayanta community of Sacaca, and Villava 
had based some of his arguments to the Crown on this man's 
complaints. In his letter to the audiencia, Sanz contended 
that Acarachi had falsely supposed that members of his com­
munity would be serving in a new mita, when actually the 
mitayos of Sacaca were to substitute for those of the 
parcialidades of Auguimarcas and Chullpas, which had been 
relieved for ten years from contributing workers because of
^Royal Order, San Lorenzo, August 3, i796, ANB, 
Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
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their low populations. Sanz appealed to the audiencia to 
keep the mita as it was and to allow the contribution of 
workers from Chayanta to continue, adding that if the 
service was discontinued or diminished, he was with this 
writing disclaiming any responsibility for "grave and irre­
parable damage that one must infer will befall this azoguerla. 
the public, the royal treasury, and the State." The 
Governor also indicated that this appeal and warning would 
find its way to the Crown.^ Earlier, he had sent a similar 
warning to the Crown which was dramatically punctuated by a 
request that he be relieved of duty so that he would not 
have to witness the imminent destruction of Potosi.^ The 
request was not acted upon.
The audiencia was unmoved by Sanz's posturings and 
his gloomy predictions. They issued an order in February, 
1797, that echoed the August 3, 1796 Royal Order, and 
enjoined the subdelegado of Chayanta from sending more 
Indians to Potosi. This gave Sanz another point on which to 
disagree with the audiencia. In March 1797 he wrote the 
audiencia that at almost the same time he had received the 
tribunal's February 7 order, he had also received an order 
from the Viceroy of Rio de la Plata, Pedro Melo de Portugal,
^Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15,
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
^Sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, December 22, 
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV. Letter to Crown 
mentioned herein.
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telling him to continue sending the mita workers to Nicolds
de Urzaingui, who had been granted their labor in 1789,
after he had sponsored the construction of a barrle machine.
Sanz said that he had to choose
. . . between the disposition of the Viceroy to 
carry out the operation already mentioned, and the 
disposition of that regal Tribunal Cthe audiencia] 
that expresses the exact opposite of that resolu­
tion. . . . This government is looking for a way to 
obey both authorities without detriment to either 
one.
It was not difficult for Sanz to decide which authority to 
obey.
44In a June 11, 1797, letter to the audiencia, Sanz 
gave a legal and a practical reason why he was unable to 
comply with the Tribunal’s February 7 order. Law XII,
Title I Book II of the RecopilaciOn, which formed the basis 
for his legal argument, stated that the viceroys were to have 
control of matters of government. Since the welfare and 
conservation of Indians were outside the boundaries of 
justice, and hence outside the audiencia's jurisdiction,
Sanz believed that they fell within the boundaries of 
government, which was headed by the viceroy, whom Sanz felt 
he was bound to obey in the matter. In the practical 
explanation that he gave the audiencia for not complying 
with its order, Sanz acknowledged that he had received the
^Sganz tc> Audiencia of Charcas, Potosi, March 15, 
1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XIV.
44sanz to Audiencia of Charcas, Conapaya, June 11, 
1797, ANB, Minas vol 129, no. XV.
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auto on the day after it was written. "But in spite of 
everything," he continued with dubitable regret, "the order 
did not arrive in time to be executed, even though it remains 
obeyed. The assignment of the Indians took place during Holy 
Week, and the Indians for that mita were sent within 
fourteen days.
Spanish colonial law, even after the Recopilacidn 
and other Bourbon Reforms, was still voluminous and its 
application was complicated. The famous adage, "se obedece 
pero no se cumple" (it is obeyed but not executed), accu­
rately describes Sanz's response to the unwelcome order from 
the audiencia. With the help of the astute lawyer Canete, 
the Intendant Governor of Potosi could resist indefinitely 
the pressure from the distant and impotent audiencia to 
decrease the mita, and he could even sidestep royal orders 
from Spain. The Crown issued another order on October 22, 
1797, that.reiterated the August 3 order of the previous 
year, and stipulated that harmful treatment of the Indians 
should cease.^ Sanz had claimed throughout the debate that 
the mitayos were not mistreated, and he promptly reaffirmed 
that stand. He had also built a case that he was complying 
with the earlier order and not actually enlarging the mita.
Villava had energetically opposed the mita since 
shortly after his arrival in Upper Peru. He had apparently
45Ibid.
4®Royal Order, San Lorenzo, October 22, 1797, ANB, 
Ruck 5 57A.
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bested the Potosi government in several debates on the sub­
ject, and royal authorities in Spain consistently upheld his 
positions. However, Sanz, counting on years of experience 
in the Spanish colonial bureaucracy and on Canete's advice, 
was able to outmaneuver his rival and keep him from dimin­
ishing the mita. Villava did contribute to the rejection of 
the Cddigo Carolino, writing that it camouflaged an increase 
in the mita, but overall, he was frustrated. In July 1797, 
some mita Indians complained to Villava as protector of 
natives. His disappointment was evident in the notation he 
made on the complaint:
Considering that it is useless to appeal to the 
audiencia, since its royal provisions are not obeyed 
by the government of Potosi; and considering that I 
am now very tired of hearing complaints— complaints 
that I can do nothing to remedy— let the Indians take 
their case to the Tribunal of God or wherever they 
choose.47
Moreover, Villava's health was troubling him. In 1800, he 
wrote the viceroy that he had been ill ever since his arrival 
in Upper Peru, and that a persistant cough and progressive 
deafness necessitated his retirement. He was relieved of
48duty the same year, and he died in La Plata two years later.
Thus Sanz had managed to retain the mita intact by 
using a variety of methods and by taking advantage of
4?viliava to Audiencia of Charcas, La Plata,
September 5, 1797, ANB, Minas vol. 129, no. XV.
4®Levene, Vida y Escritos, pp. 42-43.
151
circumstances. Following a brief respite, the intendant 
governor would soon resume his diligent endeavors to improve 
silver production at the mining center.
Chapter VI
SANZ'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PRODUCTION 
IN POTOSI: 1797-1808
After the mita debate had subsided in the late 1790's 
because of Sanz's determination and Villava's flagging health, 
the Governor turned his attention elsewhere. Surely he must 
have journeyed to the retreat at Mataca for rest and altitude 
relief. While he was in Potosi he was engaged in the day-to- 
day operation of government and financial affairs. For example, 
in 1798, he was asked by a local priest, Salvador Ximdnez y 
Padilla, to help to construct a workhouse for poor Indian 
women of Potosi. Sanz lent his support to the project and 
secured royal permission on January 15, 1799, to fund the work­
house with 300 pesos annually from the royal treasury. He 
supervised operations in the Money House, and monitored 
accounts in the Bank of San Carlos. But, as always, the state 
of the mining industry remained his foremost concern, and in 
1798, problems began to materialize in Potosi that thrust 
Sanz back into the familiar role of dealing with crises.
In that year, Potosi began to suffer a drought. Lack 
of water was a serious problem for the mining industry, which 
depended on a steady flow from the reservoirs above the city.
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Water was used to turn most of the machines that ground the 
ore; it was mixed with ground ore and mercury to form the 
pella, and that mixture was washed several times during the 
amalgamation process. Same of the new "barrel machines" were 
also operated by water power. So important was flowing water, 
that Sanz and his contemporaries often referred to Potosi as 
this "rivera," and in 1781, refining operations were halted 
for seventeen weeks because of dry weather.^"
While Sanz and the azogueros were preparing to face 
a drought, another problem was developing which Sanz deemed 
even more serious than a dry spell. This was the shortage of 
mercury. Since 1776, when Potosi was separated from the Vice­
royalty of Lima, miners there could no longer legally acquire 
mercury from Huancavelica, which remained in the older vice­
royalty, because trade between the two areas had been pro­
hibited. Potosi's mercury was shipped from Almad6n in Spain, 
to Upper Peru. Since 1796, when Charles XV signed the Treaty 
of San Ildefonso with France, Spain had been at war with 
England, and the British Navy controlled the sea routes. Some 
shipments from Spain to Buenos Aires were intercepted, and 
many more were curtailed until the Treaty of Amiens was signed 
in 1802 and the sea lanes were open again.
In 1803 Sanz wrote two reports to Miguel Cayetano
■*-Sanz to Cayetano Solar, Potosi, November 26, 1803, 
no. 48, AGX, Charcas 441.
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Soler, Superintendent General of Hacienda in Madrid, in 
which he described the difficult times that Potosi had just 
come through and the measures that he (Sanz) had been obliged 
to take to "save Potosi from destruction." Sanz began to 
fear a shortage of mercury in 1798, when he ordered the 
azogueros to cut back on their use of the commodity. The 
Governor realized that in spite of efforts to conserve, the 
supply would soon be exhausted because no mercury was arriving 
from Europe. He wrote the viceroy of Lima, Marques de Osomo, 
and requested that he lend the Potosi azogueros 1,000 
quintales^ of mercury. When this aid arrived, Sanz wrote 
that he had only had fifty quintales left in the storeroom of 
the Bank of San Carlos. This subsidy was exhausted in a few 
months, and in 1799, the Governor again turned for help to 
the neighboring Viceroy, who asked the intendant of Puno to 
lend Sanz whatever he could. Two azogueros went to Puno and 
acquired 100 quintales of mercury, which they sent to Potosi. 
They continued to the Presidency of Cuzco where they borrowed 
another 300 quintales, enough to keep the refineries operating 
for a few more months. Shortly after this mercury was 
received in Potosi, Osomo died and the Audiencia of Lima 
ruled that no more mercury would be allowed to leave that 
viceroyalty.
Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, November 26, 1803, 
nos. 48 and 49, AGI, Charcas 441. The information and quota­
tions on the following seven pages was taken from these two 
reports unless otherwise cited.
^Hundredweight.
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Sanz became concerned at this point. He reported to 
Cayetano Soler that small amounts of mercury were being 
smuggled into Potosi from the Viceroyalty of Lima and sold to 
the azogueros at exorbitant prices. The Gremio de Azogueros 
sent representatives into the neighboring viceroyalty to try 
to buy mercury at any cost. Sanz admitted that he did nothing 
to prevent these illegal acts because "the existence of 
Potosi depended on a supply of mercury." The intendant of 
Puno was not as tolerant as Sanz, however, and he arrested 
the representatives from potosi and confiscated their mercury.
By 1800, the water reservoirs had run dry, and on
April 26, Sanz wrote to the Viceroy of Rio de la Plata, the
Marques de Aviles, advising him that it was likely that 
mineral production in Potosi would soon cease. He warned his 
superior that abandoning the mines even for a short time 
could be disastrous, since water could seep into productive 
mines, or cave-ins could occur in mines that were not main­
tained. Sanz emphasized that if production halted, the 
azogueros would need funds to keep their mines and ingenios 
in a productive state, and to pay their mitayos so they would 
not desert.
As Superintendent of the Bank of San Carlos, Sanz
4was entitled by royal order of October 1, 1776, to distribute
^Real cedula de IncorporaciOn de el Banco de Potosi
a la Real Hacienda, v Ordenanza para su Regimen y Gobiemo. de 
Orden de S.M. (Madrid: Imprenta de.d. Benito Cano, 1795),
p. 30.
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50,000 pesos annually among the members of the Gremio de 
Azogueros, without his (the superintendent's) being able to 
increase or decrease the sum. This fund was to be adminis­
tered by the Gremio itself. On January 17 of each year the 
body was to meet and decide how to use the money to improve 
production. Different uses included the purchase of mercury, 
iron or gunpowder for the mining community, or the dividing 
of the fund among themselves to improve their holdings or pay 
their mitayos. Since he had been in Potosi, Sanz had super­
vised the annual distribution of this 50,000 pesos, which 
came to be known as "ordinary aid." This aid was a loan from
e
the Crown and not a gift. Therefore it had to be repaid.
This repayment occurred in the form of discounts from the 
silver ingots that the azogueros presented at the Bank of
g
San Carlos. For example, if an azoguero presented one mark 
of silver (usually worth seven pesos, four reales) he was 
paid seven pesos, three reales, and the royal treasury kept 
the remaining real.
Since 1796, however, Sanz had maintained that the 
ordinary aid was insufficient. On September 26 of that year, 
he petitioned the King for permission to increase the aid, 
and he had already taken it upon himself to allow the Gremio 
to borrow 5,000 pesos per week to be paid back out of the 
weekly discounts, pending the resolution of his petition.
This practice continued, and in 1798, the Gremio borrowed
5 Ibid 6Ibid., p. 34.
5.000 additional pesos to pay for the publication of the 
Ordinance of the Bank of San Carlos. The Junta of the Real 
Hacienda in Buenos Aires learned of this loan^ and of the
5.000 peso weekly loans from Treasury officials in Potosi.
On February 12, 1799, they wrote Sanz and ordered that the 
deputies of the Gremio replace the 5,000 peso publication loan 
within four months, or Sanz would be held responsible. The 
azogueros complained that the decrease in weekly aid would 
harm their operations, especially since mercury was now 
scarce and expensive. Sanz wrote the junta, by way of the 
viceroy, the first of many letters in a long campaign to 
defend the larger loans to the azogueros. He emphasized that 
as governor, he was responsible for the well-being of Potosi, 
and that meant preserving and fomenting the mining industry.
He wrote as he had written before in other debates that "the 
well-being of the entire viceroyalty, the royal treasury, and 
the State are affected by the productiveness of Potosi."
Sanz added that he was replacing the 5,000 pesos 
borrowed for the publication of the Ordinance, lest he incur 
the disapproval of the Fiscal of the Junta, Jos6 Marques de 
la Plata. The Governor implied that Marques de la Plata, an 
enemy of his since the feud with Viceroy Loreto, was disap­
proving his activity in Potosi for purely personal reasons, 
at the expense of the economic well-being of the realm. On 
June 15, 1799, Viceroy Avil6 s wrote Sanz to convey to him the 
junta's directive that he obey the earlier provision. In 
August, Sanz replied to the junta that if he obeyed their
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order and reduced the aid to the azogueros. he and the vice­
roy could not be responsible for the dismal consequences, 
which he again described in detail. He concluded that he was 
suspending the provision, and continuing the weekly aid.
Sanz bombarded the junta and the Viceroy with more 
descriptions of the desperate situation in Potosi, throughout 
1799 and 1800. In July of 1800, after a long silence from 
the junta, Sanz received another communication from it stating 
that he should cease the extra loans. He called a meeting of 
the Gremio de Azogueros on August 11 to inform the members.
He reported that the miners were so dismayed at the news that 
they presented him with the keys to their mines and refineries 
saying that they could not operate without the funds. On 
August 19, 1800, Sanz again informed the viceroy of the grave 
situation in Potosi, reminding him that it had worsened with 
the English capture of a Spanish frigate bound for Buenos 
Aires and loaded with mercury. Apparently this report 
impressed the junta because on October 28, 1800, it informed 
the Governor that he could continue the weekly loans of 5,000 
pesos— which he was doing anyway— but that the azogueros had 
to repay the cost of the mercury they had already received 
from the Bank. The azogueros disliked the junta's second 
provision and Sanz dispatched another of his by now standard 
letters of desperation.
In September 1800 Sanz received a report from the 
Marquds de Otavi, the Administrator of the Bank of San Carlos, 
which verified the Governor's bleak assessment of the state
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of mining in Potosi. Otavi recommended that each of seventy- 
four azogueros and ingenio operators receive a weekly loan of 
250 pesos in order to keep operating and to retain their 
mitayos. This amounted to 18,500 pesos per week. In an edict 
that Sanz issued on September 18, 1800, he urged the azogueros 
to save mercury in their operations. He wrote authorities in 
Buenos Aires that he was considering the adoption of Otavi's 
plan for increased aid to azogueros. Sanz justified this 
increase by citing a royal order dated April 8 , 1798, which 
charged him with "making this profitable Gremio flourish, 11 and 
authorized him to "make whatever general or particular grants 
are necessary to do so." Sanz reported to the viceroy that he 
was sure that more silver would be coined as a result of the 
increase.
The junta did not respond to Sanz's measure for 
several months. In the meantime, on December 14, 1801, silver 
production in Potosi came to a halt because of the lack of 
water and mercury. Five days later, Sanz informed the viceroy 
of the cessation, and on December 23, 1801, he increased 
weekly loans to 18,500 pesos.
On February 22, 1802, Sanz received word from the 
Junta de Hacienda that he was "authorized to continue advancing 
weekly loans to the miners and azogueros until the loan 
totaled 300,000 pesos. By April 1802 the allotted 300,000 
pesos had been used up, and Sanz wrote the junta that he was 
continuing the loans anyway. He received no reply and repeated 
the message on June 26, 1802, saying that he would disclaim
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any responsibility if the junta disapproved his action. 
Finally, on September 11, 1802, the junta, worn down by Sanz's 
adamant persistence and reluctant to take the responsibility 
for the ruin of Potosi, approved the measures he had taken.
On November 30, 1802, Sanz summarized for the Buenos 
Aires Junta de Hacienda the measures he had taken, but in 
February of the next year, the body reversed itself again and 
reprimanded the Governor. To Sanz's delight, the same mail 
that brought him the reprimand also brought news that 750 
quintales of mercury had arrived in Buenos Aires, and would 
soon be sent to the mining center. Obediently for once, Sanz 
reported that he had cut the aid to the azogueros by half, 
confident that Potosi would be producing at full capacity 
once again.
In the summary of the dispute over the loans that 
Sanz wrote for Cayetano Soler, he enclosed a production table 
that showed the profits that the Bank had realized for the 
Crown in spite of the loans that had been granted. He 
defended his actions by indicating that the Crown could reap 
no greater profit for such a small investment.
Not all of Sanz's adversaries in the question of 
increased loans to azogueros were in Buenos Aires. One of the 
most prolific and potentially dangerous attackers of govern­
ment's measures was Sanz's old partner in the mita debate, 
Pedro Vicente Canete. The conflict with Cafiete began in 
1800, when Sanz and the azogueros were trying to demonstrate 
to the authorities in Buenos Aires that the situation in
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Potosl was extremely serious. Sanz had prepared a statement 
attesting to the benefit that would result from increased 
loans to the azogueros. To lend credence to the testimony, 
thirty citizens of Potosl who were not members of the Gremio 
signed it. Canete not only refused to sign the letter, but 
also denounced the loans to the viceroy. Sanz deemed this 
behavior "strange" adding that he was shocked that the 
teniente would behave in this way when it was obvious that if 
the loans stopped, mining operations would also halt. The 
azogueros were furious, and voted to recuse Canete.
After this incident, the teniente vacillated between 
supporting aid to the azogueros and denouncing it. In November 
1800 he told the Gremio that members would be justified in 
receiving up to 1,000 pesos in aid, in view of the disaster 
that had fallen Potosl in the form of drought and the mercury
shortage, because such emergency aid was provided for in the
7 ~Ordinance. For more than two years thereafter, Canete
cooperated with Sanz and the azogueros.
The next dispute occurred in 1303 at the annual January 
17 meeting of the Gremio de Azogueros. which the teniente 
asesor attended. Because of the difficult circumstances that 
had existed in Potosl for the past several years, the 
azogueros voted to extend the extraordinary aid that the 
Governor had granted. Canete claimed that without his approval 
the election was void, and he refused to sign the loan autho­
rization. If the loans were nullified, the azogueros would
7
Ibid., p. 35.
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lose a great deal of financial support. Canete would not 
retreat from his position and he claimed that it was a 
judicial matter since it involved a conflict between the 
authorities in Buenos Aires and those in Potosl. There is no 
mention in the Ordinances however, of the teniente asesor's 
right to approve or disapprove the loans decided upon by the 
Gremio.
Canete1s disapproval of the Gremio1s vote caused a 
great deal of commotion in Potosl. The azogueros held their 
election again without Canete's presence, and the results were 
the same. They also voted to recuse the teniente again.
Sanz and the azogueros immediately began to flood the 
superior government in Buenos Aires with complaints about the 
teniente. The communications stated that his lack of coopera­
tion had caused an uproad in Potosl that was harmful to 
mineral production. The Viceroy later noted that his office 
had received from Potosl 3,500 pages of evidence concerning 
the discord in Upper Peru^caused by Canete. For his part,
Sanz noted that he had been puzzled by Canete's behavior since 
the teniente had returned in 1797 from a two-year vis it a to 
La Paz. The Governor believed, however, that his assistant's 
grudge against the Gremio stemmed from an earlier incident in 
which the Gremio refused to allow publication of Canete's
o
book Historia del Gobi6m o  de Peru because it contained some 
"false remarks about the mita" (see Chapter V) , until certain
^Historia Flsica y Polltica de la Provincia de Potosl.
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offensive chapters had been removed. The azogueros did 
allocate 3#000 pesos for the printing costs, but when there 
was a delay in publication, "Canete declared war on the Gremio 
and threatened to ruin it."
The discord surrounding canete continued and 
increased in 1803. Officials in Buenos Aires were concerned 
by the volume of urgent messages from Potosi. Sanz wrote 
that there was difficulty keeping order among the citizens of 
the mining center, and that he had done what he could to 
restore peace, but CaKete would not be placated, continuing 
to accuse falsely the Gremio and Sanz himself. Finally, the 
Governor felt obligated to write the superior government in 
Buenos Aires requesting "a measure that corresponded to 
removing a cancer that was growing between the minister
Q
(Canete) and the Azogueria."
The viceroy, Joaquin del Pino, in an effort to calm 
the situation, turned the matter over to the Audiencia of 
Buenos Aires. That body, meeting in an executive session 
called an acuerdo on July 26, 1803, agreed that Canete needed 
to be removed from the stormy situation in Potosi pending the 
outcome of the dispute, but that he should not be. demoted.
The acuerdo decided therefore, to transfer Canete to La Plata 
where he would occupy the same position. The teniente asesor 
of charcas, Vicente Rodriguez Romano, would go to Potosl to
9Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, November 26, 1803, 
No. 51, AGI, Charcas 441.
10occupy the asesoria there.
Both of the asesores were dismayed by the proposed
exchange. Rodriguez felt that he was being unjustly demoted
from a presidency to an intendancy, and he feared that his
health would suffer in the change of climate from La Plata to
Potosi. Canete made a similar complaint about the change in
climate, but he'seemed more frustrated at having been out-
maneuvered. However, on September 12, 1803, Canete left
Potosi ostensibly bound for his new post in La Plata.^
He headed southward, however, toward Buenos Aires,
where he hoped to meet with the viceroy and the audiencia in
order to present his case. Sanz quickly learned of Canete's
deviation and informed Viceroy Pino, who ordered the inten-
dants along the route to intercept Canete and send him back
to Charcas. This was possible because Canete was traveling
slowly, accompanied by his son who suffered from epilepsy.
He later claimed that the purpose of the trip was to seek
medical attention for the boy in the capital. On October 17,
1803, the teniente was detained in C6rdoba, three-fourths of
12the way to Buenos Aires.
From COrdoba, he wrote to Jos6 Antonio Caballero, 
the Minister of Grace and Justice in Madrid, and complained 
about his transfer from Potosi, which he said had occurred
10Ibid. 11Ibid.
1 o /
Joaquin del Pino to Crown, Buenos Aires, December 
26, 1803, AGI, Charcas 713.
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without a hearing or the customary residencia. He then 
accused Sanz of unnecessarily distributing royal funds to the 
azogueros who, grateful for the favors, paid him a bribe of
10,000 pesos. Canete continued that he had not been a threat 
to public tranquility in Potosi as was indicated in the 
azogueros1 3,500 pages of testimony, which he deemed "decep­
tion and gossip." Canete submitted his own testimony to the 
contrary, in which the Gremio de Duenos de Ingenios, the pro­
tector of Indians, the captain of the mita, and several 
priests in Potosi stated that Canete was impartial, coopera­
tive and calm. He explained that the Governor and the 
azogueros resented him and wanted him removed because he saw 
and reported their deception. The teniente wrote that he
could not return to Upper Peru because the trip would endanger
13his son, and he had to continue to Buenos Aires. He wrote 
a similar letter to the viceroy.^ Officials in COrdoba were 
not swayed by Cafiete’s arguments and ordered him to return to 
Charcas.
The determined official headed north for a few leagues, 
but then doubled back and resumed his original course. He 
arrived in Buenos Aires in December, on the same day as the 
letter from the Intendant of COrdoba which informed the 
Viceroy that he had sent Canete on his way back to Charcas.
■^Canete to Caballero, COrdoba, October 20, 1803,
AGI, Charcas 713.
■^Canete to Pino, COrdoba, October 20, 1803, AGI, 
Charcas 713.
166
Viceroy Joaquin del Pino was furious when he learned that 
Canete had disobeyed his orders, saying that the audacious 
asesor was ungrateful for the "promotion" he had received. 
Pino took the side of Sanz and the azogueros in the dispute 
over the loans in Potosi, and he blamed Canete for risking 
his son's life in the useless journey. Pino reported to the 
Crown that he believed that Canete's removal from Potosi had 
secured the tranquility of the mining center, adding that 
having read Canete's petitions, he had found them to be full
1 C
of "shameful intrigues."A 3
After Canete had left Potosi for Buenos Aires, Sanz 
repeated his version of the dispute to Cayetano Soler. Sanz 
regretted the teniente's rash action and hoped that it would 
not h a m  his career. He wrote that the job of teniente 
asesor was very complicated, and in Potosl it required long 
experience with minerology, which Vicente Rodriguez Romano 
lacked. The Governor therefore recommended that Dr. Pedro 
Francisco Arizmendi, Subdelegado of Chayanta and Sanz's ally 
in the struggle with the priests of that partido be made 
asesor.1  ^ In December 1803 Pino noted that the asesorla of 
Potosi was being filled by a lawyer whom the Governor had 
recommended— presumably Arizmendi.17
15Pino to Crown, Buenos Aires, December 26, 1803, 
AGI, Charcas 713.
1®Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, November 26, 1803, 
no. 51. AGI, Charcas 441.
17Pino to Crown, Buenos Aires, December 26, 1803, 
AGI, Charcas 713.
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Meanwhile, Canete was returned to Charcas, this time
with a military escort that Pino had ordered. He did not
occupy the asesorla there but served in the post of honorary
oidor of the Audiencia of Charcas. In 1804 Canete wrote to
Pino's successor, the Marqufes de Sobremonte, and described
his unfair treatment. He also wrote to the Crown. His pleas
were ignored and, resigned to remaining in La Plata, he set
about trying to get an appointment as a permanent member of
18the audiencia.
After Canete had left Potosi, Sanz turned briefly to
personal affairs. Writing to Cayetano Soler, the Governor
related how in 1788, when he was superintendent in Buenos
Aires, the Crown had allowed two of Sanz's nephews from
M&laga to come and serve as his secretaries. When Sanz was
transferred to Potosi, the nephews accompanied him; one
worked in the Casa de Moneda and the other at the Bank of San
Carlos. The nephew at the Casa de Moneda, however, died of
fever in June, 1803, and Sanz requested that the surviving
nephew be appointed subdeleqado of Chayanta, to replace
Arizmendi. Sanz included the oja de servicio or r6 sum6 of
his relative and reminded Cayetano Soler that he had never
19before asked the King for a favor.
During the last year of the dispute with Canete over
xoCanete to Crown, La Plata, September 26, 1804,
AGI, Charcas 713.
■^Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, November 26, 1803, 
no. 50, AGI, Charcas 441.
royal aid to the azogueros. the familiar problem of Potosi's 
shortage of forced Indian labor arose again. Jos& Gonzalez, 
Intendant of Puno on the shores of Lake Titicaca, refused in 
1802 to send his intendancy's allotment of 434 Indians to 
Potosi. The number of Indians was small and Puno was distant 
and not even a part of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. 
Gonzalez's defiance, however, caused a disturbance in Potosi 
because the azogueros saw a dangerous precedent emerging. If 
the Intendant of Puno were allowed to withhold workers, other 
officials might be tempted to follow his example. Three 
officials of the Bank of San Carlos wrote to Sanz about this 
matter in April 1803. They noted that Gonzalez's action 
defied the King's order that had originally established the 
mita. The officials argued that since laborers were neces­
sary for production, and production was necessary to pay 
taxes, withholding workers was the same as depriving the 
Crown of revenue. The petitioners echoed an earlier argument 
of Intendant Sanz's that all economic activity in Upper Peru 
depended on the well-being of mining in Potosi. "Par from 
being useless as the Governor of Puno believes," they wrote, 
"the mita is necessary because without it. economic activity 
would stop. They concluded by asking Sanz to forward their 
petition to the Crown, and to the Viceroys of Peru and Rio 
de la Plata.^
20E1 Marqu6s Otavi et al. to Sanz, Potosi April 21, 
1803, copy in Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones
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In December 1803 Sanz wrote Viceroy Pino, who in 
turn informed authorities in Spain of the situation. After 
receiving word from Spain on the matter the new Viceroy, 
MarquSs de Sobremonte, wrote Sanz that the King was aware of 
the severe lack of laborers in Potosi occasioned in part by 
GonzAlez's refusal to send the Indians. Sobremonte agreed 
that Gonzalez's obstinacy was harmful and he authorized Sanz 
to do whatever was necessary to remedy the situation. The 
Viceroy also told Sanz that the King disapproved of the con­
duct of the Intendant of Puno in the case, and had resolved 
to correct it. In his letter, Sobremonte included an order 
that Gonzalez should thereafter obey the Superintendent of 
the Mita.2*1
Three weeks later, Sanz answered Sobremonte that he 
had received word of the royal opinion. He expressed concern 
that Gonzalez would not obey him (Sanz) or even the Viceroy 
of Rio de la Plata, because Puno was not under their juris­
diction but under that of the Viceroy of Peru. Therefore,
Sanz asked that Sobremonte submit copies of all their corre­
spondence on the subject to the Viceroy of Peru with a request
22that he correct Gonzalez's behavior.
Histdricas (Potosi, Bolivia), no. 1 (1959-60), pp. 64-67. 
Cited hereafter as Revista de Investiqaciones.
^Sobremonte to Sanz, Buenos Aires, September 3, 
1804, copy in Revista de Investiqaciones. p. 6 8 .
22Sanz to Sobremonte, Potosi, September 26, 1804, 
copy in Revista de Investiqaciones. p. 69.
170
In spite of these pleas and orders, Gonz&lez did not 
send the 434 Indians to Potosi. Using the same tactics that 
Francisco de Paula Sanz had once used to pursue very different 
goals, the Intendant of Puno skillfully used the law and 
circumstances to avoid executing unwelcome orders, although 
he doubtless "obeyed" them.
At first, he did not comply because the orders came 
from officials who had no jurisdiction over him— just as Sanz 
had predicted. Gonzalez's next defense was to claim that he 
could not send the Indians without the travel expenses from 
Potosi, which the azogueros alleged that they were unable to 
pay. Later, the confusion caused by the British invasions of 
the Iberian Peninsula made it less likely that officials 
would act to force Gonz&lez to comply.
Sanz complained to the viceregal government again in 
April, 1806.33 The next year, nearly four years after the 
officials of the Bank of San Carlos had first protested 
Gonzalez's refusal to send the mitayos. the workers still had 
not arrived. In February, 1807, they again wrote Sanz to 
complain of the sorry state of Potosi's mining industry i 
Thirty-three refineries had stopped operating and four 
azogueros had gone bankrupt, owing the Bank 181,964 pesos.
The officials listed other difficulties that had befallen the 
mining center and they predicted an economic collapse, the
3^Sanz referred to this communication to Sobremonte 
in a later petition to the next viceroy, Santiago Liniers, 
Potosi, November 27, 1808, ANB, Ruck 301.
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blame for which they placed on Gonzalez. To avoid this they 
begged Sanz to appeal once more to the authorities to force 
Gonzalez to comply.^ In another letter, they restated the 
old argument that "without mitayos there would be no Potosi, " 
and that the lack of Indians caused by Gonzalez's defiance 
was "worse for us than plague or war.
On November 27, 1808, Sanz wrote to the new Viceroy, 
Santiago Liniers, that the mita contingent had finally been
26sent from Puno but with fewer mitayos than should have come. 
Whether Gonzalez' s resistance was motivated by humanitarian 
concern for the Indians of Puno or simply by the desire to 
use them in that intendancy's lakeshore silver mines is 
unclear. It is certain, however, that he deftly avoided 
fully carrying out the orders to send the workers. He could 
continue to do so indefinitely, just as Sanz had avoided 
complying with the Royal Order of August 3, 1796, not to 
enlarge the mita.
Sanz realized this, and he asked the viceroy in 
November, 1808, to enlarge the base from which the mitayos 
were drawn.^7 A month later, Viceroy Liniers approved a plan
^Otavi et al. to Sanz, Potosi, February 21, 1807, 
copy in Revista de Investiqaciones, pp. 70-71.
25otavl et al. to Sanz, Potosi, September 16, 1807, 
copy in Revista de Investiqaciones, p. 72.
26ganZ to Liniers, Potosi, November 27, 1808, ANB,
Ruck 301.
27Ibid.
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that Sanz had long advocated. Under this plan, India*,/, in 
provinces where the population had grown since the mita 
seventh had been computed nearly a century before would be
"eligible" to substitute for missing Indians in provinces
28where the population had fallen. In the meantime, Sanz had 
been occupied with other ways of increasing production.
The Junta de Hacienda in Buenos Aires had not for­
gotten the extraordinary loans that Sanz had granted the 
azogueros between 1798 and 1803. The Gremio de Azogueros in 
1805, owed the Royal Treasury 1,280,000 pesos for ordinary 
assistance from the Bank of San Carlos. Members had also 
contracted a debt of 1,071,400 pesos in extraordinary aid, 
for which Sanz had fought so hard during the years of drought 
and scarcity of mercury. The Junta de Hacienda issued 
rulings on February 26 and 27, 1805, ordering that the loans 
be repaid by discounting the silver that the azogueros pre­
sented at the Casa de Moneda at the rate of two reales per 
mark instead of one real that had been charged. Furthermore, 
Viceroy Sobremonte stipulated that if an azoguero died owing 
money to the Royal Treasury, his goods were to be seized and 
sold, and if the value of his possessions did not cover his
debt, it would be assumed by the other members of the 
29Gremio.
The azogueros viewed these measures as harmful to
^^Liniers to Sanz, Buenos Aires, December 28, 1808, 
ANB, Ruck 301.
29Plan del actual estado de la Mineria de Potosi, 
February 23, 1810, ANB, Ruck 301.
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themselves and to production, and so indicated to Sanz who 
relayed the protest to the superior government in Buenos 
Aires on May 27, 1805. The petition did not receive an 
answer so Sanz repeated it in April of the next year. At 
that time the regente of the Audiencia of Buenos Aires acted 
as Superintendent of Hacienda of the viceroyalty, and in 
December 1807, he partially fulfilled the request from Potosi 
by moderating the provisions of February 26 and 27, 1805. He 
temporarily lowered the discount rate at the Casa de Moneda 
back to one real per mark, and suspended the provision that
or)
the Gremio assume the debts of deceased azogueros. ^
The azogueros were not satisfied with these measures
and explained to Liniers that they had not improved the
situation in Potosi because of their temporary nature. Sanz
wrote that the azogueros desired the security of knowing that
the provisions would be permanent, so that they could make
their plans and proceed with production. The Governor
31requested such assurance from the viceroy.
In September 1808 Liniers responded favorably to 
Sanz's request. He wrote that the need of the Royal Treasury 
for hard currency was so great that he was obliged to take 
measures to amass more specie. He therefore authorized Sanz 
to provide the Gremio de Azogueros with the relief that it
30Sanz to Liniers, Potosi, September 27, 1808, ANB,
Ruck 301.
3lIbid.
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needed to put it in a productive state and thus increase
royal revenues, "Trusting to your zeal and the knowledge that
the Crelief program] will proceed with consideration of
32increasing the Royal Treasury. Sanz, using this authority, 
declared on November 25, 1808, that all azogueros who had 
received loans from the royal treasury were exempt from any 
other obligation than the discount of one real per mark of 
silver. Furthermore, their goods were no longer subject to 
seizure by the government.0
The shortage of mercury, which had plagued Potosi 
before the Peace of Amiens, threatened the community again 
in 1804 when the British seized four Spanish ships on the 
Atlantic. As a result of the new hostilities, mercury prices 
in Upper Peru soared. A latter dated November 28, 1808, and 
signed by Sanz and twenty members of the Gremio de Azogueros, 
addressed the problem. They stated that in order to return 
to "normal production" in the shortest possible time, it would 
be necessary to lower the price of mercury to make it worth­
while for refiners to handle lower grade ores. Since most of 
the ore refined in Potosi at that time was low in silver con­
tent, a relatively large input of mercury was required; and 
with the prices of mercury and tools as high as they were,
Sanz reasoned that the azogueros could not profitably process
32Liniers to Sanz, Buenos Aires, December 28, 1808, 
ANB, Ruck 301.
33Plan del actual estado de la Minerla de Potosi, 
February 23, 1810, ANB, Ruck 301.
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much of the ore in Potosi. He therefore recommended that the
superior government lower the price of quicksilver from
seventy-three pesos per quintal to forty or at most fifty 
34pesos.
In another letter to Viceroy Liniers, Sanz admitted 
that at first glance, it would surely seem scandalous to those 
who defend the interests of the royal treasury for someone to 
propose lowering the price of mercury to fifty pesos per 
quintal. They would think that the royal treasury would be 
losing 23,000 pesos on each 1,000 quintales, and they would 
classify any such proposal as foolish and extravagant. But 
Sanz repeated an earlier claim that revenues would increase 
as a result of such a measure. "Let us compute," he wrote, 
"the loss of the 23,000 pesos in comparison with increased 
revenues of at least 25,000 pesos that the treasury will 
realize with the additional marks of silver that the azogueros 
will produce." Sanz wrote that he could prove that by 
lowering the price of 1,000 quintales by 23,000 pesos, Liniers 
could produce 2,000 pesos for the King. This figure did not 
include the revenues gained by discounting the additional 
silver produced as it was presented at the Casa de Moneda, and 
by taxing the additional amount of specie as it circulated 
and recirculated.^
■^Sanz et al. to Liniers, Potosi November 28, 1808, 
ANB, Ruck 301.
^Sanz to Liniers, Potosl, November 27, 1808, ANB,
Ruck 301.
176
One month later, Liniers informed Sanz that his 
request to lower the price of quicksilver from seventy-three 
pesos to fifty pesos per quintal had been approved. However, 
the Viceroy placed two conditions on his approval. First, 
the lower price was to be on a trial basis, and to remain in 
effect only for as long as good effects could be observed in 
the Gremio de Azogueros and in the royal treasury. The second 
condition that Liniers imposed was that those who bought 
mercury at the reduced price would be held responsible for
the original price of the mineral pending the approval of the
„ . 36King.
Not all of Sanz's activities during this period had 
to do with advancing the cause of the Gremio de Azogueros.
In 1805, the Governor received a plea for help from some 
missionaries in Tarija to the south of Potosi. Some of their 
missions had been raided by the nomadic and aggressive 
Chiriguano Indians of the region, and the priests asked Sanz 
for protection. The Governor, who had fought Indians in 
Upper Peru twenty-four years before, left Potosi with a 
small troop of soldiers and traveled to Tarija. There Sanz 
personally aided in the training of the "neophyte" soldiers 
of the missions, who were probably Indians themselves. The 
head of the Colegio de Misioneros de Tarija, Fr. Esteban 
Primo Ayala, wrote to the Crown on December 25, 1805, and
^^Liniers to Sanz, Buenos Aires, December 28, 1808,
ANB, Ruck 301.
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praised Sanz for his assistance. The priest thanked the King 
for having appointed "this zealous minister [who] had not only 
contented himself with training and exhorting our troops, hut 
he has also inspired the entire town to be zealous in royal 
service.”37
Since his appointment to the governorship of Potosi 
in 1788, Sanz had sought to be exempted from posting the bond 
of 10,000 pesos that was required by the Ordinance of Inten- 
dants. Finally, on September 7, 1806, Cayetano Soler wrote to 
Sanz that since he had been transferred to the governorship 
of Potosi from the superintendency of Buenos Aires, and had 
not been appointed directly from Spain, the King had issued 
a royal order excusing him from paying the bond. Sanz
O Q
gratefully acknowledged the order in March, 1808.
The eleven years between 1797 and 1808 were difficult 
for Potosi and for the rest of the viceroyalty. In 1802 
silver production in the Imperial City fell by nearly forty 
percent of what it had been the previous year, because of 
drought and difficulty in getting the materials and labor 
necessary for production. Sanz could do nothing about the
lack of water, but he addressed the other problems with his 
customary energy and wiliness, and in spite of the difficul­
ties, the Bank showed a profit in each of these years (see 
Chart) .
37Fr. Esteban Primo Ayala to Crown, Tarija, December
25, 1805, AGI, Charcas 434.
3®Sanz to Cayetano Soler, Potosi, March 27, 1808,
AGI, Charcas 434.
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Table 1
Potosl Production Figures Under Sanz and Under 
His Two Immediate Predecessors*
* Marks of 1 'Costs Includ-' Net profit
Year 1 silver 1 Mark of gold 1 ing thefts 1 for Crown
1 presented 1 1 (pesos) t (pesos)
I Administrations of Escobedo and Pino Manrique
1779 ' 544,763 2314, 4 p. 1 211,439 1 190,856
1780 ' 581,020 1 3539 1 228,050 a 208,880
1781 ' 447,994 1 1604 t 244,470 r 69,081
1782 ' 410,262 2204 1 214,400 a 86,734
1783 ’ 485,547 1841, 6 1 171,385 a 182,058
1784 ' 485,344 1529, 2 1 177,009 t 163,948
1785 ' 428,988 1 1628, 6 1 162,085 a 145,737
1786 ' 438,266 * 2451, 4 1 166,622 » 151,024
1787 ' 503,544 1 1874, 6 1 165,085 a 200,694
1788 ' 454,817 1 1936, 2 1 158,761 r 171,643
4780,550* 20932, 4 1900,256 1570,617
II Administration of Francisco de Paula Sanz
1789 ' 420,334 1 0000 1 152,442 a 137,126
1790 ' 468,609 1 2204 1 221085 a 168,673
1791 ' 513,550 • 1959, 6 1 174,934 a 193,452
1792 ' 503,386 t 4068 1 219,118 a 145,274
1793 ' 512,211 • 1167 1 215,293 r 155,229
1794 ' 515,261 1 1758 1 185,344 r 168,812
1795 ' 497,511 1 2190 1 204,734 I 169,320
1796 ’ 483,300 • 2034, 4 a 214,975 i 189,091
1797 ’ 518,592 1 2867, 4 i 216,342 i 168,642
1798 ’ 498.505 t 2069 a 164,520 a 252,281
4903,459* 20317 1868,787 1747,900
III
1799 r 470,310 a 2843 i 164,934 a 137,202
1800 ' 457,537 1 3353 i 154,006 a 206,313
1801 ' 481,268 1 3501 I 157,473 t 212,780
1802 ' 266,852 1 2409 i 148,870 * 83,778
1803 ' 276,793 f 2083 i 150,385 r 276,694
1804 ' 376,720 1 2647 V 114,962 a 206,746
1805 ' 213,168 1 5771 t 158,944 i 213,844
1806 ' 370,523 1 4550 i 115,321 a 218,630
1807 ' 432,126 t 4953 i 135,336 r 218.435
3336,697 31750 1300,231 1764,422
, *Source: Joaquin Blanco Antolinez, "Proyecto
Economico pide providencias para evitar los Robos en esta real 
Casa [de Moneda] Impugna, como es justo los crecidos aumentos 
de la fundacion mayor: quiere aclarer el procedemiento de las 
crecidas fallas de la oficina de Fielatura" (unpublished 
manuscript, Potosi, 1808), ANB, Ruck 256.
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In dealing with the three major issues that arose 
throughout this period, Sanz remained the staunch ally and 
advocate of the Gremio de Azogueros. The first of these 
issues, increasing financial aid to the azogueros, occupied 
most of Sanz's time during the period. He clashed with the 
Junta de Hacienda in Buenos Aires and with his long-time 
associate, Pedro Vicente Canete, over the subsidies, and he 
eventually prevailed. Similarly, he succeeded in convincing 
Viceroy Santiago Liniers to lower the price of mercury by 
nearly a third in 1808. And although Jos6 Gonz&lez never 
sent all 434 mitayos from Puno, Sanz procured the right to 
expand the service in provinces that had grown In population 
to make up for the deficiencies in other provinces, and that 
was potentially a more important victory.
Sanz prevailed in all of these disputes by following 
the same formula he had followed during the tobacco visita, 
his disputes with Loreto, and the mita debates. He por­
trayed the side that he favored in an argument to coincide 
with royal intersets, he wrote his arguments in an urgent 
tone and he repeated the arguments time and time again until 
he wore down the opponent.
The first decade of the nineteenth century was also 
the last decade of operation for Spain's empire in South 
America, and the last decade in the life of Francisco de 
Paula Sanz. Events in Europe, in Buenos Aires, and in La 
Plata were happening during this same period which would 
soon divert Sanz1s attention from aid to azogueros. production
'Sir'
figures, and t-he mita, and occupy him with attempting to 
save the unity of the viceroyalty and of the Empire itself.
Chapter VII
SANZ AS A REACTIONARY IN UPPER PERU
During his long administration, Sanz had continuously 
flaunted the authority of the Audiencia of Charcas. This 
tribunal had once been the most powerful governing body in 
South America, with jurisdiction over most of the southern 
part of the continent. The creation of the Viceroyalty of 
Rio de la Plata in 1776, and the issuance of the Ordinance 
of Intendants in 1783, however, drastically reduced the 
jurisdiction and power of the tribunal. The creation of two 
more audiencias, one in Buenos Aires and one in Cuzco, 
shrunk the area subject to the body's control. Under the 
laws, executive and economic powers that formerly rested in 
the audiencia passed to the intendants. By the end of the 
eighteenth century, the once-powerful tribunal had become 
little more than a court of appeals, with the distinction it 
retained its president.'*'
Even with a vigorous and able fiscal like Victori&n 
de Villava for a champion, the oidores (judges) of the 
Audiencia of Charcas were unable to impose their will on 
nearby Potosi. They had repeatedly ordered the intendant of
1Charles Arnade, The Emergence of the Republic of 
Bolivia (Gainesville: University-of Florida Press, 1957),
p. 3.
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Potosl to exempt certain Indians from service in the mita,
and Sanz had repeatedly sidestepped or disregarded their
directives until Villava admitted in frustration that the
2audiencia was powerless.
To compensate for this decline in authority, the 
oidores, who had always demanded personal respect, became 
more particular about etiquette. A traveler in Upper Peru 
in the late 1700's remarked on the artificialness, vanity
O
and condescension of the oidores. They went about the city 
dressed in judges' robes called togas; in fact, their unof­
ficial title was ministro toqado, and they required people 
whom they met on the streets to bow respectfully.^
Jealous of their authority and prestige, the oidores 
and the fiscal began to dispute with the president of the 
audiencia in the hope of gaining a bit more power for them­
selves. Since 1797, the president had been RamOn Garcia de 
Lean y Pizarro, a Spanish soldier born in Africa sixty-eight 
years earlier. Since he also held the post of intendant of 
Charcas, he legally held all executive power. The oidores 
resented this and, led by Villava, immediately began to test 
him. Old and easygoing, he let some of his power be taken
^See Chapter V.
^Alonso Carrion de la Vandera [Concolorcorvoil, El 
Lazarillo de Ciegos Caminantes (Lima: 1773? reprint ed.,
Madrid: Ediciones Atl&s, 1959), p. 345.
^Amade, Emergence of the Republic, p. 3.
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5 ~over by the audiencia. In 1804, Pedro Vicente Canete began
service as oidor honorario in Charcas. The energetic Canete 
forgot his quarrels in Potosi and began to encourage the 
President to regain his authority, which the oidores resented. 
The next year, Pizarro ordered an attach on the marauding 
Chiriguano Indians who had been raiding in the area, but the 
audiencia refused to allocate funds for the offensive, and 
the split between the authorities in Charcas became public. 
After being censured by Viceroy Sobremonte over this inci­
dent, the audiencia smoldered in resentment, and in 1806, it 
tried to remove Pizarro from office when he became ill.
Canete had by then abandoned the President, fearing that 
further association with the old man would harm his career. 
Pizarro, however, was able to maintain his position with the 
help of the newly arrived Archbishop of Charcas, Benito 
Maria Moxd, who became his ally. For the next two years, an 
uneasy truce reigned between the oidores on one side and
g
Pizarro and Mox6 on the other.w
In 1808, more noticeable events were taking place in 
Europe. Napoleon had invaded Spain and Charles IV had 
abdicated in favor of his son Ferdinand. The authorities in 
La Plata received this news on August 21, 1808, in a letter
^BstAnislao Just Lleo (S.J.), "Comienzo de la 
Independencia en el Alto Peril" (Ph.D. dissertation. University 
of Madrid, 1969), p. 132.
^Amade, Emergency of the Republic, p. 3.
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from Viceroy Liniers. On September 17, they learned with 
consternation that the Corsican was replacing the Bourbon 
dynasty with one of his own. The correspondence related 
that Spaniards reacted violently to the usurpation and had 
set up a junta in Seville to rule in the name of Ferdinand 
VII. Finally, they were informed that a representative from 
the Junta of Seville, Jose Manuel de Goyeneche, a native of 
Arequipa, was en route to Charcas to request their 
allegiance.7
There was considerable disagreement in La Plata on 
how to react to the news, and not surprisingly, the President 
and the Archbishop disagreed with the oidores. Pizarro 
advocated supporting the junta's resistance to the French 
invaders while the members of the audiencia wanted to with­
hold support pending further orders from the King. Mox6 
meanwhile, had exhorted the clergy and the public to support 
the junta.
At that time, there were among the law professors 
and students at La Plata's Universidad Real v Pontlfica de 
San Francisco Xavier and in the Real Academia Carolina. 
radicals interested in separating from Spain. They were 
influenced by the revolutions in North America and in France, 
and they had oh occasion distributed anonymous lampoons that 
criticized the Spanish regime, with its inherent discrimina­
tion against Creoles. These radical lawyers saw the events
7Ibid.. p. 9.
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in Europe as an opportunity to weaken ties with the mother 
country, and they sided with the audiencia hoping to under­
mine any unity that the Junta of Seville might inspire. They 
also hoped to encourage the dissension among the ruling 
institutions in La Plata.
Goyeneche's arrival was anxiously awaited in 
Chuquisaca, and he reached the city on November 10, 1808.
The public, the President and the Archbishop greeted the
g
emissary with enthusiasm, but the oidores stayed away.
Afterwards, in private, Goyeneche surprised the two officials
with sealed letters from Carlota Joaquina, the aggressive
sister of Ferdinand VII, and wife of Joao, regent of
Portugal. Carlota and Joao had escaped to Brazil as
Napoleon's general Juno entered Lisbon. The letters were
opened the next day in the presence of the audiencia, and
all were astounded at the contents. Carlota claimed to be
the guardian of the Spanish Crown while her father and
brother were under the control of Napoleon, and as such, she
was requesting the temporary allegiance of Spain's colonies.
The President and Mox6 , eager to preserve the Empire, wanted
to accept the princess as regent. The audiencia, on the
other hand opposed the move, and accused the two of delivering
g
Spain's colonies to the Portuguese.
For the next six months, from November 1808 until
^Valentin Abecia, Historia de Chuquisaca (Sucre: 
Editorial Charcas, 1939), p. 331.
g
Amade, Emergence of the Republic, p. 16.
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May 1809, the radicals in Charcas did all they could to 
increase the tension in La Plata. They realized that if the 
audiencia and the President were reconciled, and if they 
submitted to Carlota, the radical goal of independence would 
be much harder to attain. Therefore, they encouraged the 
audiencia and spread rumors among the townspeople to the 
effect that Pizarro and Moxd were agents of the Portuguese 
who wanted to maneuver Upper Peru out of Spain's control and 
into that of the designing Carlota. Pizarro, seeking to 
strengthen his position, unwisely asked the professors at 
the University for a vote of confidence, which was refused 
overwhelmingly on January 12, 1809, leaving the President 
more isolated and insecure than ever.^
Popular criticizm arose when Pizarro allowed 
petitions to circulate calling for Charcas to join tempo­
rarily with the Portuguese Empire. Concerning the leanings 
of the President and the Archbishop, it was later testified 
that when news arrived that French troops had abandoned 
Lisbon, Moxd celebrated a Te Deum and a Mass of gratitude 
with Pizarro's agreement, and the city was illuminated for 
three nights. But when they learned that Madrid had been 
vacated, no celebration was held. The council of the 
University met and drafted a resolution rejecting the 
Portuguese, but Pizarro amended the document so that it
10Ibid., p. 23.
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11lost its meaning.
Bolder lampoons began to appear in La Plata, which
not only criticized Pizarro and Moxd, but also questioned
the loyalty of Viceroy Liniers in Buenos Aires. Liniers's
French background made him suspect there and in La Plata.
In March 1808 the Viceroy sent Francisco de Paula Sanz a
secret order to go to La Plata with an armed escort. Sanz
was to find out who was responsible for discrediting the
President and the Archbishop and for maligning the Viceroy,
12and to report on the other disturbances there. Sanz, not
wishing to arouse further hostilities in the neighboring city,
did not comply in the manner in which he had been instructed.
Instead, he made an unescorted and clandestine visit to La
Plata on the night of April 30, 1809. He spent from 7:30
until 9:30 in the Archbishop's residence discussing the
situation with Mox6 so that he could report to Liniers. The
Intendant left La Plata quietly that night, but his visit
did not go unobserved, and it contributed to the suspicion
13of the oidores and the fear of the citizens.
When Sanz returned to Potosi a letter from Montevideo
^Abecia, Historia de Chuquisaca. p. 333.
12Ibid.
^^Expediente autdgrafo informativo sobre el aconteci- 
miento del 25 de Mayo tiltimo su origen y antecedentes, 
tramitado ante la Real Audiencia Gobernativa, La Plata,
August 9, 1809, ANB, Ruck 260. Hereafter cited as Exped- 
iente Autdgrafo.
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awaited him. Governor Javier de Elio of that city had 
repudiated the viceroy's authority on January 1, 1809, and a 
governing junta began ruling the city in the name of 
Ferdinand VII. The junta tried to impose its authority on 
other regions, including Buenos Aires,^ and on April 5,
1809, it sent a letter signed by fifteen Montevideo subjects 
to Spanish authorities in Upper Peru ask ding for their 
approval and cooperation. When he saw this communication,
Sanz was livid. He issued a statement on May 11, which 
lectured the proponents of the junta on patriotism and 
loyalty to the monarch and his viceroys. He explained that 
even though the Monarch of Spain, Ferdinand VII, was at that 
time imprisoned by Napoleon, the Junta of Seville was tempo­
rarily ruling in his place and in his name. Sanz equated 
the Montevideo junta's action with anarchy and concluded 
that it caused him "embarrassment and irritation" for the
signers of the April 5 letter to assume that he could
15support their action.
Meanwhile in La Plata, feelings grew more and more 
hostile and approached a climax in late May. On May 20,
Oidor Josg Agustin Uzzoz y Mozi publicly accused Pizarro of 
misconduct and invited supporting testimony from the citizens.
^Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina, trans. 
William Spence Robertson (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc.,
1963), p. 253.
15Sanz, Testamento a la Junta de Montevideo, Potosi, 
May 11, 1809. AGI, Buenos Aires 40.
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An armed clash was now feared between the supporters of the 
audiencia and those of the President. On May 23# Pizarro 
feared not only for his position, but also for his safety.
He dispatched an apprehensive message to Xntendant Sanz in 
Potosi describing the dangerous situation in La Plata, and 
asking him to be on the alert. The opposition learned of 
Pizarro's appeal on the following day, and on the night of 
the twenty-fourth, the audiencia, some of the radical pro­
fessors, and the cabildo met and decided to arm themselves 
and patrol the streets in case Sanz attacked. On the morning 
of May 25, Pizarro again wrote to Sanz bringing him up to 
date on what had happened since the last letter was written. 
The President informed the Governor of "an attempt against 
the viceregal government# and my own government, with all 
the unfortunate results you can imagine."^6 Pizarro appealed 
to Sanz to intervene, "This capital [La Plata] is in urgent 
need of the troop stationed in your capital [potosi] . I am 
addressing you in the hope that you will immediately dis­
patch the two companies [in Potosi] with their officers, and 
then mobilize the militia.
The same day, the audiencia met and the Fiscal,
Miguel Ldpez Andreu recommended that they depose the Presi­
dent. Pizarro countered by asking for the deposition and 
arrest of the disloyal members of the audiencia# the Fiscal,
^Sanz, Expediente Autdgrafo, ANB, Ruck 260.
17Ibid.
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and of Jaime Zudanez, the Attorney for the Indigent, who was 
also on the staff of the audiencia. Early in the evening, 
Zudanez, who with his brother Manuel, was a leader of the 
radical lawyers, was arrested in his home. Four soldiers 
and an officer conducted the lawyer through the busiest 
streets to the casa pretorial, where he was imprisoned.
People who saw the spectacle and members of Zudanez's house­
hold spread the word of the arrest. Other members of the
audiencia, fearing arrest, hid themselves in and around the 
18city. These events excited a general uprising among the 
townfolk who had for so long lived in the strained atmos­
phere of jealousies, hatred, and threat.
As the moon rose, a mob gathered in the streets and 
marched toward the casa pretorial, and others went to the 
house of the Archbiship who accompanied them to the casa, 
where Moxd persuaded Pizarro to release Jaime Zudanez. But 
the rabble was out of control, and not even Zudanez, who was 
now free, or the oidores who had come out of hiding could 
quiet them. Pizarro's allies began to ring the bells in the 
city's many churches, which only added to the commotion. The
mob then broke into Pizarro's residence, but was driven back
19by his personal guards who fired a few shots into the air. 
Mox6 fled the city when the violence began, and the old 
President was left almost alone in the casa pretorial.
18Amade, Emergence of the Republic, p. 25.
19Sanz, Expediente Autdgrafo, ANB, Ruck 260.
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The audiencia which had regrouped in a private home 
sent Pizarro a message asking him to step down, which he 
refused to do. At four o'clock on the morning of the twenty- 
sixth, the oidores declared that in spite of Pizarro's 
response, the audiencia was assuming political and military 
power, "in order to control the grave incidents of the night 
before, caused by the poor judgment of his Excellency Sr. Don
on
Ramdn Garcia de Ledn y Pizarro. " The proclamation named
the subdelegado of Yamparaez, Colonel Juan Antonio Alvarez
de Arenales, as the military commander of Charcas, and
ordered the company of regular soldiers stationed there, as
21well as the militia to obey him. After he had relinquished
power, Pizarro was taken prisoner and kept in the University
to protect him from the rabble which was still drunk with
22the noise, excitement, and chicha.
On the twenty-sixth, the tribunal was still trying 
to establish itself as the government in La Plata, and to 
restore the city to order. The mob, which had been used to 
remove the President, had gotten out of control. The 
rioters put up a picture of Ferdinand VII in the plaza and 
howled their support. Then they hung a portrait of Pizarro 
on the town gallows, along with a dead dog, and pelted both
20"Auto revolucionario de la Real Audiencia," copy 
in "Documentos In6ditos," Boletin de la Sociedad GeogrAfica 
de Sucre (December, 1908), pp. 22-35.
22Just Lleo, "Comienzo de la Independencia," pp.
360-61.
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with rotten vegetables. The oidores knew, however, that 
sooner or later the rabble would lose interest or become 
exhausted. Their biggest worry was that Sanz would respond 
to Pizarro's call for assistance and attack the city. This 
consideration was apparent in their resolution of May 26, 
which suspended any orders from the viceroy or from any 
other government, which might result in the harming of 
citizens of La Plata. The resolution blamed Sanz for the 
commotion and alarm that were undermining their efforts to 
govern the city. The oidores warned Sanz that a copy of the 
resolution was being sent to Colonel Arenales, and that he
p O
would resist any attempt to invade the city. J
Sanz had indeed received both of Pizarro's communi­
cations, and on the night of May 26, he informed Liniers of 
his intentions:
It seems that they have acted excessively in La 
Plata, so that I believe it is necessary to leave 
here today for Chuquisaca to investigate. To save 
time, I have secretly sent part of the troops last 
night, and I am following today to join them, on 
[Pizarro's] recommendation. I want to get there as 
quickly as possible to see if I can propose a means 
of mediation to tranquil izarlos. I wish to avoid 
taking the extreme measures that I am empowered to 
take, which I would only put into practice in a 
desperate case.24
The sixty-four year old Intendant Governor rode at
the head of his troops along the rough and precipitous road
^Sanz, Expediente AutOgrafo, ANB, Ruck 260
^4Sanz to Liniers, Potosi, May 26, 1809, copy in 
Sanz, "Acuerdo con la Audiencia,“ Cuchiguasi, May 27, 1809, 
AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 59, Expediente 1.
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from Potosi to La Plata. On the evening of the twenty-
seventh, Sanz was met at the tambo (inn) of Cuchigua, ten
leagues from La Plata by Sergeant Manuel Arce, an emissary
of the audiencia, who presented Sanz with a copy of the
tribunal’s May 26 warning resolution. Sanz also learned
that the audiencia was holding the octogenarian President
prisoner, and had ordered that he be beheaded and his head
25displayed on a pike if the Governor invaded. Sanz had 
little choice but to send his troops back to Potosi, which 
he did at nine o 1 clock that evening. He then informed the 
audiencia, through Arce, that he was complying with the 
resolution and he requested a meeting with the oidores either 
in La Plata or if more convenient, in Yotala, eleven miles 
from the capital.^®
When Arce returned to La .Plata with the news that 
Sanz was capitulating, the audiencia was jubilant. The 
turbulence in the streets had not yet subsided, so the 
oidores decided that it would be wiser to meet with Sanz 
there, rather than leave the city and travel to Yotala. Arce 
informed the waiting Indendant that the audiencia would 
create a diversionary disturbance at one end of the city so 
that Sanz could enter unobserved from the opposite end. On 
May 28, Sanz entered La Plata and met with the audiencia at 
the cabildo and discussed Sanz's intentions, the purpose for
25Just Lleo, "Comienzo de la Independencia," p. 366.
26Sanz, "Acuerdo con la Audiencia," Cuchiguasi,
May 27, 1809, AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 59, Expediente 1.
his midnight visit to La Plata on April 30, and the fate of 
the deposed President. Four hours after Sanz's arrival, the 
mob found out that he was in the city. They gathered 
menacingly at the cabildo, but cheered when they learned 
that the Xntendant's purposes were peaceful. Sanz was then 
escorted by the oidores to the house where he was to be 
lodged. He stayed in La Plata for four days, and the 
audiencia wished him to stay longer to symbolize the legiti­
macy of their act. During his stay, Sanz was unable to 
secure the release of Pizarro, who was imprisoned, excom­
municated, roughly interrogated, and had his goods confis­
cated. Realizing that the oidores would continue to hold
27the President as a hostage, Sanz returned to Potosi,
probably in a state of exhaustion.
Word of the unrest reached Viceroy Liniers in Buenos
Aires in less than three weeks. On June 18, 1809, he sent
Sanz a secret message giving him command of the regular
troops in Salta, Tomina, and Potosi, and ordering him "to
28maintain tranquility in those provinces." Liniers also
ordered that the audiencia act as interim government until a
new president was appointed— provided that the oidores did
2 9not countermand the superior government. Sanz received 
27Just Lleo,"Comienzo de la Xndependencia," p. 367.
2®Liniers to Sanz, Buenos Aires, June 18, 1809, copy 
in "Documentos Infiditos," Boletin de la Sociedad GeogrAfica 
de Sucre (December, 1908), p. 45.
29Ibid.
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this communication in early July# and on July 9, he wrote 
the Intendants of La Paz and Cochabamba asking for their 
cooperation in case the Audiencia of Charcas tried to 
"countermand the viceroy."3° The next day, he wrote the 
audiencia itself, informing it of his commission from 
Liniers, and saying that he was prepared to return to La
Plata with troops if anything were done "prejudicial to the
31superior government."
During that same July, Liniers was replaced by 
Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros. The new Viceroy, in a 
response to a request from the Audiencia of Charcas, quickly
and on short information, gave the tribunal the right to
32continue governing "for n o w . T h e  oidores interpreted 
this as official confirmation of their action on May 25.
Their freedom to rule as they pleased, however, was tempo­
rarily restricted by the alliance that Sanz had established 
with Francisco de Viedma, Intendant of Cochabamba.
The events of May 25, 1809, had repercussions else­
where in the viceroyalty. Stimulated by the Audiencia of 
Charcas's successful seizure of power, the Cabildo of La Paz 
deposed the Intendant, Tadeo Davila, on July 16, and began 
governing the city. A few days later, the cabildo was
33replaced by a junta with Pedro Domingo Murillo as President.
30Just Lleo, "Comienzo de la Independencia," p. 371.
31Ibid. 32Ibid., p. 377.
33Jose Fellraan Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, 4 vols. 
(La Paz: Editorial "Los Amigos del Libro," 1968), 1:260.
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Sanz learned of the events in La Paz on July 25, and on the 
same day, he wrote the Audiencia of Charcas that he was pre­
paring an expedition to "maintain tranquility" in La Paz, 
and he requested help with any legal problems that might 
arise. The oidores promptly sent Sanz a sarcastic reply 
telling him to wait for instructions from the viceroy. Also 
on July 25, Sanz wrote the government in Oruro that he had 
two companies of regulars and 200 militiamen under arms in 
Chayanta^ ready to come to their aid should they have prob­
lems similar to the ones in La Paz. Sanz knew that news of 
this "offer" would be communicated to the rebels in La Paz.
The revolutionary government in La Paz was ill-fated. 
In August, Goyeneche, who had been appointed President of 
the Audiencia of Cuzco, began to advance toward La Paz with 
a well-trained army of 5,000 men.^ The Intendant of Puno 
declared his support of the royalists, and Sanz was ready to 
attack from the south. The La Paz cabildo tried to 
extricate the city from the predicament on August 16, 1809, 
by writing to Viceroy Cisneros that it had acted only because 
it feared that DAvila and Sanz had been agents of Carlota 
Joaquina and that they were actually loyal subjects of 
Ferdinand VII. Murillo sent the same message to Sanz and to
3^Sanz understandably had some difficulty recruiting 
militiamen among the Indians of Chayanta, where so many 
mitavos were drafted. Many guerrilla fighters for indepen­
dence later came from Chayanta. See Fellman Velarde,
Historia de Bolivia, 1:259.
33Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, 1:273.
197
Goyeneche, but the Peruvian was not moved.36 By October,
the situation of the revolutionaries in La Paz was hopeless,
and Goyeneche entered the town to punish mercilessly the *
37insurgents.
The animosity between Sanz and the audiencia of 
Charcas had not ended when the Governor left La Plata in 
early June, 1809. When Sanz requested their aid in dealing 
with the July 16 rebellion in La Paz, they denounced him to 
the viceroy. Their derisive refusal to cooperate angered 
Sanz, and ended official relations between the two govern­
ments. Sanz responded to the refusal by opening an investi­
gation of the occurrence in La Plata since May 25. He 
interrogated the deposed President Pizarro's supporters who 
had sought refuge in Potosi, and on August 4, he determined 
that a revolutionary situation existed there. On that date, 
he informed the viceroy of his findings. The next day, he
issued a general letter warning the oidores that he con-
38sidered their activity rebellious.
LOpez Andreu, the Fiscal of the Audiencia commented 
on Sanz's letter, reiterating that the disturbance on May 25 
occurred because of Sanz's threatened invasion. The audiencia 
then passed a resolution declaring Sanz a traitor and ashing 
the viceroy to remove him from office. The Governor awaited
36lbid.
3^Amade, Emergence of the Republic, pp. 28-29.
38just Lleo, "Comienzo de la Independencia," p. 392.
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the viceroy's response, which was dated August 16, and
arrived the next month. Cisneros approved of Sanz's actions
and reiterated Liniers*s order of June 18, that Sanz "restore
39tranquility to these provinces." He also revealed that he 
had appointed Field Marshall Vicente Nieto to succeed Pizarro 
as President of the Audiencia of Charcas and intendant.
With this approval, Sanz began preparations to 
extinguish the rebellion in La Plata. As had become his 
custom before beginning a maneuver, he made sure of the 
military support of Cochabamba's intendant. Jos6 Gonzalez 
del Prada had succeeded to the office after the death of 
Francisco de Viedma the month before. In his letter of 
September 13, to Gonzalez del Prada, Sanz wrote that he was 
aware of "the truly criminal outlook of the city of La Plata 
and its caudillos, and of the independence and insubordina­
tion with which they are proceeding."^® Sanz continued that 
he planned to leave Potosi between September 20 and 22 with 
500 to 600 men, and to await the Cochabamba detachment at 
the Pampa de Punilla.^1 He planned to impress the citizens 
of La Plata with a show of force on the twenty-eighth, so 
that they would surrender without a fight. In conclusion,
^9Cisneros to Sanz, Buenos Aires, August 16, 1809,
AS38, Tribunales, Legajo 59, Expediente 1.
^®Sanz to Gonzalez de Prada, Potosi, August 13,
1809, AGN, Legajo 65, Expediente 6 .
^This was the same place where Sanz had fought with
the Catari Insurgents twenty-eight years before (see 
Chapter III) .
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he reminded Gonzalez de Prada of his authority to "maintain 
tranquility."^ On September 19, Gonzalez de Prada wrote 
Sanz that although the ammunition caissons were not ready to 
travel, he would make every effort to have the soldiers at 
the meeting place in time."^
Ever since Goyeneche and Sanz had cowed the revolu­
tionaries in La Paz, the audiencia and the radical lawyers 
in La Plata realized that their only hope for continuing in 
office lay in convincing the viceroy to restrain Sanz from 
invading their city. They addressed urgent appeals to 
Cisneros and grimly began to fortify their city against 
attack. On September 20, Sanz issued a dour proclamation to 
the citizens of La Plata. He assured them that he did not 
want to harm the inhabitants, for whom he had risked his 
life during the Indian Insurrection of 1781, but that he was 
personally leading a troop to La Plata to "reinstate your 
loyalty and tranquility." He assured them that he was a 
loyal subject of Ferdinand VII, and that he only had a 
quarrel with the seditious element. He hoped to find them 
faithful and loyal citizens, and if not, he was ready to 
treat them as rebels and enemies of the Crown.^
4.2Sanz to Gonzdlez de Prada, Potosi, August 13, 1809, 
AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 65, Expediente 6 .
^Gonzdlez de Prada to Sanz, Cochabamba, September 
19, 1809, ASH, Tribunales, Legajo 65, Expediente 11.
^Sanz, Proclamation to the Citizens of La Plata, 
Potosi, September 20, 1809, AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 65, 
Expediente 7.
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The next day (September 21) at 3:00 P.M., as Sanz
was preparing to leave Potosi with his troops, a special
messenger brought him a letter from Cisneros ordering him to
suspend preparations to attack La Plata, pending the arrival
of the new President, Vicente Nieto. Sanz complied, informed
his allies in Cochabamba; and the seat of the audiencia was
45again saved from attack by the Governor of Potosi.
Cisneros had earlier stationed Nieto in Salta in
case he was needed in either La Paz or Chuquisaca. On
October 10, 1809, Sanz wrote him that he should hurry to
46Chuquisaca to avoid travel during the rainy season. The 
new President finally arrived in La Plata on December 25. 
Although the subdued audiencia and radicals received him 
docilely and had already released the mistreated Pizarro, 
the President arrested five oidores and some members of the
cabildo.
The revolutions in Charcas and La Paz had been 
isolated and quelled. Francisco de Paula Sanz's readiness 
to act decisively with military force had helped the royalist 
side accomplish these goals. The Governor's reputation for 
resoluteness and physical courage perhaps helped to deter 
expansions or imitations of these movements elsewhere in
4%anz to Gonzales de Prada, Potosi, September 21, 
1809, AGN, Tribunales, Legajo 65, Expediente 6 .
46Camit6 Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la 
Repdblica, Monografla de Bolivia, 2 vols. (La Paz: Biblioteca
del Sesquicentenario de la Republica, 1975), 1:110.
^Arnade, Emergence of the Republic, pp. 29-30.
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Upper Peru in 1809. But the radical lawyers and the queru­
lous audiencia in La Plata had struck the revolutionary 
spark that would inflame the entire southern part of the 
continent within a year.
In May 1810 word reached Buenos Aires that French 
troops had overthrown the Junta of Seville. On May 25, 
exactly one year after the uprising in La Plata, Creoles in 
Buenos Aires, including Mariano Moreno, who had studied with 
the radicals at the Academia Carolina, deposed Viceroy 
Cisneros. They claimed that since the viceroy no longer 
represented the Junta of Seville or the King, power reverted 
to the people. The Creoles established a governing junta of 
their own in Buenos Aires, and set out to extend their 
authority to the remainder of the viceroyalty.
The structure of colonial government throughout Rio 
de la Plata remained even after the Viceroy and the audiencia 
had been exiled from Buenos Aires. In Upper Peru, Nieto and . 
Sanz acted swiftly to consolidate forces and to make plans. . 
On June 20, 1810, Nieto announced a congress of royalists to 
be held in Chuquisaca. Sanz sent the only delegate from out­
side Chuquisaca, and the "congress" agreed with the Buenos 
Aires Junta that without a viceroy there could be no vice-
I
royalty, but they sought a solution to the problem quite 
different from the junta's. Sanz wrote to Viceroy Josd de 
Abascal in Lima, and declared that Upper Peru had reverted 
to the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Abascal
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accepted Sanz's declaration and dispatched aid via Cuzco to 
the royalists.^8
Former Viceroy Santiago Liniers and Intendant Juan 
Gutierrez de la Concha of COrdoba also launched a counter­
revolutionary movement in that city. They contacted Sanz 
and Nieto and planned to retreat to Upper Peru to join 
forces with royalists there if necessary. The Governing 
Junta of Buenos Aires sent an expeditionary force to Cdrdoba 
under the command of General Antonio Gonzalez Balcarce. The 
royalists realized that the junta's forces were overwhelming 
and began the retreat to Upper Peru, but were quickly over­
taken. On July 28, Mariano Moreno ordered that Liniers and 
Gutierrez de la Concha be executed. Balcarce hesitated to 
have the heroic ex-viceroy shot, so in August, Juan Jos6 
Caste Hi, a member of the junta, and also a former law 
student at San Francisco Xavier, joined the force and super­
vised the execution.
Meanwhile, Sanz and Nieto continued their efforts to 
defend their intendancies and the rest of Upper Peru. Sanz 
had established the customary alliance with Cochabamba, but 
on September 14, 1810, this was nullified when Gonz&lez de 
Prada was forced to resign and Francisco de Rivero, the 
military man who headed the provisional government in 
Cochabamba announced his allegiance to the Governing Junta
4®Modesto Qmiste, Obras Escogidas de Modesto Omiste.
2 vols. (La Paz: Editorial del Estado, 1941), 2:86.
4%,evene, A History of Argentina, p. 246.
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of Buenos Aires.50 Santa Cruz and Oruro followed 
Cochabamba's example, and the two reactionaries were not 
isolated from Goyeneche, and surrounded by partisans of the 
revolutionary junta.
The governing junta wanted to extend its control to 
all the territory of the viceroyalty that it had replaced.
So in October, 1810, the expeditionary force, led by Castelli 
and Balcarce, crossed into the Intendancy of Potosi. Sanz 
and Nieto had dispatched the main body of the royalist army 
to Cotagaita on the only road between Argentina and Potosi 
to intercept the invaders. Nieto accompanied the force and 
shared its command with General Jos£ de COrdova. The two 
small armies met at Cotagaita on October 27, and after four 
hours of battle, castelli's and Balcarce's forces retreated, 
leaving twelve dead. COrdoba jubilantly wrote Sanz that 
they had won a great victory.51
On November 7, at 2:00 A.M., Nieto wrote Sanz that 
the enemy was still retreating, but actually Balcarce was 
luring the royalists to the fields of Suipacha, where his 
troops had been joined by reinforcements from Jujuy. He 
also attempted to spread the rumor that his troops were in 
disorder.5  ^ At 11:00 A.M., COrdova attached, but the forces 
from Buenos Aires were so well prepared, that within an hour,
50Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia. 1:292.
51-0miste, Obras Escoqidas, p. 93.
52Xbid.. p. 95.
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they had routed the royalists.33 Nieto gave the order
54j "Salvense corao puedanl " Many officers fled and soldiers 
defected to the junta's camp.
After the battle, Felipe Lizarazu, the Count of the 
Real Casa de la Moneda rushed back to Potosi, arriving on 
the afternoon of the ninth, to deliver the bad news to Sanz. 
The disappointed Intendant, wanting to avoid an uprising in 
Potosi, released several individuals from jail who had been 
held since the previous year for expressing sympathy with 
the uprising in charcas, hoping to foster a general spirit 
of forgiveness.33 On the tenth, the streets were filled 
with people who expressed anger at the Governor and blamed 
him for the disaster at Suipacha. The frightened potosinos 
stormed the cabildo, where Sanz was meeting with officials, 
and demanded that the Governor account for the defeat. 
Supporters of the Buenos Aires Junta in the cabildo then 
called a cabildo abierto (public meeting), placed Sanz under 
arrest, and took over the government. The Governor was taken 
to his home across the plaza and placed under guard.
Sanz's friends in Potosi did what they could to 
arrange his escape. One of the offices in his residence 
connected with the roof of a neighboring house, and for three 
successive nights, accomplices waited for him nearby with
33Diario AnOnimo, Potosi, ANB, Ruck 26.
54<‘Save yourselves however you can!"
33Diario Andnimo, Potosi, ANB, Ruck 26.
205
saddled horses. But he did not have access to the office 
because he could not get a key. His friends attempted to 
smuggle him one with a servant whom Sanz had long trusted, 
but the servant alerted the guards, and the Governor was
56removed to the Casa de Moneda, where Cdrdoba was being held. ° 
On November 25, Castelli entered the city with his 
unruly soldiers. An anonymous diarist related that the army 
was composed of Spaniards, mulattoes, Negroes, and Indians 
and that "the mulattoes and Indians committed many crimes, 
murdering and robbing citizens, while the Negroes, surpris-
6  *7ingly, peacefully obeyed their officers.37
On December 2, Nieto, who had a 3,000 peso price on 
his head, was captured and also imprisoned in the Money House. 
Twelve days later, the citizens of Potosi noted some excite­
ment among Castelli's men, and they learned that the prisoners
CD
in the Money House were going to be sentenced.
Castelli's sentence, in the name of the Junta of the 
Provinces of Rio de la Plata and of Ferdinand VII, charged 
all three men with conspiring with Liniers, Gutierrez de la 
Concha, and others to divide the provinces, delivering parts 
of the viceroyalty to the Viceroy of Lima, hiding important 
facts from the public and telling the citizens falsehoods, 
raising troops to oppose the government, and misusing govern­
ment funds. "For all of this, which is proven and well 
documented, I condemn the said prisoners, Sanz, Nieto and
57Ibid. 58Ibid.
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Cdrdova, prisoners as a result of our armed victory, as
criminals guilty of high treason and usurpation, to suffer
the death penalty in a military execution, to take place
59tomorrow, in the Plaza Mayor."
The diarist related that on the night of the four­
teenth, officials read the sentence to the three prisoners. 
Three priests were present to hear their confessions. The 
next days
. . . there were artillery pieces at the four corners 
of the plaza, the soldiers with smoldering wicks ready 
to fire the guns; there were sentinels on all of the 
streets with orders not to let anyone on the streets, 
and to shoot if they were disobeyed. The Money House, 
the Plazuela del Rayo, Merced Street, and Bel6n Street 
were filled with guards. No one was permitted to come 
out on his balcony or to open any door. Down the 
street from the door of the old tavern, there were 
placed three stools, each about three varas (yards) 
from the other.
At nine in the morning, all the troops entered 
the plaza. At 9:30, the prisoners were brought from 
the Money House, manacled and blindfolded. Their 
confessors led them, saying prayers and solemn psalms.
They stood in the plaza and the sentence was read by 
the town crier. The [officers] made them kneel before 
the flags. Then they were securely strapped to the 
stools. Nieto occupied the stool furthest up the 
street, COrdova the one in the middle, and Sanz the 
lowest. On a signal, the soldiers fired and the 
prisoners died. Nieto and COrdova were carried in a 
hearse to the Misericordia, and Sanz to the Convento 
del Carmen, where he was buried.60
As Sanz approached the revolutionary standards, he was
reported to have uttered these last words:
If these are the flags of my King, Fernando VII, 
then give me the privilege of kissing them and
^9Fellman Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, 1:114-15. 
^Diario Andnimo, Potosi, ANB, Ruck 26.
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this will be the ultimate demonstration of my love 
and veneration for that august Monarch. My integ­
rity and resolution remain indelible, and let the 
world know that neither torture nor the most horrible 
punishment can force me to change in the least these 
pure sentiments. They cannot intimidate a soul whose 
firmness seems to grow in proportion to the weakening 
of the vital springs of my fragile body.61
6-*-Mariano Torrente, Historia de la Revoluci6n 
Hispano-Americano, 3 vols. (Madrid: Imprinta de D. Ledn
Amarita, 1829), 1:93.
Chapter VIII
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION
Francisco de Paula Sanz had governed Potosi for 
twenty-two years. According to Modosto Omiste, a Bolivian 
historian, Sanz had ruled kindly and without taking advan­
tage of his nearly absolute power, and the same cannot be 
said of most of his predecessors or of those who followed
X
him in power. It is a reflection of the citizens' regard 
for him that after Suipacha, they thought of his comfort and 
imprisoned him at home rather than in the Money House until 
they learned of his escape plans. Castelli's placing of a 
heavy guard at the four comers of the plaza on December 15, 
1810, and his order that all windows and doors be kept locked 
during the execution demonstrated that he feared that Sanz 
had enough friends left to try to save his life.
A royalist historian. Colonel Andrfes Garcia Camba, 
wrote that Castilli was not only unjust, but also ungrateful 
when he ordered Sanz executed. Garcia Camba alleged that 
Sanz had befriended Castelli when he was young and poor in 
Buenos Aires. The Spaniard paid for the youth 1s education
■^Modesto Omiste, Obras Escogidas, 2 vols, (La Paz: 
Editorial del Estado, 1941), 1:105.
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through the doctor of law degree at San Francisco Xavier,
oand was rewarded for his generosity by being shot. Vicente 
Fidel LOpez discounted this episode by pointing out other 
inaccuracies in Garcia Camba's work, but the story persisted.
Castelli's troops were excessively cruel in Potosi 
both before and after the executions. Any admiration the 
potosinos had for the revolutionary cause was soon stifled 
by their hatred for the soldiers who robbed, raped, and 
murdered the citizens.4 A week after the executions,
Castelli left Potosi for La Plata and La Paz, and he stationed 
a small detachment of soldiers in the mining city. These 
insensitive rebels continued to lord it over the proud 
citizens, and occasional outbursts of violence resulted.5 
After Castelli's army was defeated at Guaqul by Goyeneche 
on June 20, 1811, it fled from Upper Peru by paths which 
avoided towns and cities. His soldiers straggled into 
Potosi in June and July, 1811. But the potosinos had had
enough of the unruly invaders. On August 5, a fight between
a soldier and some citizens of Potosi exploded into a deadly
brawl. The soldiers opened fire, and precipitated an all
^Andr6s Garcia Camba, Memorias. 2 vols. (Madrid: 
Editorial America, 1916), 1:79-80.
3Vicente Fidel LOpez, Historia de la Reptiblica 
Argentina, 10 vols. (Buenos Aires: Carlos Casavalle
Editor, 1883), 4:208.
40miste, Obras Escogidas, 1:110
5Ibid., 1:134-35.
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night battle that left 145 soldiers and nine citizens dead.
Soon after this melee, Juan Martin Pueyrredon, who 
had replaced Castelli as commander of the rebel troops in 
Potosi, attempted to bring about a reconciliation between 
his motley army and the citizens of the city. He realized 
that the resentment would persist; and to make matters worse, 
Goyeneche's army, after defeating Castelli's troops, was 
advancing toward the Imperial City. Late in August,
Pueyrredon decided to retreat from Upper Peru. The Money 
House contained about one million pesos in silver and gold 
bars and coins, and Pueyrredon did not leave that prize 
behind. Expropriating 400 local mules to carry the plunder, 
he made his way southward. The rebel general and his few 
soldiers had to fight off the enraged potosinos as they quit
7
the city. The great treasure that Sanz had helped to 
accumulate was thus lost to the royalist cause.
Goyeneche and his royalist forces entered the city 
in September, 1811, and were welcomed just as enthusiastically 
as Castelli's rebel forces had been welcomed ten months 
earlier:
One of Goyeneche's first acts in this villa was to 
honor with regal splendor the memories of the royalist 
leaders shot by Castelli on December 15, of the year 
before, in order to dazzle the masses and arouse 
favorable sympathies in them.
Charles Amade, The Emergence of the Republic of 
Bolivia (Gainesville: University of Florida Press', 1957),
p. 63.
^Ibid., p. 65.
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He ordered that the bodies of each leader be 
exhumed and that a funeral for each take place on 
separate days. On September 22, Cl81l] Sana's body 
was removed from the Carmelite Convent, where it 
had been buried, and taken to San Francisco Church 
for the celebration of the exequies.8
The army attended in formal uniforms, formed in 
two flanks along the streets where the body was to 
be carried. They stood with inverted arms [weapons 
in funeral position]. The muffled drums and muted 
bugles played funeral music.
The nobility of the town also attended, dressed 
in mourning. The archbishop, wearing a long purple 
train, led the procession, and then the priests, the 
prebendary, prelates, and other clergymen, secular 
and regular, followed him. General Goyeneche in all 
of his finery and the decorations of his grandeeship, 
with the counts, marqueses, cabildo members,8 oidores, 
knights of military orders, colonels, and lieutenant 
colonels completed the cortege. Half a cavalry 
regiment preceded the retinue, and the other half 
served as a rear guard.
In the center of the church was a catafalque with 
thousands of candles attached to it. On either side of 
the bier were magnificent daises, one for the arch­
bishop and one for Goyeneche.
Because of Sanz's stature in the community and the 
affection with which the people of Potosi remembered him and 
because of the excesses of the rebel troops, Sanz became a 
martyr for the royalists.
The war for the independence of South America
8Before the author had found this passage, he sought 
the grave of his protagonist in the Convento del Carmen in 
Potosi. After a long negotiation with a faceless voice behind 
the convent's turn (a revolving shelf that permits the entry of 
goods but precludes face-to-face contact with the sisters) 
and a contribution that disappeared into the turn, the author 
was admitted to the dangerously ramshackle sanctuary. The 
privileged visit was of course unfruitful, and no grave was 
found.
Q
These same cabildo members had deposed Sanz on 
November 10, 1810.
l°Omiste, Obras Escoqidas, p. 195.
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continued to rage. The cities of Lima and Buenos Aires at 
either end of the continent had become opposing poles of the 
revolution: The Peruvian city as a center for the royalists,
and the Argentine city as the seat of the rebellion. The 
vast territory between these two poles was the prize in the 
struggle as well as the battlefield. Spanish colonial insti­
tutions in Upper Peru ceased to have significance as local 
caudillos when fierce guerrilla armies began to take their 
place. Bellicose republiguetas controlled by opportunistic 
guerrilla leaders were emerging. The leaders had strong 
antiroyalist leanings, and controlled the rural areas while 
more organized armies vied for control of the cities.^
Midway between Buenos Aires and Lima was Potosi, the 
largest and potentially richest city in the contested 
territory. After Sanz's funeral, royalists remained in 
control of the Imperial City until 1813, when forces of the 
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata under Manuel Belgrano 
came up the road from Salta and retook Potosi. Possession of 
the disputed city alternated several more times during the 
bitter sixteen-year transformation of Potosi from Spanish 
intendancy to a part of the Republic of Bolivar, which 
declared its independence on August 6 , 1825.
* * * * *
In 1776 Charles ill created the Viceroyalty of Rio 
de la Plata amidst hopes that this measure would tighten
Amade, Emergence of Bolivia, pp. 32-40.
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Spain's control over her colonies. The following year, 
Francisco de Paula Sanz received an appointment and made 
the long voyage to the new viceroyalty, where he would serve 
for the next thirty-three years. During this time, he held 
more different high-level administrative positions there than 
any other individual. As Director of the Tobacco Monopoly, he 
traveled to every province and to practically every correqi- 
miento (soon to become intendancies and partidos) in the 
sprawling viceroyalty. Besides exposing the young Director 
to the immensity of the territory, and to its problems of 
transportation and communication, the marathon visita brought 
him into contact with most of the officials of the viceroyalty 
and with their problems of administration.
Sanz's purpose on the visita was to establish the 
Tobacco Monopoly. He had a specific mandate from the King 
and he was accompanied by a military escort, both of which 
helped to blunt any resistance he encountered. In Asuncidn, 
however, he experienced the first of many disagreements with 
other officials. To subdue the AsunciCn capitulares, he 
began to formulate his modus operandi for dealing with 
bureaucratic opposition. He wrote his arguments not only for 
his opponents to read but also (and more importantly) for his 
superiors in Buenos Aires and in Spain. To do this, Sanz 
stated his position clearly and simply, leaving out local 
details. He identified this position with the interests of 
the royal treasury or the State, so that opposing it would be 
like opposing the Crown itself. The capitulares succumbed to
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this strategy, and Sanz retained it for use in future dis­
agreements .
Back in Buenos Aires, Sanz witnessed the imposition 
of the intendancy system and he was subsequently appointed 
superintendent general, the second most important position in 
the viceroyalty. During his five years as superintendent#
Sanz was responsible for the financial and military affairs 
of the entire viceroyalty. He doubtless called upon his 
intimate knowledge of the varied regions as he helped to 
govern them.
During most of this segment of his career, Sanz 
clashed with his superior# Viceroy Loreto. Superintendent 
Sanz continued to use the same strategy that had worked for 
him before— identifying his interests with those of the 
Crown~but this was more difficult when his opponent was the 
King's representative. Sanz had to learn to temper his 
opposition carefully with respect for his rival's office. In 
1788# he was reprimanded for his bluntness with the tribunal 
de cuentas, so that in later disputes, he was more tactful 
with opponents. Sanz honed his skill as a polemicist in 
Buenos Aires, continuing to write with Spanish authorities in 
mind, and he won most of his encounters with Loreto and other 
authorities. But the death of Jos6 de Galvez in 1787 reduced 
Sanz's support at Court. 2he office he held was soon 
abolished but Sanz was transferred to Potosi as Intendant 
Governor in 1788.
Almost as soon as Sanz arrived at that mining center.
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he aligned himself with the Gremio de Azocrueros. He quickly 
and forcefully acted to acquire financial aid from the royal 
treasury for the construction of silver refining machines for 
the azocrueros. In 1793, he entered a debate on behalf of the 
azogueros to increase the number of Indians serving in the 
Potosi mita. His principal opponent in this debate was Fiscal 
Victorian de Villava of the Audiencia of Charcas. The 
Governor used tactics that had worked for him before, remem­
bering to treat his opponent civilly. He simplified the 
issue and tried to show that a reduction of mita workers 
would bring about a reduction in the amount of silver produced, 
and in the revenue raised for the King. He relentlessly
repeated these arguments in a flurry of discourses and
> * •
petitions over the next four years, until Villava threw up 
his hands and retired. Sanz continued to use the same tactics 
in the interest of the azogueros. During the drought and war 
years between 1798 and 1803, he persistently requested and 
finally received aid for them from the royal treasury.
For his constant and loyal assistance, Sanz must have 
been a great favorite of the Potosi azogueros. Whether or not 
he received any financial gratuities from the group would be 
difficult to prove but not so difficult to believe since large 
gifts to helpful officials were common in the Spanish 
colonies. Sanz's assistant Pedro Vicente Canete accused the 
Governor, after their relationship had soured, of accepting a 
10,000 peso bribe from the azogueros. Sanz registered proper 
outrage and denied the charge.
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The revolts In La Plata and in Buenos Aires were the 
final problems that Sanz faced in his career. His antagonists 
in La Plata remained loyal to the Spanish colonial system, of 
which they considered themselves a part; and they felt 
obligated to obey the viceroy. This made it easier for Sanz, 
authorized by Liniers and later by Cisneros, to isolate and 
quell the movement. However, the Buenos Aires Junta of 1810 
deposed the viceroy on May 25 and recognized only itself as 
the supreme authority in the territory of the viceroyalty. 
Sanz's old modus operand! was useless against the ruthless 
Jacobins of the Buenos Aires Junta who disregarded his position 
and authority. Sanz was forced to depend on military force 
instead of written arguments; that military force proved 
inadequate, and Sanz became one of the first victims of the 
Revolution of May 25, 1810.
* * * * * *
In a dispute with Sanz, Canete once accused him of 
being simplistic and repetitive, and of exaggerating the 
urgency of his claims. This accurately describes Sanz's 
technique. He simplified issues for his superiors in Spain 
who lacked the time and interest to involve themselves in the 
local squabbles of remote parts of the Empire. Sanz explained 
his position as coinciding with the interests (usually 
financial) of the Crown and then he urgently and repeatedly 
implored his superiors to follow his advice. While he was 
not innovative or brilliant, Sanz developed over the years an
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operational procedure that worked well in the complicated 
interactions of the Spanish colonial system under the Bourbons. 
When this system collapsed, Sanz's technique was no longer 
workable, and he perished with the Viceroyalty of Rio de la 
Plata.
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The Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata
APPENDIX
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8. 
9.
10.
11.
THE VICEROYS OF RIO DE LA PLATA
Pedro de Cevallos 
Juan Josa de V4rtiz
Nicolas del Campo, El Marquas de Loreto
Nicolas de Arredondo
Pedro Melo de Portugal
Antonio Olaguer Feliu y Heredia
Gabriel de Avilas y del Fierro,
El Marquas de Avilas
Joaquin del Pino
Rafael de Sobremonte, El Marquas 
de Sobremonte
Santiago de Liniers y Bremond
Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros
1776-1778
1778-1784
1784-1790
1790-1795
1795-1797
1797-1799
1799-1801
1801-1804
1804-1807
1807-1809
1809-1810
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